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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Shane Donnelly Hall 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Environmental Studies Program 
 
June 2017 
 
Title: War by Other Means: Environmental Violence in the 21st Century 
 
 
 
 
 This dissertation studies the intersections of militarism, climate change, and 
environmental justice in U.S. literature and popular culture since the end of the Cold War. 
The project identifies different mechanisms enacting environmental military violence 
through discursive analysis of literary and cultural texts, and considers the ideas, values, 
and beliefs that support environmental military violence. In each chapter I trace a 
different dynamic of environmental violence structured through the logics of U.S. 
counterinsurgency theory by examining what I call “narrative political ecologies”—
cultural texts that center concerns of ecology and broadly defined political economy. 
Chapter I establishes the stakes and questions of the dissertation. The next two chapters 
investigate the dynamics of environmental violence depicted within narrative political 
ecologies. Chapter II investigates how eruptive interpersonal violence secures more 
insidious, hidden forms of slow environmental violence in Héctor Tobar’s The Tattooed 
Soldier. Chapter III considers the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands and the environmental 
military violence responsible for the deaths of undocumented migrants by examining 
Luis Alberto Urrea’s The Devil’s Highway and the Electronic Disturbance Theater’s 
Transborder Immigrant Tool. Chapter IV turns to potential f wars and conflicts that may 
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be caused by climate change as they have been depicted in speculative fiction. In novels 
depicting climate migrants, such as Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) and 
Parable of the Talents (2014), I show that even politically progressive, intersectional 
approaches to environmental endangerment naturalize conflict and occlude dialogic 
solutions to environmental change. The final chapter traces how the environmental 
refugee has become a paradigmatic figure in climate change discourse, particularly the 
aspects of this discourse where issues of national security are articulated. At the center of 
these texts is the figure of the migrant and narratives of migrations, and I argue that the 
figure of the environmental migrant offers a privileged vantage on the constitutive forces 
of the Anthropocene. The dissertation identifies the specific literary and rhetorical 
techniques that authors use to contest environmental militarization and expand the U.S. 
public’s capacity to creatively and compassionately reason around increased flows of 
environmental migrants— issues of vital importance for humane climate change 
adaptation.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENCE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
“The 20th century will be remembered as the age whose essential thought 
 consisted in targeting no longer the body, but the enemy's environment.” 
 
–Peter Sloterdijk, Terror in the Air 
 
“In a few decades, the relationship between the environment, resources and 
  conflict may seem almost as obvious as the connection we see today between 
 human rights, democracy and peace.”  
 
–Wangari Maathai, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate  
 
“Whose security gets protected by any means necessary? Whose security is 
 casually sacrificed, despite the means to do so much better? Those are the 
 questions at the heart of the climate crisis.” 
 
–Naomi Klein  
 
An Introduction to War, Militarism, and Environmental Crisis  
 
At the 2015 Universal Expo in Milan, Italy, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
urged world leaders to adopt aggressive standards for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and fund measures for adapting to climate change. Kerry took the theme of the Universal 
Expo (“Feeding the Planet, Energy for Life”) as a jumping off point for building 
momentum for the upcoming 21st United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Conference of Parties (UNFCCC COP21) negotiations: “Climate change is 
perhaps the most significant threat to global food security today.” He warned, however, 
that “[climate change] isn’t only about food security; it’s about global security, period.” 
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How then, per the former Secretary of State, is climate change an issue of global 
security? Kerry continued by providing narratives tying climate change to the generation 
of wars and mass movements of refugees and migrants spurred on by clime-fueled 
poverty and extreme weather, as the dangerous ramifications of unchecked, run-away 
climate change. Specifically, Kerry tied aberrant climatic conditions to the ongoing war 
in Syria:  
It is not a coincidence that immediately prior to the civil war in Syria, the country 
experienced the worst drought on record. As many as 1.5 million people migrated 
from Syria’s farms into Syria’s cities, and that intensified the political unrest that 
was beginning to brew. Now, I’m not telling you that the crisis in Syria was 
caused by climate change. No. Obviously, it wasn’t. It was caused by a brutal 
dictator who barrel bombed, starved, tortured, and gassed his own people. But the 
devastating drought clearly made a bad situation a lot worse. 
 
While Kerry firmly lays the blame for the civil war on the dictatorship of Bashar al-
Assad, he bookends his remarks on Syria with reminders of how environmental 
conditions “clearly make a bad situation a lot worse.”  
 Kerry shifts quickly from the battlefields of Syria to the refugee crisis generated 
by the war. At the time, over one and a half million Syrians had migrated out of Syria, 
and millions more were internally displaced people (IDP) within Syria. According to 
Kerry, “unless the world meets the urgency of this moment, the horrific refugee situation 
that we’re facing today will pale in comparison to the mass migrations that intense 
droughts, sea-level rise, and other impacts of climate change are likely to bring about.”  
Kerry proceeds to explain the general concept that the war in Syria and its attendant 
refugee crisis illustrate: “Climate change is – to borrow a term from the Department of 
Defense in America – a ‘threat multiplier.’ Even if it doesn’t ignite conflict, it has the 
ability to fan the flames.”  It isn’t just Pentagon upper brass and America’s top diplomats 
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who refer to climate change as a “threat multiplier;” narratives linking conflict and 
political instability to climate change are now commonplace among academics and 
environmentalist civil society organizations as well. And in these narratives growing 
conflict— in size and global scope, accompanied by waves of migrants teeming out of 
the Global South and into the Global North—are fast becoming hallmark tropes of global 
climate discourse. 
On the night of November 13, three weeks after Kerry’s speech and just three 
weeks before COP21, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) gunmen attacked 
various public spaces in Paris, killing 130 people. In the chaotic aftermath of the horrific 
attacks, delegates and civil society participants didn’t know if the much-vaunted 
negotiations would take place at all. These attacks caused French President Francois 
Holland to declare a state of emergency— France’s first since World War II. COP 
negotiations involve a lot of people— an understatement, given that each of the 197 
Parties to the treaty send negotiating delegates, civil society delegates who can be present 
for parts and spaces of the negotiation, media representatives, and thousands of un-
credentialed groups such as NGOs and businesses descend around the negotiations. 
Environmentalist and climate justice organizations’ planned marches, civil disobedience, 
and counter-summits. Such events, typical of COP negotiations, were suddenly illegal. 
Climate activist Naomi Klein, in an op-ed for the Guardian, spoke out against the 
curtailment of civic freedoms in France on the eve of the fateful negotiations. Klein 
charges that the shut-down of public space reflects the “fundamental inequity of the 
climate crisis itself – and that core question of whose security is ultimately valued in our 
lopsided world:” 
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Here is the first thing to understand. The people facing the worst impacts of 
climate change have virtually no voice in western debates about whether to do 
anything serious to prevent catastrophic global warming. Huge climate summits 
like the one coming up in Paris are rare exceptions. For just two weeks every few 
years, the voices of the people who are getting hit first and worst get a little bit of 
space to be heard at the place where fateful decisions are made. That’s why 
Pacific islanders and Inuit hunters and low-income people of color from places 
like New Orleans travel for thousands of miles to attend. The expense is 
enormous, in both dollars and carbon, but being at the summit is a precious 
chance to speak about climate change in moral terms and to put a human face to 
this unfolding catastrophe. (20 Nov 2015).  
 
 In the wake of the ISIL terrorist attacks, this slim chance for some procedural and 
representative justice (means towards greater distributional climate justice) evaporated. 
More than directly lobbying the official delegates, the alternative summits, workshops, 
and demonstrations planned during each COP serve as a loadstone in the global climate 
justice movement, a space where coalitions of students, workers, academics, indigenous 
and civil organizations form coalitions and articulate counter-visions to the thus-far 
inadequate response by the governments of some of the UNFCCC treaty signatories. The 
official negotiations proceeded under the surveillance of a heavy militarized presence, 
without direct action engagement by civil society. Kerry’s speech and the ISIL terror 
attacks leading up to the COP21 negotiations highlight two examples of how militarism 
and armed conflict impact environmental politics and imaginations. 
This dissertation, “War by Other Means,” explores this confluence through 
environmental cultural studies.  It is an exploration not only of “whose security is valued” 
at others’ expense, but also of the “imaginative ways” writer activists and artists respond 
to environmental military violence and weaponized landscapes. The world is witnessing a 
rise in militarism that corresponds with the rise in global temperatures; and the growing 
consensus is that the collision course of these trends is potentially catastrophic. In Kerry’s 
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speech, the specter of catastrophe took on the appearance of civil unrest and a hungry tide 
of climate migrants swarming into Europe and the United States. For those planning to 
attend and influence the COP21 negotiations, that catastrophe took the form of terrorists 
targeting public spaces and militaries squelching civil liberties in the name of security. 
Visions of a violent, warmer world suggest a consequential confluence of political and 
environmental violence in the 21st century. “War by Other Means” turns to the work of 
artists and activists to recover fugitive environmental violence in modern armed conflicts. 
My project identifies the specific literary and rhetorical techniques that these authors use 
to contest environmental militarization and expand the U.S. public’s capacity to 
creatively and compassionately reason around the intersections of security, violence, and 
environmental change.  
Wangari Maathai, the founder of the Greenbelt Movement, writes: “In a few 
decades, the relationship between the environment, resources and conflict may seem 
almost as obvious as the connection we see today between human rights, democracy and 
peace” (Greenbelt Movement).  Maathai’s grassroots linking of environmentalist projects 
(such a planting trees) to women’s empowerment and direct democracy and peace-
building efforts in Kenya, and later, across the Global South, have made her the only 
African woman Nobel Peace Prize laureate, as well as the first environmentalist to win 
the prestigious prize. Her prophetic claim that the links between “environment, resources 
and conflict may seem almost as obvious” as those relations the Greenbelt Movement 
made between environment, gender, economic self-determinacy and democracy is, like 
many a prophesy, ambiguous. The sentence can be read with optimism or dread.  I am 
riveted by my project because I cannot help but read that quote by Wangari Maathai with 
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apprehension. “In a few decades,” as issues of climate justice continue to challenge 
political, economic, and ethical systems, how will the “relationship between environment, 
resources, and conflict” be made “obvious?” Will these connections be valued precisely 
because we have avoided the collision course of rising tides and rising militarism? Or 
will the obviousness of these connections be made salient through constant warring over 
scarce resources? Based on depictions of climate change and other forms of global 
environmental change in popular culture, the answer to these questions favors a decidedly 
dystopic turn; narratives of environmental collapse saturated with interpersonal and 
organized violence dominate recent U.S. film and literature. In many of these stories, set 
“a few decades in the future,” the scarcity of natural resources or disruptive 
environmental hazards of the future spark and sustain a Hobbesian state of constant 
warfare1 between different tribal groups of humans.  U.S.-based climate activists and 
public intellectuals make similar arguments, albeit via different rhetorics. Christian 
Parenti, Naomi Klein, and Bill McKibben each press for climate mitigation and 
adaptation based on the premise that climate change poses threats not just from 
geophysical changes to earth systems but also from changes to human politics and 
hatreds.  
I am motivated to explore the discursive intersections of recent US militarism, 
environmental change, and social and environmental justice because I do not want these 
relationships to be realized through ubiquitous conflict, but rather through the peaceful 
                                                      
1 In De Cive (1642) Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes writes that humans’ natural state is that of a “warre 
of all against all” (“bellum omnium contra omnes”). Each individual, moving from a fundamentally greed-
and-need driven nature, struggles against one’s fellow human for scare resources. Only by entering into a 
social contract with a civil state can people find peace among one another, and so by giving up certain 
freedoms civil society holds back the war of all against all.   
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understandings and compromises people make to meet the challenges of climate change. 
It is not a question of which reading of Mathaai’s prophesy corresponds most closely to 
the ground truth of the empirical world. Indeed, Marshall Burke, Solomon Hsiang, and 
Edward Miguel find a positive correlation for both interpersonal and intergroup violence 
and rising temperature in a recent meta-analysis of 55 peer reviewed studies. Across these 
studies, Burke et al. conclude, one degree Celsius increased interpersonal violent crime 
by 2.4 percent, and intergroup conflict by 11.4 percent. There is empirical evidence then 
that global climate change may increase violence. Yet the causal pathway(s) by which 
this violence increased is, as these authors note, as yet unclear. From a social 
constructivist viewpoint, the answer to Mathaai’s question is ultimately a matter of 
human choice and understanding. Whether humans engage in conflict or in peace-
building is a question ultimately of how humans choose to live in the world, of our 
ethical, political, economic, and creative relationships to one another and to the more-
than-human world. Such peace-building, I believe, is only made possible by creative and 
compassionate democracy. Militarism is not, after all, solely a matter of bombs and 
bullets, but rather the ideas and beliefs we hold that enable the use of violence as an 
extension of politics (Sturgeon, Clausewitz).  
This dissertation argues that we should theorize environmental military violence 
as the kind of violence done to humans conducted through, or resulting in, ecosystem 
degradation. Militarism and militarization refer to social processes that structure the 
production of organized military and paramilitary violence, and so militarism refers to 
both recognizably material as well as ideological and discursive formations. Modern 
warfare, and both its direct and indirect effects on human bodies and environments, is the 
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object of this study. Yet to call modern warfare to account through critical study one must 
also disrupt the easy separation of object and subject in academic study. I aim not only to 
uncover some of the different kinds and mechanisms enacting environmental military 
violence through discursive analysis of literary and cultural texts, but also to consider 
how knowledge of this subject— including that which is produced in academic 
discourse— is imbricated with specific assemblages of power, privilege, and difference. 
In other words, “War by Other Means” examines both mechanisms of environmental 
violence as well as the ideas, values, and beliefs that support and sustain environmental 
military violence. I trace a different dynamic of ecological violence structured through 
the logics of US counterinsurgency theory in each chapter by examining what I call 
“narrative political ecologies”—cultural texts that center concerns of ecology and broadly 
defined political economy. I find these narrative political ecologies within a broad 
contemporary cultural archive, one that includes novels, news media, documentary film, 
and art installations. These popular culture texts use shared vocabularies in representing 
environmental military violence, the logics undergirding that violence, and the links 
between war and the environment. A chief trope deployed throughout these texts is the 
figure of the migrant and narratives of migrations.  
The figure of the environmental and climate migrant offers a privileged subject 
position with a vantage on the constitutive forces of the Anthropocene, the name 
stratigraphers have used to signify human-caused changes to global climate. These forces 
include structural racism and patriarchy, environmental change, nationalism, and rising 
economic inequality. Many of the texts that I treat in this dissertation examine 
environmental violence and just adaptation to global environmental change by deploying 
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the figure of the environmental migrant and refugee; one who is constructed 
paradoxically as a victim of environmental violence as well as a menacing threat posed 
by environmental degradation. I argue that the migrant plays a central role in narrating 
environmental military violence and is a locus for creative and compassionate public 
reasoning and resistance in a time of militarized climate adaptation.  
“War by Other Means” argues that since the end of the Cold War the practices 
and ideas associated with “counterinsurgency theory” have grown increasingly important 
to the U.S. military and the U.S. public’s conceptions of environment, war, and national 
security. Military conflict has always incorporated environmental violence, both as 
violence conducted against non-human environmental features, and aspects of the 
environment used as weapons against human bodies. But while environmental military 
violence may be transhistorical, it manifests in radically different ways and for different 
purposes in specific historical moments.  Drawn from models of British and French 
imperial policing, counterinsurgency is a kind of military action that constructs and 
controls environments in part through covert, interlinking forms of ecological violence 
and militarized police action. This kind of warfare is a far cry from Carl Von Clauswitz’s 
enduring conceptualization of war as an extension of politics conducted through the 
logics and practices of a duel. Unlike Clauswitzian notions of armed conflict as reflecting 
the logical extension of a duel between two combatants, each vying to disable or kill their 
opponent, counterinsurgency theory conceptualizes conflict as an attempt to shape and 
control environments and the populations living in those environments. Since the end of 
the Cold War the United States has enjoyed a level of military hegemony unmatched in 
history, however, this superpower status has also meant that the US is constantly 
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militating against insurgent threats to its power. Counterinsurgency Strategy (COIN) is 
central to how militarism organizes and deploys environmental military violence. In 
COIN strategy and tactics, environmental military violence is generally not a byproduct 
or flaw of operations, but rather a design feature. The logics of counterinsurgency not 
only animate military thinking, policy, and actions, but are also present within 
mainstream political discourse and popular culture depicting relationships of war and 
environment. Literature and popular culture articulate these logics while describing and 
contesting environmental military violence as a force of social inequality formation2. 
Militarism through the Environmental Humanities 
 
The humanities—and especially the environmental humanities—are crucial to the 
study of the values and ideas that support and sustain war, to understanding how people 
experience war and militarism. To theorize environmental military violence conducted 
through counterinsurgency logics, and describe it as marshalled to particular aims, I 
explore the discursive intersections of U.S. militarism, climate change, and 
environmental justice as they are represented in literature and popular culture produced 
since the end of the Cold War. Literature and popular culture may seem an odd archive in 
which to find the nature of environmental military violence and counterinsurgency. The 
environmental humanities—its attention to form, context, and ethics—provides unique 
and important vantage points into the study of war and the environment.  
                                                      
2 David Pellow’s notion of environmental inequality formation stresses different “dimensions of 
intersection between environmental quality and social hierarchies,” and Pellow argues that environmental 
justice studies must seek multiscalar accounts of how social inequality is forged or secured through 
environmental inequalities (582-583).  
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War, in its long and bloody history, has never been a solely material endeavor. The 
need for war, the art of war, and the making of peace after war are all simultaneously 
narrated, social, and ethical endeavors as important to the fighting and outcome of battle 
as are blades, bombs, and bullets. Studying how environmental military violence is 
enunciated in popular culture provides a means for directly theorizing the nature of this 
violence—its effects and mechanisms as they are experienced by individuals and 
collectives. Furthermore, this humanistic understanding of environmental military 
violence allows scholars to apprehend the logics and ideas that direct the use of 
environmental military violence as a mechanism of power. Discourse analysis recognizes 
that form not only reflects power, but investigates how knowledge and form are effects of 
power (A. Baldwin “Racialization” 1476). Knowledge is enmeshed with power precisely 
through form, and to analyze form and representation allows scholars to attend to the 
relationships between the subjects and objects of discourses (Foucault 1980).  This 
approach not only allows for the study how environments and environmental inequalities 
are weaponized through armed conflict and repressive military action, but also allows me 
to engage in the study of how militaristic thinking ties conflict to environmental change 
through ostensibly environmentalist rationales. What discourses support and sustain war 
and militarism’s use of environmental military violence? How do these values and beliefs 
limit public imaginaries to envision a future of resource wars and resurgent imperialism 
rather than democratic, dialogic solutions to socio-environmental problems?  
Attending to these discourses can help scholars and students recognize 
environmental conflicts and their effects that environmental studies has previously 
overlooked. Such insights are far from immaterial beyond the academy. Consider the act 
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of “truth and reconciliation” that follows many armed conflicts. Such commissions, 
supported by governments through the United Nations and other regional and 
international institutions, attempt to account for wartime casualties and crimes as a means 
of appropriating reparations, apologies, and steps towards restitution and reconciliation 
between the aggrieved parties of war. Yet these commissions also advocate for a kind of 
truth, the truth of a witness documenting what happened. What happened here? In such 
acts of witnessing, the ability to fully apprehend the faces and the names of those who 
died in the conflict is a moral necessity. By overlooking environmental conflicts, or 
ramifications of environmental violence as a mechanism of strategic power within 
widely-recognized armed conflicts, we risk overlooking and silencing a wartime 
casualties and underestimate the true human and environmental cost of militarism.  
Likewise, unpacking how understandings of environments and environmentalisms 
have at times contributed to “green hate” and “green militarisms3” may allow 
peacebuilders and environmental justice environmentalists to disrupt these ostensibly 
environmentalist justificatory schemes for war and conflict. As Jacob Hamblin shows in 
Arming Mother Nature, the current widespread popularity of at least “shallow” 
environmentalism in the U.S.  (to borrow a phrase from deep ecologists) is attributable to 
the U.S. military’s concerted interest and palletization of environmental manipulation and 
catastrophic endangerment since World War II. Hamblin complicates the quick 
association students of environmental studies often draw between notion that 
environmental concern in the U.S. emerged from preservationist movements on the 19th 
                                                      
3 Jessica Leanne Urban uses the phrase “greening of hate” to refer to ways mainstream environmental 
security discourse scapegoat marginalized populations for environmental degradation (253). With “green 
militarisms” I extend Urban’s nomenclature to the ways militaries justify their missions in environmentalist 
values and deploy discourses of sustainability and environmentalism in their efforts.  
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century and the counterculture movements of the 1960s. Such associations are 
understandable, as environmental studies formed as a discipline during raucous student 
movements reshaping college curricula around issues of identity and social justice 
(Wapner 2007). But to attending to militarism centers virulent strands of nativism and 
nationalism— if not outright imperialism— in many aspects of American environmental 
letters and thought. This may in turn offer a corrective to one of the most significant 
differences between environmental studies and the other “studies” that emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s (i.e. ethnic studies, women and gender studies). While all of these area 
studies arose from the efforts of student movements to reshape college curricula towards 
an education that could in turn reform society, environmental studies, like mainstream 
environmentalism more broadly, focused on critiquing society’s abuse of nature without 
interrogating the connections between social justice and environmental health. What 
more, the field often centered neo-Malthusian ideas that blamed people of color, 
countries in the Global South, and the world’s poor for environmental degradation. I 
believe an environmental criticism of militarism will help identify and combat the 
longstanding “green hate” biases that are perpetuated in environmental studies by 
drawing attention to the ways that imperialist military conflict by the U.S. (itself a settler 
colonial state) targets marginalized communities and normalizes violent conflict over 
environmental resources.  
Locating Environmental Humanities’ Investigations of Militarism 
 
Despite the need for bringing environmental humanities approaches to bear on 
these questions, environmental literary and cultural studies have infrequently and 
inadequately addressed the links between conflict and environmental inequalities. Indeed, 
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Rob Nixon finds that “the most startling feature of environmental literary studies” is the 
“reluctance” of American scholars to seriously engage with “the environmental 
repercussions of American foreign policy, particularly in relation to contemporary 
imperial practices” (33). He argues that work within the environmental humanities in 
America generally has remained “skewed” toward nation-bound investigations that 
seldom engage “the environmental fallout of U.S. foreign policy head on.” Such 
“superpower parochialism” is especially bewildering considering that the discipline of 
environmental studies is centered on the study of those connections that are most potent 
in shaping and mediating the relations of humans to the more than human world (Gould 
331). The fundamental task of critical environmental study, particularly in the humanities, 
is to explicate the relations between humans and the natural world. Environmental 
sociologists claim that scholars of environmental studies “cannot fully explain the 
relationship between humans and the natural world without theorizing a link between 
natural resource extraction, armed violence, and environmental degradation” (Downey et 
al. 417). Indeed, how can environmental studies make good on its mission to describe 
such forces without strong theoretical and empirical engagements with war and 
militarism? The material and discursive pathways tread by the machines of war should be 
basic to the scholarship and pedagogy of anthropogenic environmental change and to the 
study of environmental inequality and social justice in the Anthropocene.  
I argue that a literature of environmental justice is incomplete and insufficient 
without stronger theoretical engagements with armed conflict’s role in creating and 
maintaining environmental inequalities. One of the central aims of this research is thus to 
make a case for greater focus on militarism and armed conflict within the environmental 
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humanities, and environmental studies writ large. Metaphors of battle abound in 
environmental studies and studies of U.S. empire that touch on environmental issues. 
Eduardo Galleano writes that the “Open Veins of Latin America are bleeding,” Bill 
McKibben demands that we “literally declare war on climate change,” and Rachel Carson 
warns us that “man is a part of nature, and his war against nature is inevitably a war 
against himself.” Yet these wars (despite McKibben’s appropriation of millennial 
generational irony run amuck) are all metaphorical. Within the proliferation of war-talk 
in environmentalism and environmental studies, it seems odd that literal war is long been 
neglected. Although environmental studies has taken on issues of economic expansion 
and affluence, population growth, and technological change, comparatively little attention 
has been paid to wars and their environmental impacts. The literature of environmental 
justice, which studies how environmental inequalities are produced, represented, and 
understood, is incomplete without stronger theoretical engagements with armed conflict’s 
role in creating and maintaining environmental inequalities.  
Armed conflict and militarization, after all, cause massive ecological degradation 
and change, perhaps more so than any other human endeavor (Gould 331).  The buildup 
of militaries in the Global North facilitate the unequal relations with the Global South 
that allow for the extraction of raw goods and resources from the South by the North 
(Hooks and Smith 63). While relatively few people in the world today fight in wars, or 
actively plan and prepare for wars by producing munitions or practicing different 
maneuvers, the environmental impact of militarization is profound. There is perhaps no 
more iconic example of such ruination than the image of a mushroom cloud created by 
the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The image has become synonymous with the uneasy 
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apotheosis of human technological intervention into environments, and its fireball 
connotes not only the mass destruction of the detonation but also the lingering fallout of 
radioactive weaponry and nuclear winter. As the Anthropocene Working Group of the 
Quaternary Stratigraphic Society noted in its August 2016 report to the International 
Geological Congress, the dawn of a new geological epoch is scientifically warranted 
based in large part on the “geological signal” created by the radioactive elements 
unleashed by atomic weaponry and energy development during the Cold War. Nuclear 
missiles and bombs are located in submarines and U.S. military bases around the world, 
many of which were located due to the U.S. Navy’s 19th and early 20th century need for 
re-coaling stations, places where the imperial fleet could restock its fuel supplies. Today, 
those ships and submarines and planes are powered by a prodigious consumption of 
petroleum; the U.S. military is the single greatest institutional consumer of fossil fuel on 
the planet, and consequently the largest emitter of greenhouse gases.  Numerous natural 
science studies of war and militarism’s environmental footprint have proliferated since 
the 1980s, buoyed by broader public awareness of global environmental changes such as 
the depletion of atmospheric ozone, declining biodiversity and deforestation, and climate 
change. Brauer’s (sp) War and Nature collects hundreds of such studies and lays out a 
meticulous accounting of different environmental and human health repercussions of 
conflicts across the world.  
The growth of empirical studies and proliferation of public discourse concerning 
war and the environment has yet to produce a comparable body of literature within the 
environmental humanities, however, this overgeneralization does not as strongly pertain 
to two distinct areas within the environmental humanities— environmental justice studies 
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and environmental history. Scholars in these areas have begun to articulate the necessary 
critique of how armed conflict and particularly the U.S. military industrial complex 
reinforces ongoing environmental endangerment of the poor and people of color 
worldwide. Those scholars, such as Valerie Kuletz and Traci Brynne Voyles, focus on 
how US militarism produces the slow violence of toxins and radiation— deadly 
environmental burdens—and make “national sacrifice zones” across the U.S. and its 
imperial holdings.  Gregory Hooks and Chad Smith argue that the environmental 
inequalities created by the American military industrial complex are engendered and 
distributed through different processes than those inequalities distributed through 
capitalism. Hooks and Smith maintain that environmental danger caused by armed 
conflict operates by a different logic than that of capitalist expansion (the old, bitter foe 
of environmental justice critics). The logics of “arms races and geopolitical competition” 
drive a dually expansionary and accelerating human impact on the environment that they 
term the “treadmill of destruction” after Schnaiberg’s “treadmill of production” (562 see 
also Gould and Pellow 2008).  
Environmental military violence is the use of spectacular as well as attritional 
environmental violence to secure the authority of the state and the continued extraction of 
resources for capitalist expansion. Environmentalists frequently characterize capitalism4 
as a metaphorical “war” on the environment, but it seems few have articulated how war is 
war on the environment and human populations working, living, praying, and learning in 
                                                      
4 Priority in environmental justice literature has focused on extraction, production, consumption, and 
disposal of natural resources. Warfare is intimately embroiled in all aspects of this familiar material 
pathway, but may operate according to different logics and systems of representation (Smith and Clark). 
While the “treadmill of production” operates through a logic of constant expansion, the “treadmill of 
destruction” may serve expansion at times while also being directed, and expanded, for other geopolitical 
aims, such as strategic command of space or research and development (Schnaiberg, Smith and Clark). 
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it. To focus on the “treadmill of destruction” is to understand environmental military 
violence as a force that creates social inequalities by distributing environmental burdens 
and benefits. It makes some lives and ways of life more secure while making other lives 
more insecure. Thus, environmental military violence secures uneven power relations.  
Environmental historians have also been at the forefront of environmental 
humanities answers to this challenge to our research and educational agendas. For 
example, Jacob Hamblin, an environmental and military historian, traces how military 
planning from the end of World War II and throughout the Cold War produced 
“catastrophic environmentalism” both within and without the U.S. military and 
government agencies as much as the counterculture-based environmentalist movement 
(2013). The writer activists decrying slow violence coincide with a similar time frame 
throughout Nixon’s Slow Violence. Peter Sloterdijk dates the intellectual start of the 20th 
century to the moment Germans deployed weaponized gas in Ypres during the First 
World War. As he notes, “the 20th century will be remembered as the age whose essential 
thought consisted in targeting no longer the body, but the enemy's environment” 
(Sloterdijk). Edward Russell likewise focuses on the legacy of chemical warfare and 
discourses of pest control since WWI.  Within Charles Closmann’s groundbreaking War 
and the Environment, J.R. McNeill and David Painter explore the environmental footprint 
of the US military from 1789-2003, while Lisa Brady focuses on the refinement of 
environmental military tactics in the American Civil War. Scholars like Robert Marzec 
and Alfred Crosby take even longer views by examining the ecological impacts of 
European and American colonial conflicts, and in the case of Marzec’s Militarizing the 
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Environment (2015), drawing through lines from the forces that animated the 17th 
century enclosure movement to contemporary climate change war games.   
“War by Other Means” contributes to the work of 21st century “critical 
environmental studies” and more specifically, the work of “critical environmental justice 
studies” by expanding the contours of environmental justice to focus on both militarism 
and how artists take up how militarism exacerbates environmental inequalities. The use 
of “critical” in both terms is an example of academic convergent evolution. As Paul 
Wapner and David N. Pellow note, the originators of each term, respectively, do not 
appear to be in conversation with one another.  Following Robert Cox’s differentiation 
between “critical theory” and “problem-solving theory,” Wapner defines “critical 
environmental studies” as initiatives within our broader inter-, cross-, and multi-
disciplinary field that question “existing power dynamics and seeks not only to reform 
but to transform social and political conditions” (7). It is precisely this kind of critical 
action that artists like Héctor Tobar, Octavia Butler, the Electronic Disturbance Theater, 
and Junot Díaz effect in the texts I take up in this dissertation. By foregrounding migrants 
and migrations as who navigate weaponized environments and militarized landscapes, 
these narrative texts push back against simplistic frames of victimhood that have 
undergirded environmental justice studies in the past. These fictive migrants may be 
targets of oppressive violence and environmental inequality, but they also—through their 
negotiation of space and various differences that make a difference (such as race, nation 
states, and natural hazards)—are able to articulate the conditions of environmental 
violence and at times push back against it.   
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To unpack these texts’ depictions of environmental military violence and 
treatment of the figure of the environmental migrant, I rely principally on the insights of 
critical race theory and disability studies. The need for rapprochement within 
environmental studies and critical race studies has been furthered in recent years by 
scholars such as Paul Outka, Gabriela Nuñez, Julie Avril Minich, Sarah Wald, Camille 
Dungy, Rob Nixon, Byron Caminero Santangelo, and Priscilla Ybarra, among others. 
This emerging work in the environmental humanities advances what David N. Pellow 
calls a “third generation” of environmental justice scholarship that takes up multiscalar 
and intersectional approaches to the study of environmental inequality while also 
questioning “how different forms of inequality and social power are viewed as 
entrenched within society” (Pellow “Critical Environmental Justice” 223). My project 
advances scholarship along two “pillars” Pellow identifies as crucial to the growth of 
“critical environmental justice studies,” a notion of which he originally formulated with 
co-author Robert Brulle in Power, Justice, and the Environment (2005). While ever 
mindful of the intersectional nature of EJ struggles, how multiple categories of social 
difference (e.g. race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality, religion, etc.) mold geographies 
of environmental inequality and contestation, I think the constraining genre of academic 
scholarship as well as uneven scholarly attention across aspects of social difference still 
hold open the need for emphasis on subsets of social difference.  
Critical Contexts and Confluences  
 
“War by Other Means” takes up the literature and cultural production of the early 
1990s to the present because this period is a dense assemblage of intersecting social 
movements and developments that are bringing discourses of national security, 
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environmental sustainability, and social justice into stark relief. I do so by analyzing a 
wide archive of American literature and popular culture written or produced from roughly 
the end of the Cold War to present. Both ends of this temporal spectrum are necessarily 
“raggedy,” in that the specific events and historical forces that are reflected in and on by 
these cultural productions cannot neatly be contained within this specific date range. For 
example, The Tattooed Soldier by Héctor Tobar, a text I examine in Chapter II, was 
published in 1998, but its plot depicts events of the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
Guatemala before rejoining the narrative present in 1992 Los Angeles. Tobar himself 
grew up in Los Angeles decades before the end of the Cold War. It is appropriate to 
analyze this book as both a product of both Cold War and post-Cold War culture and 
history.  
Likewise, this project has changed considerably in light of developments in 
geopolitics, and particularly, climate and security state politics, following the election of 
Donald J. Trump. Much has changed since I began this project in the Fall of 2015. Any 
book emerges from its specific historical context and how that context affects its author 
and interlocutors. The events of the past few years, and the rapidly developing 
consequences of Trump’s presidency, have shaped the urgency I feel towards this project.  
While incorporating contemporary events and cultural productions into this dissertation is 
important to tracking the confluence of several of the historical trends I study in literature 
of the 1990s and 2000s, any researcher’s view of the “present” is necessarily partial; one 
is constantly trying to catch up to events even as they continue to unfold.  
The quote from Wangari Maathai that serves as frontispiece to this dissertation 
helps explain this disjuncture; by claiming that “in a few decades, the relationship 
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between the environment, resources and conflict may seem almost as obvious as the 
connection we see today between human rights, democracy and peace,” Maathai points to 
the relatively recent emergence of a popular understanding of environment as linked to 
issues of peace building and war making. Maathai’s 2004 Nobel Peace Prize signals an 
important milestone in the intellectual history of war and the environment. Maathai was 
awarded the prestigious prize for “her contribution to sustainable development, 
democracy and peace,” and more specifically for her role in founding and building the 
Green Belt Movement (nobelprize.org 2015). The Greenbelt Movement, now a global 
NGO operating in dozens of countries across the Global South, works toward “continued 
improvement of [people’s] livelihoods and a greener, cleaner world,” particularly by 
working with cooperatives of women to grow and conserve tree seedlings that they plant 
and derive material benefits from. Just three years after awarding one environmentalist, 
the Nobel committee selected the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and 
former Vice President Albert Gore Jr. to jointly share the 2007 Peace Prize for “for their 
efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, 
and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change” 
(nobelprize.org). To understand the Greenbelt Movement’s humanitarian, pro-
democracy, and environmentalist work and the IPCC/Al Gore’s climate teachings as 
peace building would not be possible without the maturation of several social trends that 
have sutured issues of environment to discourse of development and security. These 
trends shoot through the last thirty years and inform the readings I make throughout the 
project.   
  23 
The first of these trends is the growing public understanding of global 
environmental justice issues, particularly the uneven risk and vulnerability poor people of 
the Global South face from environmental degradation, industrial and market-based 
agriculture, and resource extraction more generally. Closely linked to this broad 
understanding of environmental justice is the rise in public concern over anthropogenic 
climate change as well as the rise of intersectional study and education in universities 
across the world. Finally, and perhaps most salient to the aims of this project, I chose this 
time period because it marks a major and ongoing shift in U.S. Military and National 
Security apparatus operations. Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. Military has 
reevaluated the global mission of U.S. Military power and how the various branches of 
the armed forces go about fulfilling that mission. I’ll briefly describe how I see each of 
these constitutive trends in the following paragraphs.  
A massive shift in military power and purpose  
Two events loom large in the recent history of the U.S. military: the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The first event 
instigated a shift from a bipolar political, economic, and military world to a globalized 
world in which the U.S. claims hegemonic superpower status.  Despite being the only 
superpower on the block, emergent threats such as terrorism, pandemics, and natural 
disasters are omnipresent. Such events threaten the stability and productivity of neoliberal 
markets and the general pecking order of nations. During much of the history covered in 
this dissertation it would be common to hear the U.S. described as the “world’s police.” 
This nomenclature indicates the shift in the U.S. military mission in changing from a 
bipolar to a unilateral world. For any strategic endeavor, a change of mission necessitates 
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a change in strategy and tactics. I argue that the change from a bipolar concept of power 
to a superpower fending off upstart threats entailed the gradual evolution of “small wars” 
or “revolutionary wars” (as they were called in the 1970s and 80s) into first “Low 
Intensity Conflicts” (LICs) and later “Counterinsurgency” and “Counterterrorism” 
operations. Although pivoting from large-scale preparedness for all-out war with the 
USSR or so-called “rogue nations” meant changing the target of the military’s wrath from 
large targets to the relatively small targets (like terrorist organizations or nationalist 
insurgencies), this shift did not necessitate scaling down military spending or the overall 
footprint of the military. Instead, the role of militarism has expanded and permeated into 
social institutions.  
Second, and following the September 11th attacks and the subsequent invasions 
of Afghanistan, and Iraq, both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency became front and 
center of the public face of U.S. military operations. While war games in the Cold War 
obsessively modeled nuclear holocausts shared between NATO and the Soviet Bloc, war 
games since the 1990s have emphasized “block to block” urban fighting and disaster 
relief missions instigated by terrorism, extreme weather events, and political revolutions 
(Parentii, Marzec).  
The rise of the environmental justice movement  
I focus my critical environmental justice discursive and literary analyses on 
environmental military violence as a means of capturing a time period in which issues of 
environmental justice are legible, if not omnipresent, in the representational goals and 
strategies of the authors and texts I take up. While environmental inequalities have 
existed in every human society, theories of environmental justice as a component of 
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social justice, and social justice as a primary goal of environmental stewardship existed in 
only inchoate forms in the West prior to the 1980s and 1990s. The birth of U.S. 
environmental justice is often credited to the citizens of Warren County, North Carolina, 
protesting the dumping of PCBs in their community in 1984. Hundreds of people 
engaged in direct action non-violent civil disobedience by laying down in front of trucks 
delivering loads of PCBs to a landfill near a predominantly African American 
community. While the mass protest inaugurated the environmental justice movement, 
indigenous youth grassroots organizers and over 500 people of color activists codified the 
core tenets of the American environmental justice movement in 1990 by birthing the 
Indigenous Environmental Network and convening the First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit. Delegates of the Summit generated “17 Principles of 
Environmental Justice” to guide the rapidly-growing social movement. Beginning with 
the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ) publishing of Toxic 
Wastes and Race in the United States in 1987, the so-called “first wave” of academic and 
NGO scholarship on environmental racism grew in the early 1990s, and shortly thereafter 
the University of Michigan founded the first environmental justice graduate program. 
While environmental justice linked race and class to environmental risk and vulnerability 
in the early nineties, both activists and academic study continued to expand to ever more 
refined assessments across spatial scales and through various forms of social difference 
(e.g. gender, ability, immigration status, age) in the early 21st century. That work 
continues today.   
While early EJ scholarship was based in social science methodologies, in 2001 
the first humanities-based EJ anthology, The Environmental Justice Reader, edited by 
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Joni Adamson, Mei Mei Evans, and Rachel Stein, published academic essays alongside 
activists engaged in environmental justice struggles across the country (much as Robert 
Bullard’s Voices from the Grassroots did with sociological analyses in 1998). As Cole 
and Foster have argued, the environmental justice movement has always been a 
confluence of grassroots activism, academic inquiry, legal defense, and government 
action (Cole and Foster). This integrated, or at least amalgamated, social movement has 
produced artistic movements and formal innovations as writers and artists concerned with 
the intersections of social justice and environmental conditions have taken up the 
problems of environmental impacts and influences on social inequality. Such art emerges 
from and reflects on the environmental justice movement, and to investigate both 
environmental justice literature and the literature of environmental justice together, to use 
Julie Sze’s phrasing from The Environmental Justice Reader, one needs to consult a 
contemporary archive of cultural production. At each stage of the environmental justice 
movement’s growth the connections between human health, social justice, and 
environment have become clearer and more salient to civil rights organizers and 
environmentalists alike.  
The rise of intersectional analysis and pedagogy in higher education  
The growth of the environmental justice movement in the United States coincided 
with the growth of intersectional analysis and multicultural educational movements 
within U.S. Higher Education. This body of scholarship is crucial to my study because it 
is the intellectual armature by which we can understand the multiple interlocking systems 
and multiscalar levels by which the neoliberal state stratifies social difference. Referring 
to the ways in which multiple aspects of social identity relate to privilege and oppression 
  27 
at various times, Kimberly Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality offered the 
intellectual bridge by which scholars could explain the interlocking systems of 
oppression and various aspects of power, privilege, and difference. Along with 
innovations in black feminism more broadly, intersectional analysis of social privilege 
and oppression grew within the academy at the same time as global multiculturalism 
reached mainstream status within K-16 education. Unlike the student activism of the 
1960s and 1970s, which produced black studies, Latina/o studies, women and gender 
studies, sexuality studies, and ethnic studies departments, student and faculty movements 
coming out of the “culture wars” of the 1980s yielded the first “multicultural” and “social 
inequality” related general education requirements. These requirements provided a space 
within the academy and publishing houses for a freshet of influential literary and artistic 
production by multiethnic authors and artists. While the distributional check-a-box style 
of general education requirement— to this day still the norm— may not consistently 
yield transformative learning in the liberal arts for undergraduate students, these 
requirements likely helped maintain enrollments in humanities departments and fueled 
hiring, tenure, and promotion of scholars studying multiethnic literatures of the US and 
world literature more broadly. In this context, texts like Hector Tobar’s The Tattooed 
Soldier and Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower have reached larger audiences of 
students since their publication than they might otherwise have. Yet this context also 
enabled accusations from prominent right-wing ideologues such as Pat Buchanan, Rush 
Limbaugh, Ann Coulter, and Steve Bannon who have made accusations about “political 
correctness” and “thought police” shoving bleeding-heart liberal agendas onto innocent 
students. Nowhere is the political Right’s vilification and castigation of the academy in 
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recent years more acute than in the humanities and humanistic social sciences’ studies of 
power, privilege, and difference.  
The rise of public concern over anthropogenic climate change 
James Hanson testified to U.S. Congress in 1988 about the causal links of the 
“greenhouse effect” to unprecedented global warming. Less than a year later Bill 
McKibben published The End of Nature, the first popular press book about global 
warming. Since then scientific knowledge and public concern for global warming has 
grown both globally and within U.S. politics. While climate change per se may remain at 
the margins of US politics, lagging a distant also-ran in the perennial ranking of 
American’s top concerns of economy and security, the influence and ramifications of 
climate change have permeated key events of the last thirty years. With the same 
rhetorical flourish with which Sloterdijk named the 20th century’s true ground zero, for 
me the 21st century was born on August 29th, 2005 when Hurricane Katrina narrowly 
missed New Orleans but flooded the city, killing over 2000 people. (First in the days, 
then in the weeks, then months and now years that followed Katrina proved the 
incapacity or unwillingness of an ascendant neoliberal economy and government to heal 
New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, exposing the vast extents of violence color-blind, 
post-intent racism can unleash four decades after the Civil Rights Act was signed into law 
– too long and confusing). The day the storm made landfall Jeffrey Klueger proactively 
asked, “is Global Warming Fueling Hurricane Katrina?” in a signature article in Time 
Magazine. While the specific merits of Klueger’s argument and the damage of Katrina 
attributable to global warming was, and is still hotly debated, Al Gore’s Inconvenient 
Truth and countless other global warming documentaries, articles, and books prominently 
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featured the devastation of Katrina as a harbinger for the routine devastation climate 
change could bring about via extreme weather events and reduced resilience caused by 
increased disease, decreased crop yields, and abnormal weather patterns.  
Organization of Work 
 
The first two chapters of this work take up the dynamics of environmental 
military violence as they interact within a broader political ecology of violence, 
biopower, and repressive state action. In the Chapter II, “The Spectacular and Slow 
Violence of War’s Environmental Racism in Tobar’s The Tattooed Soldier,” I investigate 
how eruptive interpersonal violence secures and enables more insidious, hidden forms of 
slow environmental violence. Referring to the Guatemalan civil war as a historical case-
study wherein the Guatemalan military and government (an often-meaningless 
distinction) enacted theories and practices of counterinsurgency to effect spectacular, 
eruptive violence as well as to use this violence to secure slow, inscrutable environmental 
harm. The effect of both tactics served one genocidal and political strategy. I read this 
ecology of violence through Héctor Tobar’s novel, The Tattooed Soldier (1998) and 
through the ethnographic interviews of actual Guatemalan military officers conducted by 
Jennifer Schirmer for the University of Pennsylvania’s Guatemalan Military Project.  
In the Chapter III I turn to the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands and the environmental 
military violence responsible for the deaths of thousands of undocumented migrants over 
the past three decades. This is not a metaphorical war, but one that has claimed between 
5,000-10,000 lives since the start of “Operation Gatekeeper” and its policy offspring. 
While scholars such as Dunn and Palafox have long regarded the region as a “low 
intensity conflict” fought through the hallmark tactics of “small wars,” few scholars have 
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directly addressed the border war using an environmental lens. Ecocritical accounts of 
border militarization stress either the environmental impact of militarization of flora and 
fauna, on the one hand, or how this militarization coincides with wilderness law to 
criminalize and demonize migrants.  I look to the kinds of environmental violence that 
have been strategically operationalized to make the Greater Sonoran Desert Ecosystem 
into an environmental weapon. In my view, one reason that this conflict has remained 
peripheral to discussions of militarism is the way in which the weaponization of the U.S.-
Mexico border environments has naturalized human violence and obscured it. I read Luís 
Alberto Urrea’s The Devil’s Highway (2004) as conducting a form of what I term 
“narrative political ecology.” That is, The Devil’s Highway does the transdisciplinary 
work of political ecology— investigating how history and power relations forge 
environmental and social landscapes—through the art of storytelling. This chapter also 
considers how the humanitarian work of The Border Angels and the “tactical media” 
firestorm caused by the Electronic Disturbance Theater/b.a.n.g. lab’s “Transborder 
Immigrant Tool” captures the fugitive human agency that undergirds and directs 
Borderlands militarization. 
Examining the discursive construction of environmental military violence also 
allows students and scholars to examine how war and militarism may be tethered to 
ostensibly environmentalist rationales, and vice versa. Chapter IV turns to potential future 
wars and conflicts that may be caused by climate change as they have been depicted in 
speculative fiction. It argues that while futurist speculative fiction remains a rich site of 
environmentalist jeremiad and epidiectic rhetoric, this archive often naturalizes 
imperialism, and an innately violent and atomistic sense of human nature to arouse 
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environmentalist sympathy. In novels depicting internal climate migrants, such as Octavia 
Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) and Parable of the Talents (2014), I show that even 
politically progressive, intersectional approaches to environmental endangerment 
naturalize conflict and occlude dialogic solutions to environmental change.  
The final chapter traces how the environmental refugee has become a 
paradigmatic figure in climate change political discourse, particularly the aspects of this 
discourse where issues of national security and apocalyptic change are articulated. I argue 
that the logics of counterinsurgency and anticipatory action undergird how the construct 
of the climate migrant embodies both threat and victim, provoking both menace and a 
humanitarian ethical demand from the future onto the citizenry of the Global North. I 
read Michael Nash’s 2009 documentary, Climate Refugees, alongside Junot Díaz’s 
“Monstro” (2011) to show how the “human face” of climate change is rendered a 
monstrous, revolutionary other to be combatted through U.S. Counterinsurgency.  I read 
Junot Díaz’s short story, “Monstro,” as an exemplar text depicting the climate refugee as 
epitome and paragon of emergent global risk, and an assertion of the folly of the 
ecological security state’s attempt to guarantee security while fomenting insecurity 
(Marzec #). Finally, and conversely, I discuss how people in the US climate justice 
movement have alternatively claimed the identity of “climate migrant” as a political 
identity. Some climate migrants claim this new political subjectivity in the 21st century 
and perform “moral jujitsu” to claim privileged epistemological and political subjectivity 
within the political and economic spaces they are militantly excluded from.  
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Conclusion: Challenging Militarized Adaptation in the 21st Century 
 
Militarism is not only the physical impact of war, but the values and beliefs by 
which these activities are supported and sustained (Sturgeon). Militarism is then, in its 
broadest sense, a social process that evokes a number of cultural relationships and 
narratives by which people perceive and understand the world through violent clashes of 
militarized force. Popular culture provides multiples avenues through which these 
understandings are articulated (Davies and Philpot 44). It is for this reason that the 
environmental humanities must study how tropes of militarism intermingle and both co-
shape and are co-shaped by environmental(ist) discourses. In this project, I center the 
tropes, narratives, and images associated with the migrants of the Anthropocene, the 
“political figure(s) of our time” (Nail 235). Tropes, as Rosemarie Garland-Thompson 
reminds us, are “structured by sets of images and ideas that have slipped from their 
original metaphoric status to control perceptions of” social phenomena (16). In the case 
of militarism, the environmental migrant and refugee appear across narrative and media 
to evoke a world of inequality, instability, and insurgency. In literary representation, these 
tropes carry forward the suppositions of the world as a dangerous and hostile place where 
an allegiance and support of state-sanctioned violence and control is a necessary 
presupposition of life, stability, and prosperity itself for the Global North.  
However, while the texts I take up in this dissertation almost invariably depict 
narrative political ecologies rife with different forms and scales of violence, the turn to 
the figure of the “environmental refugee” in these works refuses to reduce migrant 
subjectivity to mere victim or menace. The environmental refugee’s fraught position as a 
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target of violence gives this figure a unique viewpoint from which to critique 
environmental militarism. For example, one of the novels I study, The Tattooed Soldier, 
follows the experience of three Guatemalan migrants living in Los Angeles, and through 
their displacement demonstrates the various forms of environmental violence and 
inequality stemming from their encounters with military forces. In Parable of the Sower 
and Parable of the Talents, utopian communities are forged by migrants fleeing the 
structural violence of “failing economies and tortured ecologies,” and in Junot Díaz’s 
“Monstro” the potential violence of refugees to dominant social orders celebrates the 
liberatory potential of violence. By placing at the center the often-marginalized figure of 
the environmental migrant and refugee, this project reevaluates and reforms reductive 
views of migrants as helpless victims or menacing threats.   
“In a few decades,” as issues of climate justice continue to challenge political, 
economic, and ethical systems, how will the “relationship between environment, 
resources, and conflict” be made “obvious?” Will these connections be valued precisely 
because we have avoided the collision course of rising tides and rising militarism? Or 
will the obviousness of these connections be made salient through constant warring over 
scarce resources? No dissertation can answer such enormous questions. However, I see 
the texts I consider within this work as offering crucial insights into such questions. 
Changing Americans’ public capacity to creatively and compassionately reason over 
issues like increased flows of environmental migrants and refugees is vital to adapting to 
climate change. This cultural adaptation is often overlooked compared to the technical 
adaptation of building solar panels and improved levees, but it is essential to promoting 
just, peaceful adaption. Human communities, despite living in ever more disrupted 
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environments, still have the cultural resources to promote social and environmental 
justice and avert war. The task for peace-builders in the 21st century is to challenge 
militaristic “solutions” to growing environmental problems while attending to how 
environmental disruption may instigate conflict and exacerbate social oppression.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE SPECTACULAR AND SLOW VIOLENCE OF WAR’S ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM IN TOBAR’S THE TATTOOED SOLDIER 
 
Introduction 
  
 This chapter offers an environmental justice reading of Hector Tobar’s The 
Tattooed Soldier. In doing so, I take up Rob Nixon’s call for environmental literary 
studies to tackle “the environmental fallout of U.S. foreign policy head on” by tracing the 
ways in which U.S. imperialism produces different kinds of environmental violence at the 
periphery and core of empire within Tobar’s The Tattooed Soldier. Building on Rob 
Nixon’s concept of “slow violence” and Julie Avril Minich’s attention to the importance 
of corporeal metaphors within this novel I read modern U.S. imperialism operating 
through mutualistic symbiosis between spectacular repressive violence and attritional 
environmental violence. Understanding the specific dynamics of this relation is central to 
the ability of state power at the periphery and core of U.S. Empire5 to hail and dominate 
subjects.  
The Tattooed Soldier indexes the ecologies of violence inherent in U.S. foreign 
policy and the repressive Guatemalan state. The Tattooed Soldier links these hazardous 
environments to structural racism in the United States as well as racially-based genocide 
                                                      
5 I follow Hardt and Negri’s definition of Empire, that holds that contests between individual nation states 
that marked earlier imperialist systems are being supplanted by a new order of biopolitical power composed 
of overlapping and at times discordant assemblages of political, legal, military, and economic actors. This 
form of Empire envelopes and mediates social experience across the globe to secure the domination of U.S. 
interests. Within this system “enemies” are not ideological threats to Empire, but rather banal law-breakers 
and undesirables to be managed through policing actions (Hardt and Negri 6).  
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and ecocide in Guatemala. In doing so, The Tattooed Soldier provides a powerful case 
study of the causal links between different forms of environmental violence. It is a story 
that asks its readers to consider the links between ostensibly disparate forms of violence, 
oppression, and environmental change; the complex terrain of environmental justice. The 
novel places at its center counterinsurgency warfare and cruelly ironic rhetorics of 
cleanliness and public health as mechanisms of environmental change and social control. 
 The Tattooed Soldier grapples with the fraught history of the U.S.A.'s military and 
economic entanglement in the Guatemalan Civil War and genocide through the stories of 
three focal characters; two living in Los Angeles just prior to the 1992 Rodney King 
uprising, and one left dead at the hands of the "Jaguar Battalion" after voicing concern 
over water pollution in the refugee slums of Guatemala. The two immigrants, Antonio 
Bernal and Guillermo Longoria, live unaware of each other in East L.A. After being laid 
off from his job and evicted from his apartment, Antonio Bernal wanders L.A.’s Crown 
Hill neighborhood and McArthur Park until he spies one of his family’s killers playing 
chess. Antonio recognizes the killer of his wife and son by his distinctive Jaguar tattoo, 
and begins stalking Guillermo Longoria. Antonio eventually exacts his revenge in the 
chaotic midst of the 1992 L.A. Uprising, shooting Guillermo and leaving him to bleed to 
death in an abandoned tunnel. While ostensibly “a chilling revenge story6” of how 
Antonio brutally avenges his dead wife and son, the majority of the book concerns itself 
with mapping layers of different forms of economic, social, and environmental injustice 
across the geographies of Guatemala and the United States. By describing racialized 
warfare and inequality similarly in both Guatemala and the United States, the narrative 
                                                      
6 This blurb appears on the Penguin first edition paperback cover.  
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links different moments of oppression through the metaphors and rhetorics that legitimate 
and support state-sanctioned violence and pollution (Minich 212).   
 It is during Longoria’s time at Fort Bragg studying under the tutelage of School of 
the Americas (SOA) instructors that he embraces his identity as a member of the Jaguar 
Battalion and finds conviction in the military’s role in bringing “order” to a wild world. 
The narrative follows Longoria’s SOA training, and provides a scene in which the 
connections between state military force, environmental degradation, and ideological 
representation are most explicitly articulated. The insidious glue that holds these three 
forces together is the methodology and practice of “psychological operations,” or, 
“Psyops.” Longoria’s instructor, Lieutenant Sanchez, begins training the Guatemalans by 
explaining that Psyops is the use of “tricks of the mind to defeat the enemy,” (221). 
Sanchez continues:  
 “In Psyops we fight terror with terror… We fight confusion by creating more 
 confusion. We fight lies with lies. And we separate the enemy from his 
 sustenance, starve him.” (221) 
 
By “separating” the enemy from “sustenance,” Psyops is a form of weaponry that shapes 
populations and environments. This kind of environmental violence is an attack on 
resources as well as the use of environmental resources (or the depravation thereof) as a 
weapon against humans.  
 During the macabre apex of the Montt-ordered massacres in the early 1980s, 
military squadrons like Longoria’s Jaguar Battalion embarked on a campaign to raze the 
Quiche department of peasants, villages, and the forests which the Ejército Guerrillero de 
los Pobres (Guerilla Army of the Poor) supposedly relied on for food, timber, medicine, 
and shelter (Schimmer 2, Schirmer 61-62).  This “scorched earth” policy was intended 
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not, by definition, to be an excessive use of force, but rather an excessive display of 
force. Burning down villages and forests is meant to intimidate peasants from supporting 
the insurgency while also effectively weaponizing environmental inequality in the 
matazonas (killing zones) of the counterinsurgency operations (Schirmer 45). In the early 
1980s approximately 200,000 Guatemalans were disappeared or killed by the army and 
civil patrols, and 626 Mayan villages were burned to the ground (Sanford 150). Indeed, 
the “70/30 Bullets and Beans” doctrine that characterized the army’s approach to 
counterinsurgency following the coup that brought Rios Montt to power was intended as 
a “measured” and “targeted” use of force, compared to the “100% bullets” 
counterinsurgency tactics used in the war in the 1970s and early genocidal sweeps of 
1980-1982 (Schirmer 49). As Jennifer Schirmer notes, the pivot to “30% bullets and 70% 
beans” does not accurately reflect a reduction in direct or indirect violence committed by 
the Guatemalan military but rather a turn towards an ever more expansive role of the 
military in civil affairs and development while “targeting” tremendous violence more 
“efficiently” in the matazonas (ibid 78). In this kind of warfare, “efficient” violence is 
that which kills the greatest number of “targets” with minimal energy and planning. The 
expansive role reflects an important “cultural turn” in the mechanisms of modern 
counterinsurgency that conceives of warfare as “armed social work” (Gregory 9). As a 
biopolitical regime, counterinsurgency campaigns like the “30% bullets and 70% beans” 
initiative in Guatemala attempt to train and produce docile populations that will, in turn, 
produce life in terms amenable to the State. The extensive use of psychological 
operations by the Guatemalan military were seen by military leaders as central to both the 
endgame of war and the development of the State.  
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 After describing the basic logic of Psyops as one of deploying affective discourses 
as a weapon (“lies, terror”), the narrative moves away from quoting Sanchez directly and 
paraphrases his lecture:    
 The guerillas depended on the peasants for nourishment, Sanchez explained. If 
 you cut off the source of nourishment, the guerillas would slowly die, like a corn 
 plant deprived of water, withering in the sun. (221) 
 
It is unclear in this quote if Sanchez or Longoria characterizes this style of warfare 
through this particular metaphor, but I read these two sentences as Longoria processing 
Sanchez’s argument for Psyops’ effectiveness by reimagining the tactics within an 
agricultural metaphor, one he could viscerally understand because of his upbringing as a 
farmer7. Longoria listens to Lt. Sanchez because Longoria enjoys the social distance he 
has gained from his former life, a life “Longoria couldn’t help look at the ground in 
shame, remembering his own family” each time officers blamed the peasants for “the 
backward nature of the country” and “everything” (221).  Longoria, a short indigenous 
man, literally looks up to the “tall, round-faced Puerto Rican who spoke excellent 
Caribbean Spanish” (222). Having internalized a racist self-hatred of indigenous farmers 
and embracing the militarism of the army, Longoria is in the perfect (if tortured) position 
to see the devastating logic of Psyops. The logic undergirding the metaphor, that of 
separating the guerillas from the nourishing peasants, echoes how high-ranking 
Guatemalan officers during the height of genocidal and ecocidal violence in Guatemala 
(Schirmer 46, 117-120). In an interview with Jennifer Schirmer, for example, General 
Héctor Alejandro Gramajo Morales (later Guatemala’s Minister of Defense) drew a series 
                                                      
7 Maize is the principle sustenance crop grown by indigenous farmers of Guatemala, and would therefore 
have been the crop most closely associated with Guillermo’s childhood. He imagines maize as he dies, 
further suggesting that he may have supplied the metaphor as a means of grasping Sanchez’s description of 
Psyops’ goals.  
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of diagrams showing how Guatemala’s counterinsurgency operations attempted to 
“[attack] until… the Population (P) was separated from the subversive leaders” (quoted in 
Schirmer 50).    
 The irony that this “cure” seems to lay waste to far greater swaths of the country’s 
body than the actual insurgency seems utterly lost on the erstwhile agriculturalist. 
Instead, he raptly listens to Sanchez’s instructions:  
 Disorder is your friend. Violence and randomness, that’s the recipe. If the people 
 believe death can come from anywhere, anytime, they will be paralyzed by fear… 
 Dispense enough fear, and the people will be paralyzed into inaction. And 
 inaction is what we’re shooting for here… (222-23).   
 
To this Longoria cries, “¡Yo entiendo!” (223). Razing villages to ash, killing children, 
burning down valuable tropical forests… these actions devastated the infrastructure and 
ecosystems of Chimaltenago, Huehuetenago, and Quiche departmentos in the early 
1980s, leaving thousands of people dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced from 
their homes and livelihoods. Yet the physical devastation was conducted as part and 
parcel of psychological operations, and indeed constitutes a particular tactic of 
psychological operations in counterinsurgency that I term “spectacular.” Lisa Wedeen 
describes such spectacles as modes of representation which “represent a regime’s 
understanding of dominance and community” as well as “functional strategies [which] 
enforce dominance and construct community” (13). Inaction is not a given state; it must 
be produced through the movement of social energy. The fear created through spectacular 
violence “paralyzes into inaction” a larger public and thus constructs the “orderly” 
hierarchy and functioning that modern counterinsurgency operations (in and out of 
Guatemala) strive for. The more-than-human environment, which is wild by definition, 
and hence unable to “choose” allegiance to any political faction, must be likewise 
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disciplined in order to ensure the human subjects remain dependent and docile towards 
the State. The ability to access natural resources becomes dependent upon a village’s 
quiescence and contribution to the military state. 
 The logic of Psyops as it is articulated here is an expression of counterinsurgency 
doctrine as the United States and its Central American partners in Guatemala and El 
Salvador understood it during the 1980s. This iteration of counterinsurgency practice 
controls and modifies environments to become implements of terror. The understanding 
of scorched earth warfare as a form of precision psychological warfare stems in part from 
the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s. U.S. forces 
spread 19 million gallons herbicide defoliants (including the infamous Agent Orange) 
over roughly 10% of South Vietnam and used bulldozers and incendiary bombs to level 
huge swaths of territory (Agent Orange Record).  The work of counterinsurgency then 
and now in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the proliferation of militarized 
borderlands the world over is to create violent environments that produce docile bodies 
(Anderson 2). Counterinsurgency is a “politicomilitary struggle” for the “control” of a 
population. While counterinsurgency campaigns involve battles, the grounds for victory 
or defeat does not lie with military victory in those battles. Instead, each force targets a 
population for the “right and ability to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the 
population” (Kilcullen 29). This, David Kilcullen argues, is counterinsurgency theory “in 
a nutshell.”  
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Reading for Ecologies of Violence 
 
 The Tattooed Soldier models ways in which this spectacular military violence and 
attritional environmental violence work in tandem to secure the lasting, deleterious 
effects of environmental racism in Guatemala and the United States. I argue that these 
different modes of violence are legitimated and enacted through similar rhetorics of state 
corporeality, cleanliness, and purity in both countries. In doing so, I build on Julie Avril 
Minich’s reading of the novel that links the inequalities created through racialized 
warfare in Guatemala to racial and economic inequality in the United States. Like 
Minich, I find the rhetoric and metaphors of bodily purity and hygiene in the novel 
highlight the shared genealogy of the systems of oppression targeting racial minorities in 
both countries (212). The novel’s centering of environmental hazards as weapons used 
against the bodies of racial minorities suggests the importance of studying armed 
conflict’s environmental justice ramifications to broader theorizations of social justice 
and oppression.  
 Defining “environmental violence” for the sake of this analysis is tricky, for if one 
defines violence as any action which causes damage, death, or pain, most if not all  
environmental public health issues could be interpreted as “violent.” Rob Nixon terms 
this expansive view of environmental damage as “slow violence;”  “violence that occurs 
gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time 
and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (3). This 
attritional violence is similar to Johan Galtung’s concept of “structural violence,” but 
Nixon places a greater emphasis on the potentially nonlinear, long-term effects of present 
actions. For example, depleted uranium bullet casings may leach heavy metals and 
  43 
radiation into a water source today only to accumulate and negatively affect ecosystems 
and humans far downstream in space and time. While I believe learning to reconceive of 
pollution and resource depletion as violence is a productive lens for directing research 
and teaching, the association of slow violence with environmental pollution downplays 
forms of eruptive, spectacular violence that also are environmental.8 These slow-violence 
frames help highlight the violent effects of quotidian pollution while ignoring 
intentionally weaponized pollution used for strategic purposes. Consequently, one way to 
read the ecology of violence depicted in The Tattooed Soldier is in terms of how it makes 
visible how both “fast” and “slow” forms of environmental violence are weaponized in 
armed conflict to create or exacerbate social inequalities.  
Microbios: Discourses of Cleanliness and State Repression  
 
 The Tattooed Soldier is the first novel by Héctor Tobar. Tobar grew up in East 
Lost Angeles, the son of Guatemalan immigrants. Some of the principle scenarios of 
environmental endangerment in the novel are drawn from his father’s stories of life in 
Guatemala (personal correspondence, October 2015). Before becoming a novelist and 
creative nonfiction writer, Tobar was a journalist for The Los Angeles Times, sharing a 
Pulitzer Prize with the Times’ team for coverage of the 1992 L.A. Uprising, otherwise 
known as “The Rodney King Riots,” or the “1992 Civil Unrest.” Tobar’s training and 
ongoing practice as a journalist heavily influences his fiction; Tobar describes his writing 
process as one of “intensive research” into all matters related with his story (Personal 
correspondence, October 2015). Tobar’s research, as well as his own experience 
                                                      
8 This difference may be overwrought; Nixon argues that a purpose of attending to slow violence is to see 
the pressures which often incite “exponential” violence in the form of more conventionally perceivable 
armed conflicts (13).  
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navigating the 1992 Uprising as a correspondent for The L.A. Times, is evinced in the 
grounded realism of The Tattooed Soldier. Yet it is not the novel’s mimetic fidelity that 
makes it a useful text within a literature of environmental military violence and the 
literature of environmental justice more generally. The strength of literary 
representations’ are in their ability to flexibly represent the experiences of living with 
environmental degradation and the simultaneously global and historical roots of forces 
contributing to environmental oppression (Sze 163-164)9. The Tattooed Soldier provides 
especially fertile ground for the seeds of a literature of environmental militarism to take 
root. It does so because its three focal characters encounter different forms of 
environmental military violence through unique ideological lenses, and thus give vantage 
to the ideological representations that shoot through spectacular and attritional forms of 
environmental violence depicted in the book.  
 Tobar describes the physical and political environments of Guatemala in the 
1980s and Los Angeles in 1992 using similar words and phrases, associating the two 
spaces. Specifically police action, genocide, and the microbial hazards of poverty appear 
in the novel within similar discourses of pollution, infection, and sanitation. Most of the 
characters (including those in positions of relative social power and those in marginalized 
positions) describe marginalized peoples and environments associated with these peoples 
as infections, vermin, or viruses. These descriptions are dehumanizing, and evidence the 
claim that those who commit violence dehumanize their victims through already 
                                                      
9 Writing in 2000, the same year as Julie Sze’s call for greater literary study of environmental justice, the 
environmental sociologist David Pellow wrote that comprehensive theories of environmental justice need 
to incorporate foci of “history and processes” which result in environmental inequalities, “the complexity 
of stakeholder interactions” and a “life-cycle approach to environmental harms” (590-97). A strength of 
literature is that literary texts refract and critically reflect on each of these criteria due to the fact that a 
novel is not restricted by disciplinary limitations and has the formal length and complexity necessary to 
engage each criterion. 
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powerful discourses and affects of pestilence, disgust, and aversion (Tucker and Russell 
8). Specifically, calling people and places dirty, pestilential, or noxious designates these 
people and places as “ecological others,” a term Sarah Jaquette Ray uses to describe 
those who are defined as “bad” for nature and thus subject to eugenic programs enacted 
through environmentalist rationales (15). The bitter irony of this violence is that these 
discursive “props” conceal the ongoing violence of toxics, microbes, and material 
pollution used as weapons against the very people who are dehumanized and rendered as 
toxic influences (Minich 223).  
 While the Los Angeles Sanitation Department, the L.A.P.D., and the Guatemalan 
military dehumanize the target populations by conceptualizing these people as vermin in 
need of eradication, this dehumanization is rendered through the deployment of 
superficially environmentalist tropes and attention to the physical infrastructure of 
specific places. Julie Avril Minich argues that the deployment of such discourses is a 
“rhetorical devices that nations employ to incorporate their citizens into a unified body” 
(214). The racially idealized body of the state, be it the “mestizaje” ideal projected by the 
ladino military regime in Guatemala or the ostensible “multiculturalism of the United 
States” “is not the united body it purports to be” (Minich 214). The necessity for 
repressive force to masquerade as required, even beneficial, public hygiene programs in 
both locations means that neither state body is just and whole. Minich argues that the 
“discursive props” of mestizaje (in Guatemala) and multiculturalism (in the United 
States) constitute a form of “national prosthesis” that construct a normate body that 
occupies an ableist social location predicated on unmarked, dominant racial identities. As 
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metaphorical prostheses, these rhethorics both hide and reveal the illogic of the states’ 
claims to purity, justice, and unity (Minich 213).  
While I find Minich’s concept of national prosthesis through ableist and racist 
discourses compelling, my analysis adds to her reading of the novel by explicating the 
environmentalist rhetoric within these same metaphors of state corporeality and 
cleanliness. I argue the logic of state purity and state repression are both aligned with and 
are articulated through the construction of particular environments and human relations to 
these environments.  
 In both Guatemala and in Los Angeles, repressive state apparatuses discipline 
unruly bodies to ensure docility and productivity among subdued subjects. Guatemala 
and the L.A. Police Department represent the primary agents of repressive state action in 
different settings and act through different forms of violence, each force’s position is 
enabled and maintained through the creation and reproduction of hegemony. As I’ve 
noted above, both the Guatemalan military and the L.A.P.D. justify their use of repressive 
violence through similar rhetorics of state-corporeality, sanitation and cleanliness. These 
rhetorics point to how even the most blatant violence (as in the “scorched earth” state 
terrorism of the Jaguar Battalion, or the demolition crews of the sanitation department) 
always operate through ideology as well as through physical force. 
 Early in the chronology of the plot’s present, the Los Angeles Police Department 
teams up with the “sanitation” department to bulldoze a homeless encampment in the 
Crown Hill area of Los Angeles, a real-life neighborhood that in the early 1990s would 
have been a mixed plot of “sagging apartments, homeless camps, weed-strewn lots and a 
smattering of faded historic homes” (Mosse 2004). The “lush knoll of wild plants and 
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grasses in the middle of the city” provides space for Antonio and Jose Juan, freshly 
evicted from their apartment, to camp alongside other homeless Angelinos (13). Antonio 
experiences déjà vu looking at the ruins of the old Crown Hill neighborhood, registering 
the novel ecosystem as the product of some ancient war like the one he experienced in 
Guatemala (14). Recognizing the “plastic shelters, the ruined homes” of the area, Antonio 
begins to feel a “kinship with the flattened earth around him” (15). When the L.A.P.D. 
comes to displace the squatters, an officer evokes “Penal Code Section Six-Four-Seven” 
(“a misdemeanor”) through a bullhorn to roust the homeless people from their shanty 
homes (Tobar 231). When one of the camp’s inhabitants, “the Mayor,” challenges the 
police officers as to the legality and morality of demolishing their homes, one police 
officer responds by declaring the shacks “health hazards,” adding quickly that “this is 
private property” (231). The violence of the demolition to the property of the homeless is 
justified through a protective rhetoric privileging the property of the absentee landowner 
and an appeal to public health. This rhetoric criminalizes poverty by casting it a danger to 
public health. The pale green vehicles with the word “Sanitation” stenciled on their door 
gobble up the encampment, leaving “nothing to be found but the bumpy soil beneath… 
the crisscross of the bulldozer’s long tracks, [and] the wounds gouged by the shovel” 
(232). This scene shows that the act of sanitizing the wild encampment is both injurious 
to the nonhuman biota of the hill as well as the people living in the camp. If the squatters 
were indeed an unsanitary threat to people’s health, the sanitation department has broken 
their de facto quarantine and dispersed these people across Los Angeles. What was a 
vibrant community among a novel ecosystem of grasses, plants, and animals is reduced, 
yet again, to a muddy palimpsest of present and past real estate speculation, poverty, and 
  48 
state violence. The ability of the state to “protect” the speculative project of private 
property holders is articulated within a regime of sanitation and health, while grinding out 
the actual life and community that the Mayor categorized as a “liberated zone” (47). The 
private interest is cloaked in invocation of the public good. For Crown Hill, that once 
bore stately Victorian homes before the last forty years of real estate speculation, the 
cycles of capital and violence are another profound moment of déjà vu, one that the 
refugees of the economy and far-away wars can relate.  
Longoria the jaguar  
 Ideology is not just used in public rhetoric, but interpellated within individual 
subjects. Guillermo Longoria, the eponymous tattooed soldier, epitomizes how subjects 
are interpellated within the rhetorics of state sanitation and control in this novel. 
Understanding the processes of Guillermo’s subjection are critical to explicating how 
slow and eruptive environmental violence interact within the novel. Longoria’s identity 
as a Guatemalan soldier is predicated and justified as one spent “fighting… a cancer” 
(63). Believing that atrocities are necessary to “cure” such a “cancer” allows Longoria to 
commit environmental violence as well as overlook the slow devastation of that 
violence’s ramifications. Thus, through Longoria’s spectacular interpersonal violence is 
slow violence made inscrutable and incontestable within a warzone. 
 Longoria is trained by his superior officers to understand the civil war as a 
biopolitical act undertaken to protect Guatemala’s population. Longoria’s colonel 
compares Guatemala with a human body, one that is susceptible to disease and pollution. 
The “uncles and cousins… and children” of the guerrillas all constitute the “organisms” 
or a “virus” that threaten the metaphorical corporeal body of the state (63, 64). The need 
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to stave off infection justifies the brutal acts that Longoria is forced to commit as a 
soldier, as squashing the infection theoretically spares the rest of the “body.” The impetus 
for genocide, viewed in terms of eradicating cancer and removing pollution, is an 
“environmentalist” rhetoric gone horribly awry. It is also apiece with other 20th century 
justifications for genocide. In Why Not Kill Them All? Chirot and McCauley argue that 
perpetrators of genocides fear pollution most when the metaphorical pollution is deemed 
evidence of failure in the “natural” or social order (39). Edmund Russell adds that the 
ability to destroy humans and environmental features on unprecedented scales developed 
in many 20th-century conflicts (such as the WWI and WWII) through the metaphoric 
rendering of war as pest extermination10 (144-145). In a similar way, Longoria recognizes 
that “you had to believe” the officers account of children as bearers of an incurable virus. 
The consequences of not believing the officers are omitted, but are implicitly obvious to 
the mostly indigenous recruits who are regularly bludgeoned and threatened by their 
officers.  Ripped from his home and mother, Longoria begins to embrace his role as a 
soldier and internalizes the eugenicist logic of his superiors:  
Sometimes the children were contaminated with it too. You killed the cousins and 
the uncles to make sure the virus was dead… the parents passed the virus along to 
their children. It made you want to kill the parents again and again, even after 
they were dead, because if it wasn’t for the fucking parents you wouldn’t have to 
kill the children. (Tobar 63-64)  
 
Believing this absurd rhetoric of national corporeal health seems to be Longoria’s only 
way of surviving his service. Yet as his iconic tattoo suggests, Longoria emerges from 
                                                      
10 As both Peter Sloterdijk and Edmund Russell’s work suggests, deployments of chemical and biological 
weapons were coeval with the environmentalization of armed conflict. These weapons targeted the 
environmental conditions of life itself, and killed humans and nonhumans, combatants and noncombatants, 
indiscriminately. Technologies which target the common biological conditions for life’s existence, it would 
seem, also provide a rhetorical platform for dehumanizing, and verminizing, human populations.  
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this service a transformed man who carries the trauma, guilt, and anger of one who has 
committed crimes against humanity. He struggles against the “necessity” of killing 
children and his own identity by projecting his anger and hatred onto indigenous families, 
not his commanding officers or the national project of “winning” a war against his 
compatriots. Longoria struggles with his actions, but sees his integration into the body of 
the army to ultimately be a cleansing and elevating struggle against his Quiche identity 
(Minich 220).    
 Unlike Antonio and Elena, whom the reader comes to know only in their adult 
lives, the narrative treats Guillermo both as a child as well as a military officer. Thus, the 
reader sees Guillermo develop as both the brutally oppressed and the brutal oppressor. As 
a child Guillermo works with his mother11 to “grow corn on two acres of hillside” until 
the army abducts him.12 After his forced conscription, Guillermo is disciplined by the 
army into Longoria the sergeant (33). Through Guillermo’s “education” in the army the 
narrative reveals how Guillermo is transformed from a “skinny campesino with a wispy 
mustache… head bowed before the officer” to a muscular, modern-day Spartan with 
utmost fealty to hierarchical order (37) His superior officers hail Guillermo as Longoria, 
his surname, and this hailing symbolizes the profound physical and moral change that the 
army brings to the boy.  As “Longoria,” his head is shaved, and the army begins 
immediately to humiliate Guillermo and teach him to feel shame about his indigenous, 
peasant origins (216). Guillermo muses later in life that “you had to love the army, 
                                                      
11 The lack of any reference to Guillermo’s father suggests that he has, like Guillermo, left his native town 
for a life abroad or already become victim to the war prior to the narrative’s start.  
 
12 The novel is unclear as to the mechanism by which Guillermo is conscripted, however, the timing of the 
narrative (in the early to mid 1980s) fits with the mass mobilization of up to a million men into “civil 
patrols” that carried out numerous human rights violations under the order of the army (Sanford 148).   
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because if you didn’t love it you were finished... you had to believe” (63). In short, 
Guillermo is broken down and remade as “Longoria the Jaguar.” The ideology of order, 
freedom from pollution, and corporal strength carries into his life in L.A. after his 
involvement in the war. He views the polluted neighborhoods of L.A. as showing signs 
that “the same kind of infection [as in Guatemala] was spreading” into America, which 
he had previously envisioned as a “country where order and cleanliness reigned supreme” 
(216). Expelled from the body of Guatemalan state, Longoria obsessively erects and 
fastidiously maintains a barracks-like apartment and personal appearance that epitomize 
personal cleanliness and hygiene. Longoria’s devotion to cleanliness, his violence 
towards those around him (including his customers at a money-wiring service and his 
girlfriend), and his continued analysis of urban life within the logics of counterinsurgency 
and war, all evince the extent to which Guillermo the campesino is ultimately supplanted 
by Longoria the soldier.    
 After his schooling at Fort Bragg, Longoria maintains his fealty to order, 
cleanliness, and Psyops as his guiding belief system for the rest of his life. The extent to 
which his identity is married to this ideology is ultimately measured at the moment of his 
death. Propelled by his rage and by his inability to recognize or forgive his own frailty, 
Longoria attempts to chase and kill Antonio after Antonio shoots him. After Antonio 
shoots Longoria in the shoulder with a .22 caliber pistol, Longoria pursues Antonio 
through the chaotic streets of Los Angeles in the midst of the 1992 Uprising. Longoria 
eventually succumbs to the massive loss of blood and falls down near the homeless 
encampment where Antonio has been living. Antonio carries Longoria into an abandoned 
Pacific Electric Red Car tunnel to hide the body. Initially Longoria is frightened by being 
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surrounded by the filth in the tunnel, and snaps out of a semi-conscious revelry when he 
comes in contact with the “muddy floor” (300). But as Longoria bleeds out in the muck, 
an interesting change to his character appears to take place. This man, who has so 
obsessively militated against “pollution” and pursued personal purity and cleanliness, 
begins to imagine himself as the campesino teenager who once worked the soil with his 
mother; a memory triggered by being immersed in the mud. He imagines a return to life 
revolving “around the cycles of rain and harvest” and hallucinates his mother walking 
towards him through the stalks of corn that have sprouted and risen through the mud. “He 
smiles at his dirty toes, mud caked in the nails... so strange and happy,” (301). Yet when 
his mother speaks to Longoria, she calls him, “Balam” (33, 301). In this moment it is 
clear that Longoria has switched to thinking in his first language, Quiche, but is hailed in 
his mother’s tongue as “Jaguar.” Although in his final moment he recovers his first 
language, signifying, along with his “strange and happy” return to an ethereal field of 
maize and mud, some rapprochement to his identity as a Mayan farmer, he remains 
marked as a member of the Jaguar Battalion. The title negates the wishful reclamation of 
his innocence, and proves that the scar of Guillermo’s ideological branding, his true 
Jaguar tattoo, remains his central identity at the moment of his death. 
Germ warfare 
 
 Longoria’s belief in the metaphors of a unified and pure state body cause him to 
both embrace the terroristic spectacular violence of Psyops and overlook the obvious 
ironies and inconsistencies of this counterinsurgency tactic.  The antiseptic rhetoric of the 
state make it difficult for each of the characters to apprehend the environmental violence 
produced through state violence. This additional ironic resonance of the antiseptic 
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rhetoric of the state body is most tragically exemplified by the Guatemalan state’s 
propagation of actual microbial infection amongst the impoverished residents of San 
Cristobal, as well as the U.S. state’s environmental racism that produces “the toxic soup 
and hydrocarbon winds” of East Los Angeles. The bluntest descriptions of environmental 
violence in The Tattooed Soldier occur during “Part 2: Antonio and Elena,” when Elena 
takes it upon herself to uncover and stop the pollution that is killing babies in San 
Cristobal. Funeral possessions “float” past the pregnant Elena’s fortress abode on the top 
of a hill in San Cristobal; three to four children are buried each month. The children hail 
from a slum that holds only one thousand residents. The location of San Cristobal in the 
novel itself is somewhat of a mystery, which is interesting within a novel that pays so 
close attention to how power relationships are mapped across actual space in a realist 
manner. Guatemala is a small country and the text of the novel clearly states that the 
small town is close to Quetzaltenango in the Totonicapán department (West Central 
Guatemala, not far from the origins Longoria and the bulk of the 1982-83 massacres 
committed under order of the Montt regime) (Steinberg et al 3-5). There is indeed a San 
Cristobal in the Totonicapán department, northwest of Quetzaltenango. Yet despite these 
geographic cues, the town’s location is confounded by an odd description of the towns 
Elena and Antonio pass as they flee the capital city along the Pan American Highway; 
Elena relieves herself at a rest stop in San Marcos twice, even though this town lies over 
an hour’s drive west of San Cristobal, which in turn is west of Guatemala City. Thus, the 
exact location of the town, in an otherwise realist novel, is mystified.  
The military state’s terrorism in the region both produces the attritional violence 
responsible for the children’s deaths as well as the inability of San Cristobal’s residents to 
  54 
meaningfully apprehend the violence in such a way that they can stop it. Elena is 
dumbfounded by her maid’s casual description of the many deaths amongst the children 
from illness in a nearby area called Colonia La Joya. The maid explains to Elena that La 
Joya is “a limonada, a slum they built in the ravine by the old bridge” (Tobar 116). La 
Joya, supposedly placed at the outskirts of San Cristobal in the Totonicapán department, 
would be more correctly described as “La Limonada,” an actual slum founded in a ravine 
bordering Guatemala City after the land reforms of deposed president Árbenz Guzmán 
were revoked. Refugees of the civil war and those displaced by military land grabs 
flocked to the capital city and took up residence in unused land near the city’s dumps.  
 The origins of La Limonada are mirrored in the fictitious limonada, La Joya (even 
down to the absurdly incongruous name13). According to Lemonade International, a U.S.-
based community development NGO working in the ravine, La Limonada, with a 
population of 60,000 residents, is the largest urban slum in Central America (“La 
Limonada”). The images and descriptions of La Limonada on the websites of aid 
organizations such as Lemonade International or El Fondo de Apoyo Comunitario 
International resonate with those images and descriptions of La Joya Elena confronts in 
The Tattooed Soldier (121-122). Elena gains access to the “burning trash stacked into 
small pyramids” within a wild, overgrown, “city of corrugated tin, plastic, and paper… 
patchwork structures” by wandering away from her 19th century colonial home in the 
center of San Cristobal.  
                                                      
13 Tobar has not relocated La Limonada to San Cristobal in this narrative, but instead narrated “a 
limonada;” another Guatemalan asentamiento created by internal refugees of the grueling civil war that 
Elena, Antonio, and Longoria each fall prey to. The presence of “a thousand or so” inhabitants in La Joya 
contextualizes Antonio and Elena’s relatively privileged exile from a core city to the “country” within the 
larger displacement of nearly 1.6 million Guatemalans inside and out of their country during the conflict. 
Elena is determined to play “biologist, a public health expert” for “this limonada” in order to halt the 
alarming flood of deaths she witnesses from her window. 
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 Elena, whose support for liberal ideas and marching with protestors in college 
made her a target of the Montt regime and caused her to flee the capital, reacts to the 
pollution by immediately concluding that she needs to take political action. Elena is 
powerfully moved by the poverty and pollution she encounters in her investigations, and 
unlike her local informants, feels that the situation can be ameliorated if she somehow 
intervenes. She describes the untreated sewage she finds upstream from La Joya as 
something out of “the nineteenth century, things [she] read about in books, conditions 
that belong to history” (133). Despite the research she conducted which led her to 
“suspect the answer to the riddle” of why so many people were dying in one area was 
“probably quite simple,” she is unable to determine the cause of the pollution from 
interviewing San Cristobal’s residents. Her maid, Marisol, explains to Elena that the “bad 
air” in the ravine, along with the poverty of the residents, accounts for why “those babies 
die so easy” (emphasis added, 116). Both hypotheses locate the source of pollution in the 
intrinsic nature of a place (the bad air of a ravine) or unhygienic behavior of the poor. 
Both these explanations naturalize the problem and scapegoat the poor as naturally 
unhealthy, and thus suggest the deaths are inevitable. Marisol elaborates that the cause of 
death is “diarrhea,” which of course is symptom of water-borne diseases, not “bad air.” 
Both Marisol and Father Van der Est (who would likely be more formally educated than 
Marisol) tell Elena that the cause of death is diarrhea, yet neither is forthcoming with an 
accurate attribution for the diseases’ cause. Elena, who carries her activist ethics with her, 
is unable to believe her eyes when she looks upon the utter lack of sanitation at the dump. 
Elena immediately confides to Antonio, “we have to stop it. This sewage is killing the 
people downstream. It’s killing the babies” (133).   
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 The denial of the pollution among the local people, and the shock Elena 
experiences upon finding the dump, speaks to how the war emaciates democratic 
governance, and by extension, environmental stewardship. Even if the residents of La 
Joya came to live downstream of the dump through poverty, and not the acute 
displacement of war, the inability of residents or Elena to voice and redress their 
concerns without being executed speaks to the war’s effect. The novel thus offers not 
only a depiction of deadly pollution, but also an internally held, subtle explanation for 
why it persists without contestation. It is implausible that Elena’s letter to the 
Totonicapán department government would be the first indication that there was a public 
health problem in San Cristobal. Instead, the slow violence of untreated sewage is 
condoned by the state to continue the work that Guatemalan death squads started in the 
refugees’ villages. The public murder of Elena and Carlos remind residents of San 
Cristobal and La Joya how dangerous it is to even acknowledge the attritional violence 
they are complicit in or subjected to.  The three to four deaths each month in La Joya 
constitute what Rob Nixon calls “cold war casualties” of the Guatemalan Civil War; 
“post-combat” fatalities killed by the deferred effects of environmental military violence 
(214-215). Germ warfare hardly requires high-tech military laboratories.  
 Antonio is exposed to similar forms of germ warfare in East Lost Angeles. 
Elena’s peregrinations, and the dangerous infrastructure she encounters, mirror Antonio’s 
forced wandering through L.A.’s “hydrocarbon winds” to find the unkempt shanty town 
of Crown Hill at the start of the novel (10, 122). The “plastic shelters, the ruined homes” 
located on “vacant property” in Crown Hill, focalized through Antonio’s eyes at the start 
of the novel are replicated nearly verbatim by his wife as she sleuths to discover the cause 
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of diarrheal disease in La Joya (16, 122). Just as the residents of La Joya are refugees of 
war, so too are the residents of Crown Hill referred to as “gringo refugees” by Antonio 
(41). Evicted from his apartment, Antonio is himself an internally displaced person on 
top of already being an unofficial international refugee. Just as the peasant refugees are 
rhetorically constructed as threats or obstacles to the modern state, the residents of Crown 
Hill are displaced from their “liberated zone” by the police and sanitation department for 
supposedly being “health hazard[s]” to the larger L.A. community. By rhetorically 
linking Guatemala and Los Angeles through the description of “sanitary” police action 
and the microbial dimensions of poverty, Tobar’s narrative shows how structures of 
oppression in both countries are linked. The similarities of rhetoric are born of a shared 
history of U.S. Empire in Latin America. That both victim and perpetrator of atrocity 
reside within one small, toxic neighborhood in East L.A. is neither accident nor flight of 
fictional fancy. While the war drove both men out of Guatemala in different ways, the 
poverty, xenophobia, and racism they experience in the U.S. push them into similar social 
spaces where they experience new but familiar forms of political disempowerment and 
industrial pollution.   
 In The Tattooed Soldier, the pollution of the inadequately managed landfill 
(“something out of the 19th century”), like the “liquid trashcan” of the lake in McArthur 
Park, seems to sink into the background of the landscape while exerting its insidious 
influence on the bodies trapped in the spatial orbit of its reach (74). The pollution is both 
byproduct and strategic weapon of repressive state authorities that are linked in both 
Guatemala and Los Angeles through the U.S. military’s ongoing sway over Central 
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American governance and military actions14 that devalues and discards people as “health 
threats” and a logic of counterinsurgency that prizes preemption and preparedness against 
emergent (racialized) ‘threats’ (Anderson 211). 
 The atrocities committed by the Guatemalan military initiated multiple forms of 
creeping environmental violence, from the aftermath of the fires destroying agricultural 
and agroforestry lands to the displacement of victims throughout Guatemala and abroad. 
All told, the Commission for Historical Clarification concluded that the conflict displaced 
over one million Mayan Guatemalans internally, and another 200,000 to Mexico or the 
United States (Jonas). Elena’s encounter with the unending stream of small corpses 
flowing past her refuge of relative privilege attests to the fate of many of these displaced 
and impoverished peoples. This is a clear instance in the novel of how a torrent of “fast” 
violence (environmental and just plain old physical violence) enables the gradual rise of 
environmental violence.  The fast, spectacular violence of village massacres and burning 
of forests leads to the attritional violence of poverty and microbial infection for the 
displaced refugees.  
 But what of the inverse relation? Does slow violence lead to fast violence? Nixon 
argues that “attritional violence” can lead to “exponential violence,” a term I dislike. I 
dislike it because “exponential” functions are nonlinear, (a trait that Nixon notes in other 
places to be an important trait of slow violence) but implies an unstoppable expansion of 
                                                      
14 There are additional avenues of intervention that a fuller explication of the U.S.’ links to Guatemala 
should scrutinize. These include corporate interests, particularly those of the United Fruit Company. 
Though the United Fruit Company (UFC) is not mentioned explicitly within the novel, the U.S. military’s 
role in deposing democratically-elected president Árbenz Guzmán in 1954 was linked with the U.S. 
company’s loss of thousands of hectares of farmland to the president’s land reform acts which redistributed 
idle farmland to peasants. Guatemala’s Civil War, which intensified in the 1980s, partially fought in 
defense of American capitalism broadly, and the interests of select U.S. companies, narrowly (see Stephen 
Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer’s authoritative Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in 
Guatemala).  
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violence and precludes other nonlinear functions of violence. For instance, couldn’t the 
functional progression of violence be “sigmoidal” or “logarithmic?” I prefer to 
characterize the kinds of violence Nixon calls “exponential violence” as “eruptive” 
violence; like a seed germinating into a sprout, the slow activity of slow violence beneath 
the surface of perception rises up to pose novel threats.  
 The clearest instance of such an emergence occurs in the destructive climax of the 
novel, when Antonio enacts his vengeance against Guillermo. The acute cause of the 
L.A. Uprising is associated with the acquittal of four L.A.P.D. officers who had been 
accused of using excessive force when detaining Rodney King. Videotape made by an 
eyewitness shows the police horrifically beating King after he attempted to flee from the 
officers. The eruptive response of South Central L.A. communities was precipitous and 
violent, though as in more recent uprisings responding to police assaults or killings of 
black men, this violence was primarily targeted at physical infrastructure, not human 
bodies. That truth aside, 53 people died in the Uprising and hundreds were wounded. 
While the acute cause of the violence was a specific act of police brutality, a long durée 
of structural racism and economic stagnation fueled the collective anger felt by the 
protesters. The attacks on infrastructure and private property are telling; revenge enacted 
against the structures that daily wound and oppress people.  
 Both Antonio and Guillermo view the riotous Uprising through their experiences 
with the Guatemalan Civil War, and fixate on how the physical infrastructure of South 
and East L.A. symbolically and materially produces the outbreak of violence. Antonio is 
caught off-guard by the sudden eruption of violence. Seeing young men with rocks 
“roaming the streets,” he wonders:  
  60 
 How did they get rocks in the middle of the city? [He] looked closer and saw they 
 were just chunks of concrete and brick, pieces of crumbling walls. There were 
 plenty of crumbling walls in this neighborhood and thus no shortage of 
 ammunition. (283) 
 
The rubble providing the literal ammunition for the youth is a metaphor for the squalid 
conditions and environmental hazards that Los Angeles’ poor, largely minority 
inhabitants live with everyday. The rubble is also a metonym of the 1964 Watts Riots, 
another uprising responding to the structural violence of poverty and racism as well as the 
eruptive violence of police action. Antonio concludes that “someone had declared this the 
municipal day of settling accounts, a day for all vendettas” (283). The attritional violence 
of structural and environmental racism add line after line to the accounts that Antonio 
feels everyone is attempting to settle in one swift wave of cathartic anger. The rubble, 
acting as a line of these accounts as well as the literal ammunition for the violence 
suggests the causal link between slow and eruptive violence. Guillermo also confronts the 
“scorched brick walls left standing alone... twisted and rusting” across South and East 
L.A. as “familiar” markers of war (Tobar 187). While these events are called “uprisings” 
or “riots” or, more euphemistically, instances of “civil unrest,” both Guatemalan migrants 
read the sudden wave of violence in terms of a war that has been waged for a long time. 
Verifying or disproving this causal relationship is more difficult than describing the 
relatively linear ways in which Psyops produce displacement and pollution that exact 
slow violence, however through Antonio and Guillermo’s eyes at least, slow and 
structural violence of environmental racism does seem to be a contributing factor in the 
cataclysmic violence of the 1992 L.A. Uprising. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The Tattooed Soldier links structural racism in the U.S., U.S. foreign policy, and 
the genocidal war machine of the Guatemalan State. The environmental inequalities and 
acute interpersonal violence Antonio, Elena, and Guillermo experience are a result of 
these structures. The Tattooed Soldier is a violent novel, but a close reading of that 
violence reveals that there is an web of different forms of violence contributing to the 
oppression of the focal characters in the book. The ubiquity of polluted images, 
descriptions, and phrases within the novel invite the discursive association and analogy 
between the structures of oppression operating at the level of the state and individual 
within each nation. This study shows how the studies of spectacular military violence and 
the slow violence of racism and poverty are linked discursively and materially through 
environmental entanglements. In so doing The Tattooed Soldier offers a compelling case 
study of how discursive analysis of literary texts may contribute to studies of 
environmental inequality and violence.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE “FUNNEL EFFECT” AS ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: DESCRIBING AND 
DISRUPTING THE FUGITIVE AGENCY OF THE BORDERLANDS IN URREA’S 
THE DEVIL’S HIGHWAY AND ELECTRONIC DISTURBANCE THEATER’S 
TRANSBORDER IMMIGRANT TOOL  
 
Introduction  
 
Each year, hundreds of undocumented migrants die of exposure due to the adverse 
climactic conditions in remote regions of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. The deaths are 
the result of a “funnel effect” created by U.S. border security policies and enforcement 
actions that effectively close urban crossing sites (San Diego, Nogales, etc) and redirect 
migrants into thousands of miles of inaccessible desert and other hazardous terrain. 
Since the start of “Operation Gatekeeper” in 1994, between 6,000 and 12,000 people 
have been killed trying to cross the border. Although the borderlands have long been, in 
the words of Gloria Anzaldúa, una herida abierta (an open wound), a place of constant, 
re-irritated violence and trauma, I argue that only recent militarization of the U.S-Mexico 
Borderlands has marshaled environmental weapons against undocumented migrants. The 
deaths caused by these clandestine forms of environmental warfare are a nefarious take 
on the term “death by natural causes” and are the hidden casualties of a conflict waged by 
the U.S. against bodies crossing this particular political barrier. The number of exposure 
deaths has climbed dramatically over the last forty years. Border militarization and 
migrant deaths have positively correlated since at least the Reagan administration 
(Palafox 58). And while the overall number of people crossing the border without legal 
documentation has dwindled following the 2008 recession, the number of recorded deaths 
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has remained the same. This suggests that crossing the border today is more dangerous 
than it has been in years past (S Anderson). While scholars have attempted to describe the 
mechanisms and logics by which this humanitarian crisis has steadily continued to 
destroy human lives, few have looked at how the buildup of these military assets along 
the border has explicitly molded environmental features; how militarization15 weaponizes 
the borderlands ecosystems targeting migrant bodies. This means that U.S. border 
militarization is under-theorized as an environmental project. 
The argument to view the “low-intensity conflict”16 of the borderlands’ migrant 
death crisis as an environmental project is simple. It claims that U.S. border policy and 
concurrent militarization of the border—including in spaces ostensibly dedicated to 
nature and wilderness conservation—has intentionally17 incorporated and channeled the 
violence of environmental hazards into environmental weapons in its ongoing attempts to 
“secure” the border. Furthermore, the deadly gauntlet created by borderland militarization 
is so devastating and enduring in part because this form of weaponry appears inevitable 
and an obvious aspect of the land, not the product of human politics, ideology, and 
individual decisions. With urban crossing sites effectively closed through militarized 
policing, migrants are funneled into sparsely-occupied deserts where harsh climactic 
                                                      
15 Lisa Meierotto’s definition of U.S.-Mexico border militarization offers the most salient consideration of 
militarization along the U.S.-Mexico border region for this analysis. Meierotto defines militarization as 
“the concentration of armed forces—and all of the resources, human power, and technology that 
accompany this concentration—on the U.S.-Mexico border” (645).  
 
16 The sociologist Timothy Dunn was the first scholar to investigate the borderlands and U.S. border 
policies through a military framework.  
 
17 Ultimately, I am not interested in questions of intention, as “it is enough to see that these policies have 
these effects” (Huspek 52). Nevertheless, Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold the Line operate under 
the explicit logic of “deterrence” whereby the extreme danger posed by desert crossings is intended to deter 
undocumented crossings. Given that this deterrence failed from the start, and that these policies have not 
been revoked in the face of the catastrophic death toll, one cannot but see the policies as intentionally 
violent.  
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conditions and difficult terrain kill migrants who are trying to avoid the detection of 
various borderlands policing agencies.  
The naturalization of environmental violence, the mystification that makes it 
appear normal if noticeable at all, depoliticizes the ongoing war at the border and 
provides little stimulus for political solutions.18 The evacuated agency of this 
environmental warfare has allowed the deaths of the borderlands to largely remain hidden 
from public view— both figuratively and literally. Maldonado-Torres describes “a 
peculiar death ethic that renders massacre and different forms of genocide as natural” 
along the border, and it is precisely this death ethic and its naturalization that an 
investigation of environmental warfare in the borderlands attends to. Naturalization is a 
key mechanism that “flexibly” provides discursive and social justification for unjust 
situations (Sturgeon 11-12). As such, naturalization is a rhetorical tool that secures and 
reproduces power. Counterinsurgency theory, the doctrine that guides U.S. Low Intensity 
Conflicts, understands the power of the concept of the natural within its “full-spectrum” 
war to secure long-term control over unruly populations, the naturalized environmental 
military violence ensures that most Americans fail to notice that there is even a conflict at 
all. Environmental military violence kills efficiently, and doesn’t raise political hackles in 
the same way that ground troops with guns would. The covert, naturalized/izing violence 
of the funnel effect and the visual and narrative desolation of the desert border 
contributes to what John D. Márquez calls the “racial state of expendability” and 
                                                      
18 The environmental violence of the borderlands is similar to Rob Nixon’s concept of “slow violence,” 
violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, and thus carries unequal heft compared to more spectacular 
and immediate forms of interpersonal violence (3). 
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ungrievable deaths of Latin American migrants killed in the crossing.19  American mass 
media images depict the borderlands, and Mexico more broadly, as a “moonscape”; an 
inhospitable and uninviting locale (Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga 128-129).  The stark 
imaginary supported by the austere landscape photography of the borderlands suggests 
that the economic desperation of the imagined average Mexican migrant is the product of 
the impoverished natural resources in the country itself, not the global economy and 
certainly not the economic influence of the region’s economic and military superpower.  
 This chapter explores two distinct vocabularies of protest that artists and 
humanitarian activists use to contest how these environmental warfare techniques 
naturalize the deaths of migrants along the U.S.-Mexico border. The first approach is 
descriptive, the second, disruptive. In The Devil’s Highway: A True Story, Luís Alberto 
Urrea renders the complex web of agency that defines the treacherous borderlands in his 
narrative account of fourteen Mexican migrants who died (and twelve who survived) 
crossing the border in 2001. My analysis of The Devil’s Highway shows this text 
recaptures the fugitive human agency behind these and other migrant deaths by creating a 
formally inventive, rhetorically engaging political ecology of the borderlands. Through a 
unique blending of different perspectives into a focal narrative voice that provocatively 
deploys tropes of body genres, historiography, and jeremiad, Urrea’s book excavates the 
beauty and brutality of the socionatural Arizonan desert as the center of a border war 
fought with land itself as a weapon. The second, disruptive approach is that of public and 
clandestine placing of water caches in the desert for imperiled migrants. While Urrea’s 
                                                      
19 Of course many of the migrants who perish entering or exiting the U.S. are not Latinx or Hispanic; 
migrants from around the world, and in particular South East Asia, cross the border using the same trails 
and encountering the same perils as Latinxs. Yet, as Márquez notes, the border has long been associated 
with racialized conceptions of Latinidad. 
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narrative political ecology describes the complicated logics of the borderlands, 
humanitarian groups like Humane Borders, No More Deaths/No Mas Muertes, and 
Border Angels place caches of water in desert regions where migrants routinely die. 
These direct action interventions offer a particularly contested vocabulary of protest that 
disrupts the environmental weaponry of the borderlands. The Transborder Immigrant 
Tool (TBT), a tactical media project of the b.a.n.g. lab that was partially inspired by The 
Devil’s Highway, engages these drops by repurposing used cellphones to guide lost 
migrants to water caches while reading out ecopoetry. Both The Devil’s Highway and the 
Transborder Immigrant Tool build alternative epistemological guides of the borderlands, 
replacing the “Desolation” of naturalized violence with a layered sense of the history of 
human and natural agency in the borderlands. They do so through what I call “narrative 
political ecology;” they are texts that perform the transdisciplinary work of political 
ecology through the art of storytelling.    
La Frontera Through an Environmental Warfare Lens: Building Deadly Funnels in 
the Borderlands 
 
 The Frontera is continuously— and violently— reproduced. In most places, and 
for most of the binational border’s history, “the best way of visualizing the border is as an 
imaginary line in the sand” (Mize 137). This description captures the artificial, and often 
unmarked nature of the boundary, but perhaps understates its importance. This imaginary 
line is integral to nation building and imperial plunder (Meierotto 638). It has also shifted 
its geographic location at numerous intervals over the past 200 years. In its contemporary 
instantiation, this line has been most compellingly described by Gloria Anzaldúa as “una 
herida abierta where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds” (Borderlands/La 
Frontera 25). The open wound, grating against the First World, cannot heal itself, or 
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staunch the bleeding. Her oft-quoted description centers violent trauma as a master 
metaphor for the borderlands, and for Anzaldúa this metaphor holds true throughout the 
imperial history that has erected this imaginary line in the sand. But Anzaldúa’s metaphor 
takes on even greater salience in the explicit weaponization of the borderlands 
environment; a physical organization of space that wounds and kills. To understand how 
the border has become an environmental weapon is to understand an entire “paradigm” of 
late 20th and early 21st century border-making. This understanding also gives a vantage 
onto how counterinsurgency techniques pervade militarized institutions.  
 When Timothy Dunn published the first comprehensive account of borderlands 
militarization in 1994, he wrote that “analyzing immigration and drug enforcement in the 
border region in terms of a military framework… is an admittedly unconventional and 
imprecise project” (30). Though unorthodox at the time, Dunn’s publication in 1993 
would prove prescient. In 1994 “Operation Gatekeeper” dramatically increased the 
degree of militarization and sent migrant deaths soaring. Subsequent scholarship and 
public engagement along the border has latched onto the growth of militarization as 
culpable in the precipitous rise of migrant deaths, yet these analyses have not attended to 
the environmental nature of this militarization. Concurrently, analyses by environmental 
studies scholars and NGOs have often decried the ecological toll of this militarization, 
but have not connected militarism’s environmental costs with migrant endangerment.  
Militarization of the border has consciously molded environmental features to target 
migrants’ bodies using counterinsurgency and environmental warfare tactics.  
 The weaponization of the environment and its harsh climate is the definitive 
product of Operation Gatekeeper and its policy progeny (Urrea 59 see also Dunn, 
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Nevins).  As of 2016 these policies have built over 800 miles of fencing, installed 
thousands of massive floodlights, motion sensors, and launched hundreds of military 
drones and a fleet of SUVs. All this military infrastructure supports and is supported by a 
complex web of police and military agencies actively patrolling or staking out different 
locations along the US-Mexico border. This is not only a concentration of armed forces as 
a means of preparing for conflict, but an ongoing use of military violence directed against 
migrants crossing the border. These forces orchestrate a geographical organization of 
space that produces environmental military violence.  The specific deployment of these 
forces make human disasters out of natural hazards; deadly gauntlets out of desert.  “The 
manipulation of environmental features as a tool of warfare,” according to Arne Willy 
Dahl, is a key feature of war-related environmental consequences (qtd. in Brauer 21).  In 
sum the U.S.-Mexico Border has become one of the most militarized spaces under the 
purview of the U.S. Military, and is a site of ongoing state-sanctioned violence directed 
against migrant bodies, even though this environmental violence may not appear a tactic 
of war at all.  
 While the U.S. Mexico border has been a contentious militarized location for over 
one hundred years it has only been the site of de facto environmental warfare for the last 
twenty or thirty years. With Operation Gatekeeper, the border shifted from a political 
boundary to a kind of environmental trap. Undocumented migrants have traveled north 
across the border for as long as there’s been a border, but have only recently died by the 
hundreds, if not thousands each year (Palafox 59). The most prominent cause of death—
“death by sunlight, hyperthermia”—appears to be the most natural and perhaps least 
pernicious of ways to die crossing the border. Consider that 16-year-old José Antonio 
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Elena Rodríguez was shot 10 times in the back by Border Patrol Agents without even 
crossing from Mexico in the U.S. near Nogales (Binelli). As Urrea notes, stories of white 
nationalist vigilantes and murderous agents of la Migra abound along the Mexican side of 
the border (cite). The Arizona OpenGIS Initiative for Deceased Migrants, a Google Earth 
supported collaboration of the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner Humane 
Borders, Inc., lists 17 different ways20 migrants have died crossing the border, including 
exposure, drowning, homicide, complications to pregnancy, and even, lightning strikes. 
 Understanding the U.S.-Mexico borderland militarization as an environmental 
project, even as orchestrated environmental warfare, adds to existing scholarly attempts 
to explain this ongoing humanitarian crisis. Many accounts attribute the deadly effects of 
recent border militarization with the U.S. State’s perceived need for territorial 
sovereignty and control in a rapidly globalizing world where “opening” markets are 
diluting or threatening the hegemony of the nation-state. The influx of migrant workers 
and immigrants stems from the way neoliberal market policies growing out of structural 
adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as 
and multinational trade agreements displaced workers across Latin America (Mize 137). 
Critical race theorists also point to how Latinidad has long been made into a racial 
marker that has caused Latinx immigrants in the U.S. to be widely viewed as undesirable 
Others contaminating the white cultural and racial identity of the U.S. (Márquez 479).  
Today, “the simplistic equation of what it means to be Mexican equals illegal and thus a 
criminal is increasingly the false logic that neo-nativists promote in their call for closed 
                                                      
20 This count excludes indeterminate ways specific migrant deaths are recorded in the Arizona OpenGIS 
Initiative’s customizable mapping tool. In addition to the 17 relatively straightforward ways these deaths 
are categorized (e.g. attributed to “drowning, lightning strike, exsanguination”), migrants are also classified 
as “undetermined, pending,” or “not reported” (“Custom Map of Migrant Mortality”). 
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borders and mass deportations” (Mize 141). This “Mexicans as Latinos, Mexicans as 
Criminals, Criminals as Latinos” logic is perhaps most paradigmatically exemplified 
when Donald Trump announced his bid for political candidacy into a crowded field of 
more known and respected politicians. He captivated nativist votes (and eventually the 
presidency) by echoing this false, racist logic.21 To read the literatures that supports each 
of these explanations together allows one to see how neoliberal market forces and 
policies push and pull migrants from Latin America (and beyond) across the border while 
racist projects seek to protect the White sovereignty of the U.S. state in the face of 
increased migration (Márquez 476). The environmental military violence of the 
borderlands conceals how US gatekeeping policies target and kill migrants and 
contributes to the criminalization and racial Othering of Latinx workers. That migrants 
die crossing the border, so nativist logic might hold, is an effect of those people’s own 
inferiority, ineptitude, or evidence of their nefarious reasons for eluding law enforcement 
and entering the country illegally. Such logics ignore U.S. responsibility for how 
migrants are criminalized and funneled into weaponized deserts.  
Learning “The Rules of the Game”: The Narrative Political Ecology of The Devil's 
Highway 
 
The Devil’s Highway creates a richly layered and polyvocal history of the border 
to explain the political and ecological nature of the border conflict. The narrator, by 
partially inhabiting different voices across space and time, lays out the epistemological, 
                                                      
21 Standing in front of a giant American flag in Trump Tower, New York, Trump accused Mexico of “not 
sending its best people.” This would seem to be an understatement, as he continued to claim: “they’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime.  They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” As the 
Huffington Post notes, Trump quickly made the racial dog whistle inherent in that comment into a bullhorn 
when he “the candidate expanded his comments beyond Mexico.  ‘It’s coming from more than Mexico,’ he 
added. ‘It’s coming from all over South and Latin America’” (Moreno, 2015).  This isn’t a nationalist 
grudge against Mexico (as if that would be any more palatable), but slander of largely Latino peoples. 
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geopolitical, and narrative “rules of the game” by which the 26 undocumented migrants 
are killed and how the reader will encounter their story in the pages ahead. In the case of 
The Devil’s Highway, the story of the borderlands can be thought of as the fabula of the 
book, and the physical movement of the migrants across the desert as the sujet within the 
narrative plot. The narrative itself identifies that the “rules of the game” refer to a 
particular historical “paradigm” of border war; one of “walkers crossing Desolation in 
place of jumping urban borders” (Urrea 59). The Devil’s Highway is a story of 26 men, 
most from Veracruz, Mexico, who die or suffer severe injury trying to cross the border in 
2001. Their ordeal garnered national attention, as the fate of the “Yuma 14” (as they were 
called) constituted the single largest number of migrants to die at any one time.  
The Devil’s Highway begins in media res as five migrants, dying of exposure, 
stumble into a Border Patrol agent and tell him that between 17 and 70 men are dying 
back the way they came. It was, as Urrea describes it, the arrival of “the apocalypse” for 
the borderlands, and would prove to be the single greatest death-event of migrants in the 
border’s history (18). The narrative starts at this moment of crisis, when the lives of an 
untold number of people hang between the rapidly-mobilized Border Patrol searchers and 
the oppressive heat of the May sun, but instead of resolving the crises proceeds to pan 
further back into the past and intricacies of transnational histories. In The Devil’s 
Highway, this history extends back to a Tohono O’Odham origin story of the land itself 
within a few pages of introducing the drama of the dying migrants. From the timeless 
origin story the narrative proceeds to build up a sweeping survey of gunslingers, 
cowboys, and railroads expanding in a mythic history of White imperialism (Urrea 7-8 
The rapid shift in temporal scope, and switch from indelible empirical evidence to myth 
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and memory establishes a vast and uncertain stage on which the drama of the dying 
migrants plays out in The Devil’s Highway. 
To understand the mechanisms of how borderlands militarization enacts 
environmental violence, one needs to understand the mechanisms— social, economic, 
political, and ecological— that govern the current border conflict. The unnamed narrator 
of The Devil’s Highway calls these mechanisms and customs “the rules of the game;” a 
phrase that is also the name of the first chapter of the book. Understanding the rules of 
the game requires the ability to sift through layers of acute events, structural forces, and 
deeper ideologies. The first chapter of The Devil’s Highway describes the powerful 
interpretive ability that the U.S. Border Patrol sign cutters possess.  
There is room, in this desert world, for scholarship as well as sport.  
Cutters read the land like a text. They search the manuscript of the ground for 
irregularities in its narration. They know the plots and the images by heart. They can 
see where the punctuation goes. They are the landscape grammarians, got the Ph.D. in 
reading dirt. (Urrea 29). 
 
While this passage directly references the sign cutting skills employed by la Migra, it also 
is a metaphor for the work of Urrea’s investigative, polyvocal narrator throughout The 
Devil’s Highway.  The story of the largest single borderland death event, of the group of 
migrants the media would come to call “the Yuma 14,” serves as a focal anchor for a 
larger political economy and ecology of the border. The physical evidence left by 
migrants crossing—evidence constituted by inevitable, low-fi “irregularities in [the] 
narration” of the borderlands’ soil (footprints, litter) as well as the high-tech, 
strategically-gathered pings of Border Patrol motion sensors and photographs from 
cameras and drones—grounds Urrea’s “true story” in the materialist evidence and 
procedural logic of a true crime narrative. If “the footprints wrote the story” of the 
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twenty-six migrants involved in the tragedy of May 2001, then “somebody [has] to 
follow the tracks” in order to tell that story.  
 By establishing the importance of the signs, and by extension, those with the 
analytic prowess to read the signs, Urrea positions the narrator as an interpretive 
gatekeeper and guide to this terrain. In the midst of the chaos, the “Banzai run” of the 
Border Patrol deploying all manner of troops and cutters into the desert in a race against 
the summer heat to find the survivors and mark the corpses, the narrator claims no less 
than six times in one page that “the sign tells the story” and that “the sign never lies” 
(Urea 31). Thus the “true story” of the chaos can only be untangled by “following the 
tracks.” As a quasi-metaphor, these tracks are material, temporal, and symbolic. Urrea’s 
repeated claim that “the sign never lies” establishes the need for a historical, materialist 
accounting of the borderlands by evoking a series of “steps” back in time that herald the 
coming of the Yuma 14.  
Somebody had to follow the tracks. They told the story. They went down into 
Mexico, back in time, and ahead into pauper’s graves. Before the Yuma 14, there 
were the smugglers. Before the smugglers, there was the Border Patrol. Before the 
Border Patrol, there was the border conflict. Before them all was Desolation itself. 
(Urrea 32).  
 
This is narrative stratigraphy; drilling down through the layers of accreted history to 
reveal the original agencies that produced the deaths of the Yuma 14, and by extension, 
the thousands of other lesser or unknown deaths in the desolation of the Sonoran Desert.  
Each repetition of the word “before” heralds a layer of historical action that has 
contributed to the deaths of the Yuma 14. The short paragraph acts as a claim to a means 
of linear, if obscure, epistemological framework that is promised the narrative. In this 
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description “the desolation” of the environment serves as the bedrock upon which human 
agency is erected.  
 On the next page the narrative playfully references Tim O’Brien’s own “true war 
story” by listing “the things [the migrants] carried” as they walked the Devil’s Highway. 
These mundane objects are for some of the migrants the only materials by which Urrea 
and the reader can begin to imagine who each individual migrant was.  The potential echo 
of Tim O’Brien’s widely-read novel The Things They Carried: A Work of Fiction carries 
with it the trace of the even-more-widely anthologized and read chapter, “How to Tell a 
True War Story.” In this chapter the narrator contradicts any claims of epistemological 
certitude and validity in telling a “true war story.” Instead of the empirical validity of 
events as they occur in life, O’Brien argues that it is the deeper descriptive or emotive 
message of a war story that matters in the discernment of its truth. Even Urrea’s repetitive 
avowal of the signs on the previous page contain a trace of the truth’s cryptic nature: “the 
footprints wrote the story. And after the footprints ran out, it was a trail of whispered 
stories and paper sheets” (31). The material evidence exists, and certainly the materiality 
of life as experience (not representation) provides the causal force that “wrote the story” 
of these men from Veracruz, Mexico. But like “the rock paintings we still don’t 
understand” that are left for archeologists and elders to ponder, this evidentiary archive 
may be inscrutable or fugitive (Urrea 5).  
 Within five hundred words, then, Urrea’s narrative asserts the indelible, impartial 
truth of the migrants footprints across the Vidrios drag of the Devil’s Highway only to 
insinuate that the truth of their story, bound up in the things they carried, is perhaps more 
malleable or elusive than a straightforward accounting of their steps may suggest. The 
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subtitles of Urrea’s and O’Brien’s book, read together, show the paradox at the heart of 
storytelling: narratives and representations are “fictive” signifiers standing in for the real, 
but are the vehicles by which we construct and evaluate truth. As reviewer Boyd 
Childress writes, “It is not a simple book.” According to Publisher’s Weekly, “Urrea's 
story is a well-crafted mélange of first-person testimony, geographic history, cultural and 
economic analysis, poetry and an indictment of immigration policy” (96). Similarly, 
Sandra Cox calls The Devil’s Highway “a pastiche of testimony from heterogeneous 
perspectives to create a polyphonic perspective embodied in a singular narrator” that 
presents “a coherent, if evolving, transnational narrative history” (2012). What genre is 
Urrea’s The Devil’s Highway: a True Story? Despite his early truth claims, which bolster 
the veracity of the narrative voice, The Devil’s Highway makes numerous speculative 
leaps into the interactions and thoughts of its characters-- some of whom are dead and 
cannot affirm or deny how they are represented, and others who refused to talk to Urrea 
or were legally prevented from doing so by the U.S. federal government. Amazon.com’s 
extraordinarily-detailed algorithms list the book under “Emigration & Immigration 
Studies,” “Hispanic American Demographic Studies,” “Discrimination & Racism,” and 
even “Reference.” Such classifications suggest a sociologist’s academic monograph, not 
a New York Times bestseller and finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. Urrea’s narrator does more 
than reportage; the narrator focalizes and gives voice to the thoughts of individual 
characters, picking up and dropping perspectives and voices frequently while skipping 
back and forth across spatial and temporal geographies.  
 The cumulative strategic effect of these different voices and perspectives in The 
Devil’s Highway is to weave “narrative political ecology.” Narrative political ecology is a 
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term I use to describe a kind of subgenre in both fiction and nonfiction literature that does 
the transdisciplinary work of “political ecology” through the art of storytelling. As an 
inter and trans disciplinary academic field, “’political ecology’ combines the concerns of 
ecology and a broadly defined political economy” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:17, qtd 
in Peet and Watts 7). That is to say, political ecologists study of access and control of 
natural resources in order to take up questions surrounding environmental change (Peet 
and Watts 6). Like Urrea’s book, the study of political ecology is itself an mélange of 
intellectual frameworks and techniques. It is a field that is contiguous, if not 
consubstantial, with environmental justice studies. And like environmental justice studies, 
political ecology emerged out of quantitative social and natural science inquiries and 
have more recently turned to incorporating discursive and hermeneutic analyses. Peet and 
Watts connect three sets of ideas in their overview of political ecology: cybernetics, 
systems theory, and community ecology, first, cultural materialism and ecology, second, 
and natural hazards and disasters social science research of the Cold War era, third (7-8). 
Into this nexus of ideas and approaches political ecologists who privilege discourse 
analysis (or conversely, discourse analysts’ whose work is in close conversation with 
those topics taken up by quantitative political ecology) insist that culture, and language, 
are as important to the political struggle over resources and changes to the land as 
economics, and natural forces like wind, erosion, and orogeny.   
 Of course, The Devil’s Highway is not an academic monograph, and does not 
advance its arguments through analytic reasoning, but rather, elucidates relations of 
power producing the borderlands through narrative.  Narrative political ecology texts do 
this by design, as politically-engaged authors like Urrea are writing these texts to 
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administer a measure of representation justice to those voices and stories often occluded 
from nonliterary discussions of who owns or accesses natural resources. More than the 
political commitments and public life of the author, narrative political ecologies are 
recognizable in the formal and representational strategies they deploy. Literary form and 
narrative theorizes, albeit along creative axes over analytic modes of thinking. Thus, 
stories like The Devil’s Highway participate in the work of political ecology even though 
they are not formal academic studies.22  The Devil’s Highway administers 
representational justice to the Wellton 26 and, by extension, the other migrants killed on 
The Devil’s Highway and the borderlands by blending different perspectives into a focal 
narrative voice that deploys tropes of political history and body genre. Urrea’s narrative 
political ecology leans heavily on literary tropes and rhetoric in order to describe how 
struggles for the control of environmental features (natural resources, access to place and 
space, and ways of knowing environments) manifest in the interstices of historical, 
ecological, economic, and cultural forces in the Sonoran Desert.  
                                                      
22 The move to identify and study narrative political ecologies in literature is a logical extension of the 
poststructuralist invigorations of the field in the 1990s and early 21st century.   
Any sophisticated political ecology must contain a phenomenology of nature…it must take 
seriously Blaikie’s (1985) point that [any] environmental problem can be perceived in a variety of 
ways”(Peet and Watt 20).  
As the field has consequently turned to questions of knowledge, power, language, and identity, it makes 
sense that this research should turn to archives where these aspects are robustly represented. Literature 
reflects the world as it is experienced and known by its author and readers, and this reflection is always 
partial and molded through those experiences. But literature is also a kind of moral and aesthetic reflection 
of that world, and because of this all literature is a kind of critical—even radical—reforming of the lived 
world through language and opportunity to imagine alternate ways of existing in this world. This language 
is necessarily radical because its representations invite the reader to in turn reflect on and reimagine the 
fictive and lived world. The literature of political ecology—what I am here calling narrative political 
ecology—marshals the creative power of literary form, trope, and rhetoric to do the work of political 
ecology analysis. Yet this is not to say that all literary texts are amenable to the analysis of political 
ecology. All stories, and in particular those fabricated in through capacious form of the novel, create worlds 
of words. In order to present a narrative political ecology a text must show how political struggle over 
access and control of environmental features is articulated within particular place(s) and time(s). 
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 The narrator, by taking on different perspectives, is well positioned to do the 
analytic work of the storyteller and the sign cutter, and furthermore grasps the different 
“rules of the game.” This game is competitive. “The relentless border war is often seen as 
a highly competitive game that can even be friendly when it’s not frightening and deadly” 
(Urrea 16). The narrator likens the low-intensity warfare with a kind of game where one 
side attempts to cross into or out of the United States and the other side attempts to stop 
and arrest them.  As a “game,” the border war has its own participants who “play” under 
a set of constraints (the “rules” in the title) to pursue particular goals. Like an aficionado 
describing how to play a complex board game to a tyro, the first chapter of The Devil’s 
Highway outlines the object of the game, and gives a history of how this game over 
frontiers has come to be. The object of the game, from the side of undocumented 
migrants, is relatively simple: get across the invisible line and move deeper into the 
country. From the coyotes’ perspective, the prime directives are to be paid by the 
migrants and to avoid arrest. From the multiagency enforcement perspective of the U.S. 
Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), and their affiliate 
organizations, the goal is “to apprehend lawbreakers, [but] it was equally their duty to 
save the lost and the dying” (Urrea 18).   
 Within the parameters of the low intensity conflict and environmental warfare, 
Urrea’s narrator claims that “the game can even be friendly when it’s not frightening and 
deadly.”23 (16). In the particular context of this statement, the narrative is following 
                                                      
23 Describing the border conflict as game is hardly remarkable, especially reading them from the vantage of 
2016. Two of the most financially successful and culturally ubiquitous franchises of recent years include 
George R.R. Martin’s/HBO’s Game of Thrones and Suzanne Collin’s Hunger Games trilogy. As in The 
Devil’s Highway, the incongruity of describing matters of life and death as a form of play in these 
franchises highlight the absurd tragicomedy of how powerful interests “play” with the lives of those less 
powerful. In each of these texts the feeling of a game-like experience is uneven. 
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Border Patrol Mike F. as he first sees five of the survivors from the massacre, and radios 
in that he is “getting bodies” (16). The narrative pauses here to explain that Mike F. 
would not have been referring to corpses, but living people. The migrants hold many 
noms de guerre amongst the Border Patrol, the narrator explains, including the ethnic 
slur, “wets” (short for wetbacks), and “tonks,” a “bon mot… based on the sound of a 
flashlight breaking over a human head” (16). This callous racism and fetishizing of 
violence can be lighted by chicanery, humor, and even compassion, though these more 
humane responses are generally up to the Border Patrol’s discretion. Sometimes agents 
“know their clients” from past apprehensions, and some play pranks on the migrants they 
apprehend. For undocumented migrants, and to a different extent their coyotes, the option 
to plan jokes or cultivate a wry demeanor from the inside of a highly air-conditioned and 
provisioned SUV is not an option. The narrative underscores this by closing a sandwich 
of terror around this interjected suggestion of levity and play-making at the border by 
describing the broad swath of horror stories that cause migrants to “give up immediately” 
in the presence of the Border Patrol.  The reader is introduced to the sound of a flashlight 
crushing a skull (“tonk”), then has a contrapuntal moment of friendliness, only to be 
barraged by the rumors of the border towns. But these are not just idle rumors; “Stories 
burn all along the borderlands of Border Patrol men taking prisoners out into the 
wasteland and having their way with them” (17). If that’s too cryptic, Urrea’s narrator 
outlines the specific acts the Border Patrol and Texas Rangers allegedly commit:  
Truncheons. Beatings. Shootings. Broken legs. Torn panties. Blood. Tear gas. 
Pepper spray. Kicked ribs. Rape. These are the words handed from border town to 
border town, a savage gospel of the crossing. (Urrea 18).  
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Each of these items or outcomes are metonyms of the terrific violence that the migrants 
fear—and not without cause. Even in high profile cases such as the murder of José 
Antonio Elena Rodríguez, violence has gone unpunished. Even the U.S. Federal 
Government’s own internal investigation has repeatedly found that the “spit and polish 
military men” who make up the ranks of the Border Patrol have “operated with a sense of 
impunity.”  
 Ultimately, the veracity of these allegations is secondary when considering how 
that terror “burns” through border towns adds to the funnel effect of environmental 
warfare. The fear of the Border Patrol’s all-seeing surveillance and terrible violence helps 
push crossers into the wilderness, just as surely as the walls of cyclone fencing, 
spotlights, and drag strips that close the urban crossings. The Wellton 26’s fateful “bad 
step” at Bluebird Pass underscores this. It was in Bluebird Pass, at night, that the Wellton 
26 were “scattered by light” (Urrea 109). Having walked through the heat all day and 
climbing the steep hill to the pass through the Growler Mountains, the survivor’s had 
“already started to lose themselves” and begun to lose coherent sense of time and 
location. It is not known what happened at Bluebird Pass (was it la Migra, “wetback 
hunter” vigilantes, civilians, or other migrants?) but all agree that the appearance of 
lights, perhaps a spotlight mounted on a truck, sent the Wellton 26 running into the night. 
The narrator spends some time and careful attention to explaining how confusing this 
moment is. If it were La Migra, why would the coyote commit the “suicidal gesture” of 
“running headlong into the desert” at night (110). Better to be apprehended, transported 
back to Mexico, as Mendez the coyote had done perhaps six times before, and try again 
with another group.  Losing the pass, the group was doomed. But the terror of 
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encountering the Border Patrol, or vigilantes, combined with the discombobulated senses 
of the migrants, may well explain why it made “sense” in that fateful moment to run for 
their lives, even into death.  The migrants may well have thought that they were not only 
facing detention and deportation, but police brutality, even lynching. The threat of 
spectacular violence— whether extralegal or state-sanctioned— pushes migrants into 
deadly situations of slow(er), but surer, environmental violence. The Devil’s Highway 
poetically describes this violence as being “killed by the light” (111).  
“All Illegal Aliens” in the Desert: “The Heat Becomes Personal” in The Devil’s 
Highway 
 
   This effect of Urrea’s narrative political ecology is also fundamentally a 
humanizing project, and by humanizing the Wellton 26 The Devil’s Highway gives some 
level of recognition justice to the silenced perspectives of those who suffer and die from 
environmental military violence along the border. The way the descriptions of La Migra’s 
borderland violence suggestively fuels the panicked and ill-fated flight of the Wellton 26 
from the unknown electric lights underscores another aspect of narrative political 
ecologies; narrative political ecologies depict environmental conflict through stories of 
individuals, not through generalized principles or dynamics.  In addition to elucidating 
the complex and violent “paradigm” of environmental military violence and the “rules of 
the game” that enforce that violence, The Devil’s Highway humanizes the characters in 
the story (not only the Wellton 26, but also other characters across social and political 
differences) using direct perspective taking. Taking on perspectives means that the 
narrator addresses the reader as if the reader were feeling and thinking as individual 
characters within the story are thinking and feeling, often using second person address to 
focalize these thoughts.  Nowhere does the personal and visceral immediacy of this text 
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speak more pointedly than in the three short pages that describe the six stages a human 
body goes through while dying of hyperthermia—being killed by the light (and heat). 
While most of the book is narrated in a simple third person voice, there are several 
significant sections of the story where the narrative shifts into the second person and 
addresses the reader as if the reader is either a Border Patrol agent, a human body dying 
from hyperthermia, or the repatriated corpses of the fourteen migrants. The effect of this 
is to ground the text, and by extension, the reader, in particular experiences and 
perspectives across the novel’s sujet. It shifts identification from the bird’s eye or 
informant view of the narrator to, in the most agonizing portion of the book, the dying 
body of a migrant.  
 Urrea asserts that humanity’s biological citizenship lies outside the unforgiving 
jurisdiction of the Devil’s Highway. “In the desert, we are all illegal aliens” (120). This 
statement of universal, natural law concludes a section of the text in which the deaths of 
two white, American couples in the desert of the Devil’s Highway. The deaths from 
exposure happened in 2002. One couple’s dune buggy broke down a few short miles 
from their campsite. Not carrying water with them (“They didn’t need it—they could 
drive back to the camp in a few minutes”), the woman died sitting in the dune buggy 
while the body was recovered a whole two days later—approximately 200 yards from the 
buggy (118). The second couple goes on a short hike in sight of a highway, only to die of 
hyperthermia while recreating in a pretty landscape (119). The narrator juxtaposes the 
deaths of these relatively privileged individuals’ deaths to graphic descriptions of dying 
from hyperthermia that the Mexican migrants will go through in the course of the 
narrative future of the story. This juxtaposition places the suffering of the Wellton 26 on a 
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common ground of experience with the kind of people who likely made Urrea’s book a 
bestseller: white, nature-loving, Americans. This common ground is, like so much in the 
borderlands, expressed both figuratively and literally. The Americans die in the same 
geographic space, but also by going through the same physiological changes as the 
migrants from Veracruz.  The narrative does not leave this parallel implicit:  
It doesn’t matter what language you speak, or what color your skin. Whether you 
speed through [the stages of hyperthermia] or linger at each, hyperthermia will 
express itself in six ways.  
The stages are: Heat Stress, Heat Fatigue, Heat Syncope, Heat Cramps, Heat 
Exhaustion, and Heat Stroke. (Urrea 120).  
  
The reader is led explicitly to see the deaths of these Mexican migrants at the same level, 
if not more poignant a level for their serious reasons for crossing the Devil’s Highway 
and daunting obstacles for crossing, as the privileged who die by accident recreating in 
the desert. What follows are detailed descriptions of what happens to the human body on 
a physiological as well as psycho-phenomenological level.  
 Throughout this section, the narrative voice shifts from a familiar third person 
narration that frequently channels different characters thoughts24 to a direct address to the 
reader imagining both “your own death” along with the fate of the Wellton 26 (Urrea 120, 
121). The direct address in the second person implicates the reader and encourages one to 
feel a miniscule ghost of the feelings the dying migrants in the narrative surely 
experienced. Yet while the reader is directly addressed and the stages are purportedly 
those experienced by any human going through heat death, the narrative continuously 
                                                      
24 For an example of what I mean here, think of the quote supplied in the paragraph above: “They didn’t 
need it—they could drive back to the camp in a few minutes.” This is a thought of a couple enjoying a dune 
buggy, not of the Border Patrol, coyote, or any experienced outdoorsperson. It is surely not the author’s 
personal opinion either (if we were to conflate the narrator with Urrea), as he is chronicling the deaths of 
those who enter the desert without sufficient water. 
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sets up the conditional experience of the reader being a Mexican migrant crossing the 
Devil’s Highway. While at the beginning of the section Urrea explains that the heat is 
hardest on the elderly (“that’s why Midwestern heat waves feature dead Chicago retirees 
by the score”), the narrative continuously reminds the reader of how some of the 
idiosyncrasies of these particular migrant’s identities exacerbate the danger of heat stress. 
The narrator notes that, “if you’re Mexican, your hair is likely black. The sun encounters 
body heat on a dark field,” heating up one’s head quicker than a blond or read head 
(Urrea 120). Likewise, the hale and hearty baseline a reader can assume about the couples 
who died while taking a hike is undercut in this section when the reader is reminded of 
the Wellton 26’s physical conditions:  
They were already tired before they began, perhaps slightly dehydrated from all 
their journeying and restless sleep. Some of them may have had diarrhea from the 
bad food and water on their long bus trip. (121).  
 
These particular migrants were from the state of Veracruz, Mexico. Reading these 
sentences remind a reader of the book’s second chapter, “In Veracruz,” where the narrator 
lays out how the region of Veracruz has suffered from globalization of markets that has 
even caused the local beans to flee the area, wrapped in “folkloric Mexican-looking 
burlap” sacks to be sold by Sinaloa at a greater post-NAFTA price in California (Urea 
45). The reminder of the migrant’s origins shows how this deeply personal, unique 
moment of suffering is articulated with the larger economic and political systems that 
have spurred many of the migrants’ journey’s in the first place, as well as their physical 
state of being in the moment of their crossing. To the degree that a U.S. reader like 
myself, comfortable in my University library chair reading this book, can begin to feel 
the visceral impacts of heat fatigue by reading the descriptions of hyperthermia Urrea’s 
  85 
book presents, these textual reminders of the Wellton 26’s nationality, race, and unique 
experience traversing Mexico to get to La Frontera all push back against easy 
identification in the text.  
 And yet as the description moves from heat fatigue to heat stress to heat syncope, 
the text continues to lead the reader in a kind of demonic mindfulness exercise. I am 
thinking of the Western secularized meditative practice of the “body scan,” where one is 
guided to pay non-judgmental attention on the different systems and parts of one’s body 
as a way of focusing in the moment and letting go of distractions. The “wicked genius” 
(to borrow the book’s phrase for Desolation itself) of The Devil’s Highway’s description 
of hyperthermia is its focalization on different body parts and functions as an attempt to 
evoke an embodied, self-conscious response in the reader.  
Your cheeks, your neck burn. Your eyelids burn, too. And the tips of your ears. 
Your lips are not only burned by sun, but by wind; they become dehydrated, and 
they get rough and flaky, and you keep licking them to try to wet them (Urrea 
121-122).  
 
Because the sentences are written in the second person, each directs the reader to self-
identify with each visceral description. I feel a wraith of heat on my eyelids (a sensitive 
spot), and involuntarily tear up for a second whenever I read this part of the passage, 
trying to blink away the phantom pain. This text operates not only by the logic of 
mindfulness body-scans but on some level of any “body genre” like melodrama, horror, 
humor, and pornography (Williams 3-4). Like tearjerkers, thrillers, knee slappers, and 
arousing erotica, the text provokes visceral reactions in the audience that is achieved 
formally through the focused attention to individual bodily changes as well as a narrative 
channeling of how the minds of the Wellton 26 fizzle and become unglued during heat 
syncope.  
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 The descriptions of each phase of heat death begin with their two-word title,25 and 
each phase is separated from the rest by a multiline break in the text. This parallel 
structure holds at this level of organization, but does not apply at the paragraph or 
sentence level. In the initial two stages (heat stress, heat fatigue), the paragraphs and 
sentences are notably longer and more complex than those of the later stages. This 
trajectory of long and complex expressions contracting to short, often monosyllabic 
expressions is repeated within the individual sections. The first, most innocuous stage of 
hyperthermia (heat stress) serves as an example: the first paragraph begins with three 
sentences, of twelve, seven, and twenty one words. Instead of being addressed to “you” 
directly, these sentences build a soft sense of empathy by addressing the common 
experience “everybody” has of “being tired, or even dizzy, from walking in the heat” 
(Urrea 121). The sentences contain multiple clauses that nuance the sentence and offer 
short asides. But the fourth, fifth, and sixth sentence dramatically shrink: “This is where 
it begins. General discomfort, nothing heinous. A little heat rash. Headache from the 
glare. Thirst (121).” The first short sentence cuts the comparatively grandiose sentences 
referencing “everybody’s” common experience down to size and designate that this 
experience, the experience of the Wellton 26, is going to be different from the dizziness 
one incurs on an arduous hike in the summer. The minor inconvenience of “general 
discomfort,” modified by the discounting assurance, “nothing heinous,” gives way to the 
shorter sentence fragments, and ultimately the single most important word, “thirst.” This 
final word becomes the overriding desire of the migrants are they walk deeper into the 
desert and become increasingly desperate. 
                                                      
25 i.e. heat stress, heat fatigue, heat syncope, heat cramps, heat exhaustion, heat stroke 
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 By the third stage the sentences are mirroring the thoughts of the migrants, and 
the thoughts have deteriorated to the ponderous, single-focus desire for water: “Where. 
Is. The. Water.” The lack of a question mark shows how grammar and thought have even 
begun to unravel. After dropping a jug (which may or may not be empty at this point, the 
focalized migrant begins to make staccato, irrational leaps into confidence. “Oh, well. To 
hell with the water. I’ll find water” (123). By this point it’s obvious— no they will not. 
And in this moment of desperation the narrator reveals the logic of this whole section’s 
organization, one that mirrors heat syncope itself:  
Syncope is a noun that denotes contraction: in a literary sense, you shorten a word 
by copping out letters. Never = ne’er. Ever= e’er. Desolation has begun to edit 
you. Erase you. (123) 
 
The sentences curt, abrupt starts and stops echo the delirium accompanied by this erasure 
of self in the desolation The Devil’s Highway. It shows the erasure of all but the 
migrant’s basic biological existence (what Agamben terms “zoë”) as their “brain[s] rot… 
misfir[ing] like a dying engine” (Urrea 125, Agamben 1995). Describing heat exhaustion 
and heat death, this erasure is so complete that the narrator pulls back into a more 
distanced perspective, even while continuing to directly speak to the reader. The 
figurative language of the heat fatigue section (e.g. swollen “fingers like sausages”) that 
is absent in the subsequent two sections returns in an elaborate and darkly comic 
description of how one might create a respectable urine cocktail, pulled without citation 
from one of the “surprising number of urine sites on the Internet” (Urrea 126-127). The 
voice of the migrants is no longer present, and the narrator, like some spirit, hovers over 
the dying bodies to narrate the biophysical breakdown of the body. Instead of trying to 
convey how that rotting brain would continue to attempt to think, the narrator 
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acknowledges the certainty that delirium and hallucination accompany the dying’s final 
moments when some try to dig holes to escape the sun or attempt to drink sand (128).  
 This gripping, disgust-and-fear inducing description is but one moment where the 
narrative takes up the voice of the second person and addresses its readers as if we are 
characters imbedded in the story. In the section described above, the words “you” and 
“your” are used a combined 250 times in the 2479 word passage. Having one in every ten 
words be “you” or “your,” implicates the reader in the gruesome demise of the migrant 
on The Devil’s Highway. In addition to this three page description of hyperthermia, in 
other passages of the book “you” are addressed in a number of different roles. “You” are 
a Border Patrol agent who means well and is little appreciated—even though you “don’t 
worry about being culturally sensitive and nonconfrontational” (111). “You” become the 
sentient, feeling corpses of the Yuma 14, experiencing your repatriation transport along 
the reverse route you took to America from Veracruz (197-198). “You” also become a 
widow of a migrant whose remains are kept in the Pima County Medical Examiner’s 
morgue. At other moments, the texts addresses an undesignated reader with invitations or 
commands to imagine other experiences. In “Part IV: Aftermath,” when it is clear that the 
“apocalypse” of the Wellton 26, and the Border Patrol agents who found them would 
remain a localized, personal apocalypse, the narrator bluntly, and perhaps dejectedly, 
instructs the reader to “imagine being tortured,” raped, and then killed like a girl in 
Juarez, her experience so awful that Urrea and his narrator seem unwilling to structure 
the imaginative leap into her horror.  
 All this is to say that one of the defining formal characteristics of narrative 
political ecology lies in the marshaling of rhetorical “presence” to environmental 
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conflicts through the experience of individuals. Chaim Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca 
describe rhetorical presence as the visceral attachment and immediacy created by specific 
organization and delivery of rhetoric. It is the force that viscerally “moves” an audience 
to be persuaded. The problem of collective tragedy is one of representation insofar as the 
kinds of representations artists, scholars, activists, and politicians use to speak of the 
tragedy do not produce significant presence among publics capable of not only being 
persuaded but also able to take meaningful social action to bring justice to such tragedy. 
There is even the danger in describing calamity, crisis, and controversy through academic 
frameworks that the people and non-human things at the center of such studies are 
silenced and further dehumanized. Perhaps one of the reasons that The Devil’s Highway 
is read widely and enthusiastically is because it puts forward progressive, nuanced, 
“politics of meaning.” It does so through rhetorically engaging modes of writing (and 
hence experiences of reading).  
 The property of “presence” in texts is not one to be taken lightly or embraced 
quickly. In describing the visceral effects rhetoric experienced by an audience, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca adumbrate an embodied rhetoric of the senses. This is, on the one 
hand, unremarkable, as the Western rhetorical tradition from Aristotle on has 
acknowledged the importance of appeals to pathos in rhetorical study and practice. But 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s presence, which may be produced without traditional 
appeals (merely having the goat in the king’s vision, not pointing to its potential 
suffering) places this rhetoric into a kind of body genre. The excitement of the viscera 
may spark – as an inspiration—the audience to be persuaded of or against a particular 
action, but the visceral reaction of rhetorical presence does not, in and of itself, constitute 
  90 
a decision of action within a rhetorical situation (Perelman Olbrechts-Tyteca). Likewise it 
is not so easy as to say the most viscerally-impactful rhetoric is the most powerful 
rhetoric.  
 The sin of the sympathy that images and narratives of war provoke is that such 
sympathy offers a false sense of closeness between a privileged consumer of media and 
those represented in media. For Susan Sontag,  
The imaginary proximity to the suffering inflicted on others that is granted by 
images suggests a link between the far-away sufferers…and the privileged viewer 
that is simply untrue, that is yet another mystification of our real relations to 
power (my emphasis) (102). 
 
It is not then sympathy that writer-activists should aspire to evoke through their texts. 
Sontag continues, “so far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what 
caused the suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence” 
(102). To Sontag the isolated individual, extracted from their relations to the unequal 
exchanges and forces that have more likely than not rendered their suffering and privilege 
to view their suffering from the safety of an armchair or cafe. The sympathy of the 
consumer-reader is one built on the ignorance or denial of how both reader and sufferer 
exist in the same world in relation to each others, and that the reader may well be “linked 
to their suffering” (Sontag 103).  The presence such narrative images—snapshots of 
suffering—can offer but a small provocation to untangle the knotted, hidden relationships 
that relate the oppressor and oppressed, the powerful and the weak, and the readers and 
those who suffer.  
 The narrative trope of perspective shifting and taking augments and heightens the 
effect that all heteroglossic works produce; the effect of presenting multiple viewpoints, 
values, and beliefs. The words people use and think not only represent these perspectives 
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but construct them. The Devil’s Highway turns again and again to directly addressing a 
new character’s stream of thought and projecting it onto the reader, inviting a reader to 
(re)locate oneself and one’s own beliefs in relation to the subjects of immigration, 
militarization, globalization, and the other transnational forces that course through the 
Devil’s Highway (Cox).  By guiding a reader through the escalating erasure of 
hyperthermia the text of The Devil’s Highway renders the immediacy and cruelty— even 
the “wicked genius”— of environmental violence in militarized borderlands. It brings 
human presence to deaths that this same violence occludes from political and aesthetic 
spheres of consideration by virtue of its “natural” causes and the combination its 
geographic inaccessibility and remoteness.  
Water Caches as Art in the Desert: The Ecopoetics of the Transborder Immigrant 
Tool 
 
“We have somehow or another slipped into an insane world. They are using 
taxpayer monies to help illegals come in to help collapse the system and they are 
doing it with poetry!” — Glenn Beck, speaking of the Transborder Immigrant 
Tool, 2010 
  
“All these investigations lost, art was victorious, and disturbance on multiple 
levels was accomplished.”— Ricardo Dominguez, in interview on the aftermath 
of the Transborder Immigrant Tool, 2013  
 
 Water drops are another “vocabulary of protest” (in sensu Guha and Martinez-
Alier) that are both instrumental and expressive interventions into the militarization of the 
U.S.-Mexico borderlands (13). The battles of the borderlands are always figurative and 
literal, symbolic and material. People began dropping water caches in the desert in the 
wake of the deaths of the Yuma 14 in 2001. In addition to the over 100,000 gallons of 
water placed along the border by Humane Borders over the past fifteen years, other 
NGOs funded by charitable contributions and government grants have set up dozens of 
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similar stations. Groups such as Border Angels, No More Deaths, and the Tucson 
Samaritans regularly drop water or create rescue beacons for migrants walking through 
the desert along the Arizona-Mexico border. On an even more informal scale, private 
citizens fill or buy gallon-water jugs and leave them along the trails of the Toho 
O’Odham Reservation, the Organ Pipe National Monument, and elsewhere in the greater 
Sonoran Desert ecosystem.26 They place water along the deadliest sections of the border, 
such as The Devil’s Highway in Pima County, Arizona. The caches can be large, such as 
Humane Border’s 100-gallon metal tanks that announce their presence with a blue flag 
lofted on a 30-foot pole, or the caches can be as small as one gallon plastic jugs of water 
scattered among the mesquite and cacti. Taken up in news media and fine art, or in the 
educational volunteer trips to cache the water with humanitarian organizations, the water 
caches draw attention to the weaponization of the border and common biological 
citizenship shared by dehydrated bodies of any nationality. Like Urrea’s graphic 
description of the hyperthermic body, the caches signal the importance of bodies 
traversing the land. The caches are material interventions into the deadly space of the 
border, protesting the unmarked deaths of migrants by providing resources that save 
lives. But just as these actions constitute material humanitarian aid, and act in this 
contested political and aesthetic space to call into question what the meaning and logic of 
the borderlands is and should be. These actions do not occur in a vacuum; Border Angels, 
No More Deaths, and Humane Borders all participate in broader efforts to enact broader 
immigration and border reform. 
                                                      
26 The Greater Sonoran Region comprises the desert itself along with the biotic communities contiguous 
with the sprawling desert. These include such iconic ecosystems as the coastal chaparral and scrubland of 
the Baja Peninsula, the oak woodlands of the Sierra Madre, and the Chihuahuan desert that follows the Rio 
Grande as it snakes along the border towards the Gulf of Mexico (Arizona-Sonora Desert Museum). 
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 If the water caches are one form of borderlands disruption, a means of 
interrupting the political scripts that frame migrants as “illegals” swarming the border, 
then the unique tactical media performance of the Transborder Immigrant Tool (dubbed 
“TBT” by its creators), is a radical extension of this disruptive logic. The TBT performs 
poetry as code and code as poetry to create a GPS-based life-saving tool for migrants 
crossing the border. While I’ll get into some of the details of this project below, I want to 
state at the outset that as of 2016 the TBT has never been used by an actual migrant, but 
merely by its developers in the Electronic Disturbance Theater.27 Despite not being 
“used” directly for one of its intended purposes, the TBT sparked controversy, acclaim 
and distain on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border between 2008-2010, and is well 
worth considering in dialogue with other water cache art activism and the political 
ecology work of The Devil’s Highway, especially since the “ecopoetry” of the TBT was 
inspired by Urrea’s account of the Wellton 26 (Marino 4).  
 The Transborder Immigrant Tool is the performative tactical media project of the 
Electronic Disturbance Theater and the b.a.n.g. (bits, atoms, neurons, genes) lab. The 
TBT was conceptualized and created by Micha Cardenas, Amy Sara Carroll, Brett 
Stalbaum, Elle Mehrmand, and Ricardo Dominguez. Dominguez’s UC San Diego 
website profile refers to the TBT as a “GPS cell phone safety net tool for crossing the 
                                                      
27 The TBT’s co-principle investigator, Ricardo Dominguez, says that the deployment of the TBT 
cellphones south of the border has been flummoxed by the increase in the “narco war.” Since narcos 
control coyotes and even access to crossing the border without the help of a coyote (as Urrea notes in 
Devil’s Highway) “it is very dangerous for communities to have any support beyond what the narcos are 
willing to give” (qtd in Chao 2013). It appears, in the jaw-dropping but typical irony of the borderlands, 
that the narcos, enriched through U.S. border policy and enforcement, who help migrants cross the border, 
are far more potent opponents to this tool for safe passage than the most rabid nativist or government 
official threatening the Electronic Disturbance Theater and their collaborators. 
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Mexico/US border” (UCSD Department of Visual Arts).  Micha Cardenas describes what 
that means and how Electronic Disturbance Theater made the TBT: 
We wrote this app for an inexpensive Nextel cellphones that allow people to 
access the GPS service in the phone without having cellphone service so that they 
could use the phone to navigate the border without being tracked so easily. And as 
the user is being, kind of, shown directions towards lifesaving sources of water, 
they’re offered the possibility of hearing poetry. To make this happen we worked 
in concert with social movements, working, doing humanitarian aid in the US 
Mexico borders and who put water caches in the border regions, like Border 
Angels and Water Stations, Inc. and we used the GPS system to map out these 
water caches and wrote software that leads you to water.  
 
In the charged political climate surrounding issues of immigration and “border security,” 
it’s hardly surprising that this project was both strongly celebrated and denounced. As the 
epigraphs of this section capture, the lines of attack from right wing media pundits like 
Glenn Beck were diverse and somewhat bizarre. In Beck’s coverage of the TBT, he hangs 
his outrage on the tripartite pegs of frivolous costs to tax-payers, threats to the integrity of 
the border and nation from dehydrated migrants, and that the medium of the nation’s 
downfall is poetry.  As Cardenas wryly puts it, “I put that on my CV” (“the Transborder 
Immigrant Tool: Science of the Oppressed”). The cost to taxpayers stems from the 
Electronic Disturbance Theater’s public university salaries and a $5000 grant for the 
project. But the principal critique is the charge that Electronic Disturbance Theater are 
traitors for, in the words and angry eye roll-filled sneer of Fox and Friends’ host Brian 
Kilmeade, “navigat[ing] illegals through dangerous terrain safely” (original emphasis, “a 
Phone App to Aid and Abet Invaders?”). In addition to the op-eds and strongly negative 
coverage from Fox News, the EDT received a “deluge” of hate mail, including graphic 
death threats (Chao 2013, Cardenas 2014, Warren and Warren 27).  After several 
congresspersons sent a letter to UCSD, the school began auditing Ricardo Dominguez for 
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misuse of funds28 (he, along with Stalbaum, are the principle investigators on the project) 
(Marino 2).  
 The TBT incensed nativists and captured national media attention at a level that 
the private water caches have never reached. Surely, as Dominguez himself notes, this 
notoriety is a unique and “spasmodic,” “kind of viral collision between fashion 
magazines, Fox News, the US congress, the FBI, and my own university” (Chao 2013). 
In other words, TBT’s prominence (especially before it was fully developed) is a product 
of a complex media firestorm, not necessarily the nuts and bolts of the code or the poetry 
the tool is comprised. But if the mere concept description of the project can ignite such 
strong reaction, there seems an implicitly acknowledged power of poetry, code and 
performances as texts within the political ecology of the borderland.  
 As members of academia, the Electronic Disturbance Theater have unpacked 
some of the stakes and mechanisms by which the TBT acts as what Rita Raley (a 
chronicler of EDT and b.a.n.g lab, among other hacktivists and new media artists) calls 
“tactical media.29” The collaborators of TBT, however, describe the project as a shift 
from “tactical media to tactical biopolitics” the Electronic Disturbance Theater hits 
directly on the level that US counterinsurgency operations and this particular form of 
                                                      
28 The investigations and the threats came in 2010, the same year that Daniel Millis, a Sierra Club employee 
and volunteer with No More Deaths, won his appeal for the littering citation he received in 2008 for placing 
sealed jugs of bottled water in the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge in Arizona. In a 2-1 ruling, the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals found “it ambiguous as to whether purified water in a sealed 
bottle intended for human consumption meets the definition of ‘garbage’” (qtd in Binelli). I highlight this 
here to suggest that the border disruptions of the TBT, and the reaction they engendered, occurred within 
the larger context of national news surrounding disruptions of the border mechanisms. 
 
29 Raley defines tactical media as “practices such as reverse engineering, hacktivism, denial-of-service 
attacks, the digital hijack, contestational robotics, collaborative software, and open-access technology labs” 
that achieve “disturbance” in social, conceptual, or power relations (13). Such disturbance, Raley notes, 
through “intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic regime” in a way that makes “critical thinking 
possible” (13). 
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protest contest the border. Low intensity conflict (LIC)and counter insurgency praxis has 
come to dominate U.S. interagency thinking around so-called “small wars” since Dunn 
first wrote of the borderlands through a military framework. Counterinsurgency is a kind 
of biopolitical project meant not to defeat an enemy but to control a population 
perpetually in fear of emergent threats. Migrants, as a population, appear to nativists as a 
“biocriminal” threat to the economic, cultural, and racial health of the nation. Post 9/11, 
the fear of terroristic threats penetrating the sovereign security of the nation state was 
modeled onto the longstanding threads of nativist anxiety along the U.S.-Mexico border.  
Even the bare images of cyclone fencing and the unblinking eyes of video cameras along 
the border help construct the northward-heading migrant as a danger to be vigilant 
against. Through the criminalization of migration, the War on Drugs, and these optics of 
Operation Gatekeeper, Hold the Line, and other border militarization schemes, migrants 
are made into threats and cast as disposable life.  The “tactical biopolitics” of the TBT 
contests the disposability of migrant life in the border by reappropriating the very 
mechanisms of military cartography and surveillance (GPS) to draw attention to the 
difficulties migrants face crossing the border and to mitigate that environmental violence 
by guiding people to life-saving water caches. Dominguez describes how he sees the 
tool’s intervention into the production of bodies’ relation to space in the borderlands:  
With the Transborder Immigrant Tool, we are taking a technology, the GPS 
system and a cell phone system, which, again, are very attuned, at this moment in 
time, to attachment to the body. And so the Transborder Immigrant Tool does 
continue the history of electronic civil disobedience in creating a code that 
basically performs the belief that there is a higher law that needs to be brought to 
the foreground: a universal common law of the rights of safe passage. And so the 
tool calls forth this sense that there is a community of artists who are willing to 
foreground the higher law.  
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The “higher law of safe passage” is evoked by the water dowsing navigation system of 
TBT, its most obvious functionality. But so too does Carroll's poetry provide a certain 
functionality, an “aesthetic sustenance” that “creates a sense of hospitality to migrants”30 
crossing the border (qtd in Jefferson 2010). When Amy Sara Carroll was writing the 
“ecopoetics” to pair with the code for the Transborder Immigrant Tool, she writes that 
she found herself reflecting on “what one would need from a poem in the desert.” The 
aesthetics of the poem, and the function of the poem, she speculated, were different in a 
weaponized desert: “A desert is not just a desert” (Electronic Disturbance Theater 3). 
Hence the poems are what she calls “the desert survival series.” Collectively, these 
poems, used through any flip cell phone, offer advice about how to survive in the Greater 
Sonoran ecosystem. Carroll describes the survival series as “pared down prose poems… 
procedural” instructions for how to perform core survival skills like tending to a 
rattlesnake bite, or finding true north in the day or night (4).  
 Using the “aesthetics of the survival manual,” (DH Quarterly) Carroll’s poems 
provide actionable intelligence with poetic flourishes to the lost and dehydrated. Each of 
Carrol’s poems identify a specific danger of the borderlands desert, in particular the 
Anza-Borrega desert near San Diego where the project was developed and tested by the 
EDT and their partner NGOs, Border Angels and Water Stations Inc. While the poems 
identify venomous animals, poisonous flora, and specific information about 
hyperthermia, among other dangers, Carrol’s poems do not mention other humans. There 
is no reference la Migra, nativist vigilantes, or other human dangers. The only mention of 
                                                      
30 These specific descriptions of the project were played and apoplectically received by Glenn Beck on his 
radio show in 2010. 
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other humans comes in the form of repeated calls to use the cellphone to call 9-1-1 or 0-
6-6 if the user is in a state of extreme danger (Carrol 58).  
 Carrol’s poetry was inspired by her reading of Urrea’s The Devil’s Highway 
(Marino 4). One poem appears to be a shortened, instructional summary of the six stages 
of hyperthermia that I read in detail (above). Carroll juxtaposes the symptoms (“heat 
cramps… fatigue, dizziness, fainting, nausea, vomiting”)31 with advice (“seek water at 
twilight”) (58). As the list of symptoms grows, beginning to overwhelm the user who 
may well be experiencing these symptoms at the time of hearing, Carroll instructs the 
user: “STOP. The choices you make from now on will dictate whether you live or die”32 
(58). Where in The Devil’s Highway the narrator speaks of how a body could be saved by 
being “found by the Border Patrol” or even “saved by the Border Patrol’s famous air 
conditioner,” Carroll's instructional poetry places the agency of life and death with the 
migrant user, not the U.S. authorities. In The Devil’s Highway the act of dying of 
hyperthermia is engrossing in part because the reader is thrown into the perspective of a 
dehydrated migrant, and so the reliance on the Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue 
(BORSTAR) unit finding the proverbial needle in a giant desert haystack accentuates the 
peril of a distant migrant. But when the intended audience of the poetry is a dehydrated 
person in the desert, and the avowed goal of the tool is to save the life of one who at risk 
of death, the rhetorical strategy recognizes and enhances the agency of that user. Yet 
                                                      
31 Each poem is translated into Spanish, the most common first language of migrants crossing the border. 
The Spanish poem is read aloud through the cellphone. This line, read through the TBT, would be “Los 
calambres por calor… fatiga, mareos, desmayos, nauseas, vómitos.” 
 
32 “PARE. Las decisions que tome a partir de ahora dictarán si vive o muere.” 
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Carroll cautions the user, “you will not be equipped to deal with these symptoms as they 
present themselves. Call 9-1-1 or 0-6-6” (58).  
 By appealing to an aspirational law of safe passage, the TBT takes up the tools of 
militarization to both draw attention to the environmental violence experienced by those 
who cross the dangerous border, but also to defang that environmental violence by 
guiding people through the deadly gauntlet built through borderlands militarization. 
Additionally, the TBT weds digital hacktivism with ecopoetry, redefining what a “guide” 
in and through a desert landscape can provide. The poetry points to the natural beauty—
hazardous though it may be—of the Sonoran Desert. It is a place of “Desolation,” as 
Urrea writes, but one, Carroll suggests, that is enriched by the power of the spoken word. 
The water caches save lives, and the TBT augments the act of placing water caches by 
adding additional “aesthetic sustenance” via Carroll’s poetry. If the funnel effect of 
borderlands militarization was meant to deter people from entering or exiting the U.S., 
the TBT asserts the “higher law” of safe passage and extends a different face of the U.S., 
one that is welcoming.  
Artists like the Electronic Disturbance Theater aren’t the only ones who engage in 
the borderland disruption of the water caches. The destruction of the water stations is 
equally an aesthetic communicative act, communicating to both migrants, Samaritans, 
and broader media market publics the ferocity and violence of anti-immigrant sentiment 
along the border. Opposing the NGO’s and the Electronic Disturbance Theater’s actions 
are vigilantes who counter-protest by destroying the water caches. Their acts are similarly 
a literal and figurative intervention into the environmental violence of the borderlands. 
Water barrels are frequently shot by a variety of firearms. The bullets no doubt serve a 
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functional purpose in draining the barrel, but it is not the case that bullets are the only 
means of destroying the barrels. The stations Border Angels place in the desert are not in 
high-trafficked or patrolled areas. Indeed, in areas like the Cabeza Prieta Wilderness and 
Organ Pipe National Monument, Samaritan NGOs and the Border Patrol have 
memoranda or understandings for patrols to avoid the water stations so that desperate 
migrants don’t steer away from a spotted station so as to avoid arrest. Thus, a determined 
vandal is free to walk up and destroy a station with whatever one’s favorite implement of 
destruction might be. Why expend expensive ammunition, making noise that might draw 
attention to one’s act, other than ritualistically enact a kind of vicarious violence against 
migrants.  
 But drawing attention, and exacerbating environmental violence while intimating 
interpersonal violence, is exactly what shooting water barrels in the desert is all about. 
Consider one macabre image that made the news in 2016, a photograph taken by Joel 
Smith, the operations manager for Humane Borders. In early February 2016 six of 
Humane Borders’ eight water stations were vandalized, including the station shown in the 
photograph. Lying next to the barrel, itself shot and drained by shotgun pellets, is a dead 
coyote (Canis latrans). The number of simultaneous vandalism suggests a coordinated 
plan of attack by a group of individuals, and the fact that this group carried weapons and 
also the carcass of a coyote with them offers a glimpse into the intensity of the hatred 
with which these actions were undertaken. The image, and story of the vandalism, was 
picked up by the Arizona Daily Star and other national news networks via the Associated 
Press. According to Humane Borders and the Border Action Network Executive Director 
Juanita Molina, “vandalism [of water stations] typically consists of stolen spigots and 
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drained water or flags bent so people can’t see where the water stations are located, not 
bullets and carcasses.” The widespread publication of this image online and in print 
journalism comes at a national moment of inflected concern with immigration and so-
called border security.  
 The dead coyote stands in for human coyotes, the guides, traffickers, and 
smugglers who transport people from Mexico to the United States. As the leaders of the 
groups that might access the water stations, the coyotes shoulder responsibility for aiding 
undocumented migrants into the country. Urrea’s narrator explains, since Operation 
Gatekeeper and Hold the Line, “more than ever, walkers need a coyote” (Urrea 60). And 
the coyotes, more than ever, are vilified by U.S. media and popular culture. Media 
narratives argue that if it wasn’t for the coyotes, who routinely molest or abandon their 
trusting clients, so many people wouldn’t die in the desert. If it weren’t for the coyotes, 
this line of argument holds, no one would try the crazy scramble through Desolation to 
come into the country and take Americans’ jobs; the coyotes are the villains (Spener 205). 
For the anti-immigrant vandals, whether they were part of a hate group, or lone wolves, 
the human and nonhuman coyotes resonate in ways that exacerbate this hatred33.  
                                                      
33 The hated towards human “coyotes” is also tied the longstanding hatred white settler colonists have 
shown towards the canine coyote, Canis latrans. Canis latrans has historically been the target of general 
American vitriol and concerted efforts to eliminate it from the US Southwest and elsewhere in the country; 
coyotes are perceived to menace livestock, pets, and children. The U.S. Department of Agriculture, in 
setting goals for the implementation of the Animal Damage Control Act of 1931, even tried to bring about 
the “eradication, suppression, or bringing under control” of the “injurious predator species” (Section 426, 
qtd in Bacon 366). Yet despite federally subsidized killing programs that paid hunters in the US Southwest 
and elsewhere handsomely for each coyote pelt, the coyote is doing better than ever in the US. Much like 
the failures of borderlands militarization to stem the tide of migrants into the US, the eradication programs 
targeting Canis have spent a lot of taxpayers’ dollars and committed tremendous violence without any 
measurable success. The distinctive cry of Canis latrans can be heard across a wider range than at the turn 
of the 20th century and in higher density (Urban Coyote Research Project 2016).  
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 Some might argue that the corpse of the coyote communicates anger with the 
callous, sometimes murderous, human coyotes. It’s not that these vandals want thousands 
to die in the desert. Placing the carcass of a coyote at the station serves as a message to 
those human coyotes that they are criminal scum, and tells Humane Borders staff and 
volunteers that they are aiding and abetting criminal scum. It’s one thing to be a good 
Samaritan, and another to help criminals. But even if these vandals fully believe the 
culpability of this coyote scapegoat narrative, looking past the fact that coyote guías serve 
as the expendable, exploitable bottom tier employees of larger American-Mexican narco-
human trafficking criminal networks, and certainly looking past the culpability of US 
policies driving both the swell of immigration and the deadliness of the border itself, 
there’s no remotely humane way to read the destruction of the water barrel. The water 
barrel has the capacity to save the lives of the desperate and the lost. If the dead canine 
stands in for the criminal guía, the barrel stands in as an indexical representation of the 
migrant. This act of vandalism is an act of hate, orchestrated through the symbolic 
murder of the migrants that walk through these unique and dangerous environments. This 
form of threat is of a kind with nooses hung in trees. Like the noose, the shot water bottle 
carries both the threat of violence and a trace of the material means for enacting that 
violence. Similarly, water jugs deposited by groups like No More Deaths are routinely 
slashed, again intimating extreme violence to migrant bodies (if one wanted to eliminate 
the water cache its considerably easier to open and empty the jug, not to mention carrying 
the now-litter out of the desert). No More Deaths marks their water jugs, sometimes 
including messages to migrants or to borderland vigalantes. As one jug reads, “people are 
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dying of thirst out here. If you slash this, realize it is equivalent to murder” (No More 
Deaths, figure 1). 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has shown that the most lethal weapon in the longstanding U.S.-
Mexico border conflict is quiet way that U.S. militarization has organized the space of the 
border to weaponize natural environmental hazards. While we may be “all illegals in the 
desert,” only undocumented migrants from Mexico are banished to this space, left to die 
in far-flung wild lands. In Chapter II I discussed how Héctor Tobar’s The Tattooed 
Soldier models the ways in which spectacular military violence can incite or maintain 
slow environmental violence, and argued that the environmental outcomes of such 
actions constitute a legible form of military violence. In this chapter I have argued that 
the narrative political ecology of The Devil’s Highway and the TBT reveal that amassing 
forces, even if these forces are not actively shooting and killing people on a regular basis, 
still can orchestrate lethal forms of environmental military violence. This second dynamic 
makes natural hazards into environmental weapons, and is perhaps even more insidious 
than the dynamics of environmental military violence I discuss in Chapter II because this 
form of violence looks to be natural, inevitable, and without human origin. It is also 
noteworthy, however, that in the case of both The Devil’s Highway and the TBT that 
these artistic projects have had such material impact in highlighting and intervening in 
the violence targeting migrants. Groups like Humane Borders and the Border Angels 
recruit new volunteers using The Devil’s Highway, and the act of water caches were 
spurred on by the deaths of the fourteen member of the Wellton 26. The Transborder 
Immigrant Tool sparked a national media firestorm over the power of poetry to provide 
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sustenance. Both projects bring recognition justice to the thousands of migrants who have 
died along the border by recovering the fugitive human agency that has produced this 
ongoing tide of violence.  
  Although the number of undocumented border crossings has declined since the 
global recession of 2008, there is evidence that the border is becoming increasingly 
deadly for those who do cross.  Data suggests that even as the number of migrants (and 
migrant deaths) has fallen over the last eight years, the rate of death per crossing has 
steadily climbed (Anderson, S 2) According to the National Foundation for American 
Policy, in 1998 approximately two migrants were recorded dead per 10,000 
apprehensions of undocumented migrants by the Border Patrol while in 2012 close to 14 
deaths are recorded per 10,000 apprehensions (Anderson, S 2).  Although some of this 
difference could be attributed to greater attention and effort at the border to find and 
catalogue migrant deaths, it could also well be that the border is actually more dangerous 
in 2016 than twenty years earlier. With every mile of floodlighted fences and every new 
deployment of enforcement agents, migrants are pushed into more perilous and remote 
crossings.  
 The continued effects of anthropogenic climate change will exacerbate a 
worsening situation along the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Summer, the “season of death,” 
is coming earlier, lasting longer, and getting hotter with more erratic and severe weather 
events (Garfin et al 463-464). Climate change will exacerbate the border war in other 
ways. Investigative journalist Christian Parenti writes that climate change has stoked the 
fires of “green nativism” and mainstream political embrace of a “fortress state mentality.” 
Parenti writes that “as the planet warms, the political tumors of American 
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authoritarianism, our current repression of immigrants, will metastasize” (214). 
Consciously or coincidently appropriating the armature of Garret Hardin’s “Life Boat 
Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,” ubiquitous pundits and politicians (again, 
it’s hard not to turn to Donald Trump as a paragon of this movement) marshal neo-
Malthusian arguments for closing the border and restricting immigration (Urban 251, 
Parenti 209). As reference to Hardin’s 1974 essay implies, these nativist strands are not a 
new phenomenon within mainstream US environmentalist movements, but may become 
more prominent forces so long as the links between national sovereignty and security as 
linked to ecological purity and abundance. I’ll take this argument up in greater detail in 
the following chapter, but I think it fitting to mark “green nativism” and the “greening of 
hate” here to emphasize how climate change is likely to impact the environmental 
warfare of the borderlands.  
 While the confluence of global forces is in many ways personified, and 
scapegoated, in the figure of the migrant, it is not the confluence of these forces that 
endanger migrant bodies in the borderlands. The climactic danger is weaponized by 
particular “imperial formations” that have continuously militarized the border justified as 
“deterrence” that has utterly failed to deter. The military organization of the borderlands 
environment is simply punitive and deadly, and no less the fault of human actions than 
the shooting of José Antonio Elena Rodríguez. The texts I’ve explored in this chapter 
show powerful ways of bringing the deadly environmental violence out of the sphere of 
the natural and into the realm of political and artistic struggle. They show, through one 
vocabulary or another, this “broken place in the world” and the human agency enmeshed 
with this place (Urrea 32). The Devil’s Highway and the Transborder Immigrant Tool 
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each move to describe or disrupt environmental military violence caused by border 
militarization since Operation Gatekeeper and Hold the Line. These texts suggest that in 
an era of increased militarism and growing threats from climate change in the 
borderlands that the humanization of migrants and denaturalization of environmental 
military violence must go hand in hand. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE WAR OF ALL AGAINST ALL IN THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF U.S. 
SPECULATIVE FICTION 
 
“Climate change is global-scale violence, against places and species as well as 
against human beings.” 
 
—Rebecca Solnit  
 
“This is not just about things getting hotter and wetter, it’s about things getting 
meaner. And that’s why we have to talk about values and who we want to be in 
the face of this crisis.” 
 
—Naomi Klein 
 
“It’s 2022 and people are still the same—they’ll do anything to get what they 
need, and they need… Soylent Green!” 
 
—movie poster for Soylent Green 
 
Climate Change and the “War of All Against All”  
  
 This chapter turns to the question of future wars and conflicts that may be caused 
by climate change as they have been depicted in speculative fiction. While in my 
previous chapters I have defined “environmental military violence” as a critical term for 
the study of war and the environment, I now consider how this violence is justified, 
supported, and sustained in forms of popular culture, namely, contemporary 
environmental science fiction.  Many prominent climate activists and scholars 
investigating the social ramifications of climate change assert that climate change entails 
not just a warmer world, but a world more prone to interpersonal and intergroup conflict. 
These arguments are indirectly supported by the prominence— or rather, ubiquity— of 
narrative forecasting of “low-rise [climate] dystopias” in recent U.S. popular culture 
(Davis 270). The imagery associated with climate dystopias resonate with more direct 
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arguments that place environmental change in tight correlation with rising conflict, be 
these arguments from politically left-leaning environmentalist or right-leaning hawkish 
think tanks or from the U.S. military itself. I argue that while futurist speculative fiction 
remains a rich site of environmentalist jeremiad and epidiectic rhetoric, this archive often 
naturalizes militaries and imperialism as institutions responsive to an innately violent and 
atomistic sense of human nature while stimulating broadly environmentalist sympathies. 
In novels depicting internal climate migrants, such as Octavia Butler’s Parable of the 
Sower and Parable of the Talents, I show that even politically engaged, progressive, 
intersectional approaches to environmental endangerment naturalize conflict and occlude 
dialogic solutions to environmental change.  
 Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) and Parable of the Talents (1998) 
depict climate injustice to which characters in the story adapt by migrating away from 
acute dangers posed by climate change and other environmental stressors. While Butler 
uses environmental change as a means of setting their characters in motion, both novels 
focus on the danger posed by patriarchal fanaticism and racism let loose within a 
democratic state emaciated by neoliberalism. Environmental declension is both symptom 
and cause of the state’s deterioration, and a means of strengthening hateful ideologies that 
have been the target of progressive, anti-oppressive politics. The plots of the Parable 
duology center on the act of movement away from environmental privation towards 
physical safety and sustainable living in Cascadia, even if the supposed solaces the 
characters find are yet again undermined by patriarchal violence. Each novel represents 
the intersectional nature of environmental inequality while also identifying racism and 
white imperialism as central forces promoting environmental degradation and 
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exacerbating the effects of that environmental change. Yet while the stories take up the 
whiteness of ecological violence, I argue that both Butler’s novels tend to naturalize the 
relationships between environmental change and racist violence, clouding the critique of 
white imperialism and patriarchal violence these books advance. To cloud these 
important critiques that the novels otherwise sustain is unfortunate in an era of climate 
change were a warming world is coincident with rising racial nationalism and 
authoritarianism (Norris).  
 By making this argument I do not seek to fall into the “essentialist tendency” in 
environmental studies or environmentalism of assigning singular root causes to complex 
environmental and social issues, nor do I think Butler’s duology makes this reductive 
error (Ellis 256). Each novel takes up a swirl of social and environmental issues and their 
current and potential future effects on American society. That said, I do critique the 
essentialist tendency of this genre of popular fiction, and Butler’s novels in particular, to 
link environmental degradation— and climate change more particularly— to 
interpersonal and intergroup violence. In Jeffrey Ellis’ enduring essay from Uncommon 
Ground decrying the tendency of environmentalists to squabble amongst each other over 
the essential root cause of environmental problems, he quotes Thomas Pynchon: “If they 
get you to ask the wrong questions, they don’t have to worry about the answers” (qtd. in 
Ellis 256). The quote, in the context of Ellis’ argument, alludes both to the environmental 
debates wherein different constituencies are “attacking” each other for asking the wrong 
questions based on their assumption of the wrong root cause of environmental destruction 
(i.e. population growth, technological innovations, rising production/consumption). 
Pynchon’s quote also refers to a broader failure of all environmentalist interlocutors’ 
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desire to pin all environmental problems on a single causal force. Ellis, via Pynchon, 
implies that the search for a root cause is in and of itself a form of “wrong question[ing]” 
that does not account for the complex interplay of social and natural forces that constitute 
what we colloquially call “environmental” problems. My concern is not that Butler or the 
other authors I briefly treat in this chapter are mired in such discussions (which indeed 
still characterize much of public intellectual argument around climate change today). 
Rather, I am concerned that the overdetermination of associations between environmental 
change and interpersonal/intergroup violence consolidates particular, unverified, 
assumptions that global environmental change necessarily produces or exacerbates 
human conflict.  
Furthermore, I argue in this chapter that these assumptions are often predicated on 
narratives of racial animus and conflict; the argument that climate change or other forms 
of ecological change producing interpersonal and intergroup violence rests on tropes of 
black or brown barbarism pitted against civilized white Euro-American identity.  Such 
constellations of ideas permeate not only environmentalist speculative fiction, as I 
explore here, but also seep out into public and intellectual discourses of climate security, 
immigration, and policing in the contemporary United States. In each of these arenas the 
association of environmental change and radicalized violence naturalizes and legitimates 
increased militarism and police action in the name of ecological security, but enacted in 
protection of white resource enclosure. There is a tacit conditional argument that many 
narratives of ecological change and civilizational collapse posit. The argument runs that if 
“humanity will behave poorly” in the face of climate change, then in order to protect 
individual and collective security (of those worthy of protecting) some force (i.e. robust 
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police or active military) must keep humanity from tearing itself apart. Could this force 
wreak its own form of “bad behaviour” in such a way as to match or even amplify the 
violence of the geophysical environmental change itself? If, as I argue, the elision of 
violence and climate change is a flawed assumption, then the kinds of questions, debates, 
proposals, or imaginings addressing anthropogenic climate change carry forward 
measures of unsupported and unhelpful thinking, and promise additional casualties from 
slow and eruptive violence.   
 Resource conflicts—oil wars, water wars, wars over floods of refugees—are part 
and parcel of modern dystopian landscapes. Having opened our collective imaginations to 
the possibility of such awful outcomes, these horrors slip from fantasy into cogent, no-
nonsense rhetoric. Rigorous scholarship is not exempt from the larger trend of militarized 
dystopias I identify in this chapter. Take the beginning pages of Nöel Sturgeon’s 
Environmentalism in Popular Culture (2009) as an emblematic example. Sturgeon begins 
her monograph by inviting the reader to imagine environmental utopia and dystopia. Her 
imaginings of utopia quickly and self-consciously fall into a wish list of positive policy 
solutions to environmental ills (e.g. “we will reduce landfills and toxic waste by rejecting 
the throwaway society through recycling… consumer goods”) (3). Sturgeon draws 
attention to the way her vision has maxed out its proverbial genie wishes by ending her 
cogitation with the line, “And, … well, the list could go on forever” (4).  The utopia is 
marked by a serial erasure or negation of modernity’s worst side effects; these changes 
are enacted (it’s not quite clear who the expansive “we” is) through discreet policy and 
cultural shifts. In contrast to utopia’s wish list structure, Sturgeon forecasts a dystopia 
through a cause and effect chain reaction characterized by constant terror: 
  112 
One can easily imagine the Global North, especially the United States, will not be 
willing to rapidly make major changes in the overuse of nonrenewable energy, 
especially the oil we use to run our businesses and homes and to drive our cars. 
The quickly industrializing countries of the Global South, especially China and 
India, will not then be willing to sacrifice their attempt to match our 
environmentally exploitative ways of living. Global climate change will 
accelerate as a result. The increasing costs and decreasing availability of oil will 
legitimate U.S. military operations in countries that have oil reserves… increasing 
our military budget and shrinking our social services budget. War will also break 
out in new areas, for example, between the United States, Canada, Denmark, 
Russia, and Norway over the ownership of oil resources in the arctic… (Sturgeon 
4).  
 
Sturgeon continues to detail how this new violence will result in increased environmental 
burdens for the world’s poor and marginalized peoples. Of course, Sturgeon’s global 
feminist approach to the study of U.S. popular culture is one that constantly seeks to 
critique dualisms and the discourse of “the natural” as a tool of power (19). Yet even for 
as insightful a critic of naturalization, the visions that preface her book rely on tropes of 
innate human selfishness and violence being unbridled by environmental change and 
resource scarcity. Her use of the passive voice is telling: scarce oil “will legitimate” U.S. 
imperialism. Oil availability in the melting arctic will ensure that new wars will “break 
out.” This cascade of violence is not placed in the realm of politics and morality but 
rather simple cause and effect. Scarcity produces violence as sure as fuel, friction, and 
oxygen produce fire.   
 Until this point in my dissertation, I have examined two distinct relationships that 
describe the nature of environmental military violence. In Chapter II I describe how 
forms of spectacular organized violence— like bombs and arson and political 
assassinations— not only cause forms of slow environmental violence, but secure their 
effects or forestall initiatives to ameliorate this violence. In the second chapter I described 
how the violence orchestrated by weaponized environments conceals its human agency 
  113 
through its apparent naturalness. While these chapters describe two important dynamics 
of contemporary environmental military violence, I have yet to focus on the ideas within 
popular culture that support and sustain the use of these different types of environmental 
military violence, and the ecology of violences deployed through environmental warfare 
more broadly. That is not to say that the previous chapters have ignored such ideological 
armature; for instance I track the transformation of Guillermo the peasant farmer into 
Longoria the Jaguar Battalion killer in The Tattooed Soldier precisely by examining how 
he internalizes oppressive concepts of race, masculinity, and nationality. Likewise, the 
narrative political ecology of Urrea’s The Devil’s Highway examined how globalized 
economies but virulent, radicalized nationalism contributed to the weaponized 
borderlands of Arizona. Yet in both of these examples my main concern was explicating 
the forms of violence rather than examine how the violence itself fit within larger 
discourses of power and meaning-making. Environmental militarism refers not only to 
the kinds of environmental violence deployed in military or national security endeavors, 
but also the values and beliefs that support the linkage of military action to environmental 
rationales or modes of military action. Indeed, it is because militarism is both material 
and discursive that an environmental humanities approach is necessary to the study of 
war and the environment. And it is for this reason that I must focus on the cultural 
vehicles by which these values are propagated in order to understand both the specific 
associations that constitute these values and their tenacity in the public sphere.   
Environmentalism through Speculative Fiction  
 
 Speculative fiction has long been an important site for the articulation of 
environmentalist appeals. Science fiction in particular has, along with romanticist nature 
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writing, long been a key genre through which concerns with the growth of industrial 
modernity at the expense of a supposedly wild and pristine Nature have been articulated 
(Barratta). Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, commonly regarded as the first science fiction 
novel, depicts the struggle of the Enlightened man against his own wretched 
machinations and violations of Nature (all the while brilliantly calling into question just 
what “nature” a wretch made up by a scientist would inherently posses). In Shelley’s 
second novel, The Last Man, global climate change in the 2190s correlates with the 
emergence and spread of a deadly pandemic that ultimately decimates all of humanity 
(save, you guessed it, the last man narrator). The Last Man is perhaps the first truly 
future-casting speculative novel, and opened the imaginary so that the likes of H.G. Wells 
could also offer up visions of Social Darwinist dystopia and apocalypse via the death of 
the sun in Time Machine. Pandemics again reared their head, albeit in a very pro-human 
way, in War of the Worlds. These canonical early entries into science fiction evince how 
this genre, in fulfilling its world-making propensity and engaging with the cutting-edge 
tools of industrial development and “progress,” often raises environmentalist anxieties 
and critiques of Western Civilization’s growth and Nature’s decline.  
 Yet we need not look so far back as the 19th century and sift through these proto-
environmentalist novels to see how their 20th and 21st century progeny take up and 
elaborate these critiques. It is not my goal here to conduct such a genealogy of 
environmentalism in science fiction, though such a work would be worthy of study34. I do 
want to note, however, that American environmentalism’s most-enduring environmental 
                                                      
34 Chris Barrata’s edited collection, Environmentalism in the Realm of Science Fiction and Fantasy 
Literature is a good start to such an effort.  
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jeremiad, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and its most enduring environmental work of 
children’s literature, Dr. Seuss’ The Lorax, both draw on tropes of speculative fiction. 
While my inclusion of The Lorax, with its furry barbaloots and swammy swans and 
doomed truffula trees obviously is a work of fantasy inspired by the realities of species 
extirpation, Silent Spring’s speculative qualities are often overlooked in summaries of 
this monumental work in favor of descriptions of its scientific, or journalistic, exposé of 
DDT’s effects on birds, agriculture, and human health. Yet as The New York Times 
Magazine noted in its recent fifty-year look-back essay on the influence of Carson and 
Silent Spring, “Silent Spring begins with a myth” (Griswold Sept 21, 2012). In the first 
chapter, “A Fable for Tomorrow,” Carson paints a poetic American pastoral scene before 
introducing an insidious influence of anthropogenic pesticides that blight the land. 
Weaving tropes of nature as nurturing mother, vulnerable garden, and ultimately vengeful 
harbinger of doom, Carson’s “Fable” concedes in its final paragraphs, “This town does 
not actually exist, but it might easily have a thousand counterparts in America or 
elsewhere in the world” (3). After admitting to the fiction, Carson explains her authorial 
rationale:  
I know of no community that has experienced all the misfortunes I describe. Yet 
every one of these disasters has actually happened somewhere, and many real 
communities have already suffered a substantial number of them. A grim specter 
has crept upon us almost unnoticed, and this imagined tragedy may easily become 
a stark reality we all shall know. (3).  
 
In this moment, Carson’s voice disrupts her speculation and shows this act of fiction has 
been done in service of drawing together the collective stakes of disparate cases and 
potentials. She implicitly justifies her use of fiction by claiming a “grim specter has crept 
almost unnoticed” into “stark reality.” The creeping violence of such a specter anticipates 
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Rob Nixon’s exegesis of environmental slow violence, and Carson uses speculative 
fiction to, in Nixon’s terms, “apprehend” the violence; to understand and act to halt the 
threat of industrial pesticides.  
 “A Fable for Tomorrow” offers a convenient and powerful narrative template that 
has been taken up time and again in the rhetorical appeals made by environmentalists and 
politically-engaged speculative fiction more broadly. The template, stripped of frills and 
boiled down, looks something like this for a prospective environmental speculative 
fictionist.  
Move 1 
Move 1 involves constructing a nostalgic past-present. This present, like the 
future you’ll get to momentarily, only exists in individual and collective imaginings and 
ideas. The keyword here is nostalgia; to build a sense of attachment to the conditions of 
the present or recent past that this story is going to threaten and destroy.  
Silent Spring wastes absolutely no time building a nostalgic, Edenic image of the 
American hinterlands:  
There was once a town in the heart of America where all life seemed to live in 
harmony with its surroundings. The town lay in the midst of a checkerboard of 
prosperous farms, with fields of grain and hillsides of orchards where, in spring, 
white clouds of bloom drifted above the green fields. In autumn, oak and maple 
and birch set up a blaze of color that flamed and flickered across a backdrop of 
pines. Then foxes barked in the hills and deer silently crossed the fields, half 
hidden in the mists of the fall mornings. (Carson 1).  
 
The “harmony” between the town and the country yields “prosperous farms, with fields 
of grain.” This image, in the early 1960s, stands in stark contrast to the financial and 
ecological travails of the Midwest and Great Plains farms in the nineteen thirties and 
forties, when the Dustbowl and the Great Depression would have indelibly marked the 
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consciousness of many of Carson’s readers.  The brief paragraph moves from seasonal 
descriptions of spring, summer, and fall, suggesting a full and bountiful harvest for the 
harmonious town. The pastures of plenty evoke an idyllic image of farmlands fully 
recovered from the Great Depression—if such a time even touched this perfect refuge.  
Move 2 
Move 2 is to introduce the dystopian influence of environmental disruption and 
hazard and systemically corrupt the benevolent past and/or replace it with the 
consequences of the dystopian influence.35 
In Silent Spring, this influence is first described as a “strange blight” that causes 
“everything to change.” In each subsequent paragraph Carson builds the tension and 
uncertainty surrounding the strange blight, characterizing the blight as “some strange 
spell,” with “strange,” and “puzzling,” effects. Systemically the productivity and 
prosperity of the land and the farmers is stripped away; livestock miscarries, orchards fail 
to bear fruit, and fish in the rivers die. In this landscape both economic productivity and 
biological reproduction are essentially halted. Long before acoustic ecology was a 
recognizable field within conservation biology, Carson strongly links the silencing of 
organisms to the death of an ecosystem. The death of ecology is expressed through 
silence; an absence of noise that should be the product of birds singing, fish splashing, 
bees buzzing, etc.  
Move 3 
Move 3 is to build in the causal exposition (or at least a really strong, suggestive 
                                                      
35 For those of you more into the in media res start, the irresistible casting of one’s readers into a brave new 
world, don’t neglect offering some nostalgic snapshots into the past so that the reader understands these 
two worlds, the horrible future and the generally decent but already corroding present, are somehow linked. 
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corollary) of how the dystopian present of the story has been enacted through the 
negligent actions in the near-to-nostalgic past-present mentioned in move 1. 
As a genre, fables are narratives that are didactic and address their audience 
through analogous epideictic. Commonly incorporating personified animals, the fable 
praises or blames human character traits, human virtues and vices with the explicit intent 
of moving readers to either emulate or disavow certain behaviors. In “Fable for 
Tomorrow,” the unsettling nature of the descriptions of ecological violence are 
heightened by the uncertain origin of the destruction, incomprehensible to the 
complaining farmers who are the only human voices in this story, Carson describes a 
“white granular powder” as the mysterious corrupting influence (2). While this short 
introduction withholds the precise identity of the powder, readers learn through a series 
of negations that the powder is symbolic representation of the community’s own actions. 
The powder and its effect of “silenc[ing] the rebirth of new life,” is not “some witchcraft” 
nor “enemy action,” but rather “the people had done it to themselves” (2-3). Carson’s 
“fable for tomorrow” resists personifying animals and plants, allowing the technological 
interventions of humans into ecosystems to stand as an analogy for what the humans may 
be doing to their own lifestyles, financial security, and reproductive health.  
 Unpacking Silent Spring’s use of speculative tropes underscores mainstream U.S. 
environmentalism’s reliance on speculative fiction and ecocatastrophe (L. Buell 250).  
While scholars and those seeking to effect environmentalist social change should always 
be wary of the “great books” historiography of any social movement—the urge to credit a 
single speech, declaration, or publication with the rise of organized social protest and 
policy-making—the impact of Carson’s Silent Spring is undeniable. Images from “The 
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Fable for Tomorrow” became standards in other environmentalist science fiction, such as 
Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and its film adaptation, 
Bladerunner. This dialogue between fiction and nonfiction texts in turn underscores how 
speculative genres have also been invested in environmental themes. Like Silent Spring 
itself, this corpus of literature, film, and art is a dynamo of environmentalist rhetoric and 
popular influence. In the first two decades of the 21st century Hollywood box offices and 
titanic video game industry36 have been especially enamored with overtly 
environmentalist speculative fiction such as Suzanne Collins The Hunger Games and 
apocalyptic science fiction like The Day After Tomorrow, Interstellar, and Avatar.  
This rich and influential genre helps people think about environmental and social 
problems, operating as a kind of funhouse mirror held up to reality. There’s the 
reflection, but warped in unfamiliar ways that highlight or accentuate different parts of 
the real. Moreover, “Science fiction, too, is a way of opening up the future, affirming the 
possibility that things could be otherwise—its various scenarios and conceits less often 
about the future as such than about the present estranged from itself, released to 
uncertainty” (Uncertain Commons). Yet, while speculative fiction and science fiction 
helps advance environmental thinking, it often naturalizes and legitimizes militaristic 
values and environmental violence. Assuming the premise that social and environmental 
issues are linked, and that militarism is more often than not damaging to ecosystems and 
socio-economically vulnerable communities, the stakes and lessons of such 
representation are clear: if one advances an environmentalist critique, calling into 
question the stability or even wholesale existence of nature, but holds up militaries and 
                                                      
36 For parallel environmentalist speculative games see Bethesda’s Fallout series, Final Fantasy VII, etc. 
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violence as a permanent, necessary actors in the world, these texts legitimate 
environmental problems themselves, as they spring from the imperial ruin of military 
projects.  
While I maintain there are any number of exemplary science fiction texts that I 
might use to evidence the prevalence of such easy linking, one or two well-known 
examples should be sufficient to establish the existence, if not ubiquity, of this 
relationship between environmental decline and rising tides of violence in 
environmentalist speculative fiction. My first text is perhaps the bluntest example one 
might hope to find, and thus it is illustrative of the general move I’ll make in larger 
argumentative readings of Octavia Butler later in this chapter. The movie poster for 
Soylent Green (directed by Richard Fleischer) sports the tagline “People never change/ 
they’ll do anything to get what they need/and they need SOYLENT GREEN.” The 
poster’s tagline captures one kind of association environmentalist speculative fiction 
makes between violence and environmental decline. If “people never change,” and 
“they’ll do anything to get what they need,” the implication is that in an environment 
marked by scarcity or pollution people will be capable, and willing, to do violent things 
that the contemporary audience viewing the film would find unpleasant. In this case, the 
line teases (as a good poster should) that the inhuman, very human response to the year 
2022 will be the desperate scrum for “SOYLENT GREEN,” which of course, “is… 
people!”  
 The subtle promise of on-screen cannibalism, though, is secondary to the violence 
and governmental discipline promised by an environmentally-compromised future. The 
image accompanying this text shows one individual—a cartoon rendition of Charleton 
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Heston—running from a red dump truck labeled “riot control” that is literally pushing 
and lifting hordes of people out of its path in pursuit of Heston. Other trucks carrying 
masses of similarly-dressed people follow in a staggered line. The image paints a picture 
of society without individuals, as the white-clad civilians exist only as a writhing mass of 
flesh, and the riot control personnel wear rubber suits and mask themselves in domed 
helmets reminiscent of 19th and early 20th century diving suits. Even the few individuals 
directly behind Heston are masked. The lack of individuality in the hordes swarming the 
clearly-identifiable Heston implies that although “people never change,” the future 
dystopia depicted in Soylent Green will strip humans of their discernable, individualized 
humanity. Heston’s character is posited as a protagonist fighting to retain his autonomy in 
the face of these threats. These defaced, inhumane hoards stand in stark contrast to the 
line of Hollywood stars’ cameos shown at the bottom of the poster. Repressive violence, 
in the form of the militarized trucks, the riot patrol’s batons, and Heston’s holstered pistol 
associate the dehumanized future with a surge of people and violence.  
 The Soylent Green movie poster is emblematic of a host of successful 
ecocatastrophe apocalypse and dystopian film, television, gaming, and literature. The 
entire Mad Max franchise is predicated on a lack of nature producing a surfeit of 
explosions and murder. The extraordinarily successful serialized graphic novels and 
television show, The Walking Dead, moves from the premise that a pandemic causing a 
zombie uprising can overthrow the world’s militaries and governments, but a few 
scattered bands of southern Americans with shotguns and machetes can survive the 
zombie apocalypse. Threatened by zombies and stripped of the comforts of civilization, 
apparently the only reasonable form of adaptation is to align oneself with the most brutal 
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white strongman you can find37. Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, while not so overtly 
Hobbesian, similarly shows that human nature can be stripped away along with 
nonhuman nature in an ecoapocalypse. In the novel, as well as the film there is hardly any 
recognizable “ecology” to see at all—just the few last souls scavenging a non-
regenerating supply of canned goods (or people, there’s always people). The Road, a 
bestselling book in 2004 and a modestly successful box office adaptation, is the kind of 
“chilling and caustic” ecoapocalypse that is reminiscent of a much earlier generation of 
post-Carson collapse narratives (F. Buell 251). In such narratives, both “ecology” and the 
historical political forces that usually interact with ecology are stripped bare, and in the 
case of The Road even the linguistic capacities of the characters seem as denatured as the 
natural ecology they inhabit (Saliba 144). Monosyllabic, terse exchanges mark the 
dialogue between father and son, and it appears throughout that culture and nature both 
have all but perished.   
Instead of continuing to rattle off the Hollywood blockbusters (and the equally 
prolific busts like Waterworld) that elide human savagery and environmental decline, I’m 
more interested in the links between violence, environmental inequality, and overall 
environmental quality presented in Octavia Butler’s Parable duology: Parable of the 
Sower and Parable of the Talents. Published in 1993 and 1998, respectively, Butler’s 
books are generally considered to be more “literary” than the blockbuster fictions I 
discuss above, and are widely assigned in environmental humanities courses in higher 
                                                      
37 In The Walking Dead’s seven seasons of television, most of the different groups of survivors are led by 
white strongmen. The focal group is led by Rick Grimes, whom fans of the show have dubbed the 
“Ricktator” (playing on his dictatorial leadership). Grimes’ fall into brutality is triggered in his fights 
against antagonistic groups led by white men. Rick’s nemesis, “The Governor,” is even overtly identified 
with a “white king” chess piece in an episode.  
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education across the United States. I am interested in how Butler’s depiction of 
environment and violence in Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents attaches 
meaning between environmental change, interpersonal violence, and organized large-
scale violence. California and Oregon, the predominant setting of the Parable duology, 
are marked, in contrast to the mid-1990s when the books where written, by increased 
levels and kinds of interpersonal violence (what Rebecca Solnit sardonically terms 
“artisanal violence…from below”) and organized structural violence as well as a more 
hazardous and chaotic physical environment. As each is prominently situated within the 
setting and plot of the two novels, the rise of violence and environmental hazards are 
clearly correlated; but what if any causal links do these texts suggest between the three? 
Conveyed through tropes of radicalized urban blight, slavery, apocalyptic fire, scarcity, 
and earthquakes, these different forms of violence are the product of similar causal 
factors within the novel. 
Of Ecocatastrophe and Violence in Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents  
 
Answering what causal links exist between violence (of any or many kinds) and 
environmental change are significant because these links suggest, on the one hand, that 
issues of environmental justice are central to discourses and policies promoting peace and 
security. But as I argue throughout this dissertation, the linking of resource scarcity, 
environmental hazards, and violence in academic, popular, and literary arenas often 
naturalizes and legitimizes further cultural, political, and financial investments in 
militarized organizations that “produce insecurity in the name of security” (Marzec 7). It 
seems undeniable that ecological change and environmental hazards challenge humans 
personally and societally, yet these stressors need not result in greater investments in the 
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ideas and practices that have manufactured social and environmental injustices. Yet the 
unleashing of violence seems natural, seems inevitable, when ecological change and 
conflict is locked together by the secret, but not-so-subtle subtext of race and racism. The 
linking of environment, violence, and race within Lauren Olamina’s epistolary narrative 
puts forward a dystopia ridden with tropes of environmentally-inflected race war even 
while she articulates explicitly anti-racist ideals and actions while founding Earthseed, a 
quasi-religious praxis founded on the idea of sustainability.  
Both Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents are part of a long and 
storied literary history of California rife with both utopian yearnings and dystopian 
world-making. Lynn Mie Itagaki writes that “at the continental end of the U.S. westward 
expansion, California has long held the imagination of a nation building a global empire, 
at the forefront of technological innovations, and increasing economic dominance” (371). 
The continental margin and perennial mythic frontier of Manifest Destiny, California 
retains romantic utopian possibilities ever encumbered by bloody histories of conquest, 
exploitation, and genocide. And despite California’s unique ability to broadcast its 
cultural, financial, and technological hegemony onto the rest of the country and other 
parts of the world, it has always been the most ethnically and culturally diverse state in 
the U.S. (Itagaki 372). From such diversity have come a plethora of utopic imaginaries 
and strivings. If, as Mike Davis claims, “there is a dramatic trend…in merging all of Los 
Angeles fiction with the disaster or survivalist narrative,” the same can not be said of 
other regions of the state. Indeed, with the white flight of the 1980s to the early years of 
the 2000s, while Los Angeles has taken on the yoke of a perpetual Ground Zero, 
suburban and particularly northern wildspaces in California’s utopic stock has risen. In 
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the 2014 bestseller California by Edan Lepucki, two lovers’ blind flight from a depressed 
and dangerous Los Angeles to make life anew (without much survivalist know-how or 
preparation) in the woods of northern California are a perfect expression of the desperate 
hope placed within ex-urban locales of the West. While the rise of cults— like the “burn 
the rich” junkies of Sower and President Jarrett’s Christian Crusaders in Talents— are 
associated with times of change and catastrophe, the terra nullius of Californian and 
Oregonian wild spaces within the settler colonialist narrative of westward expansion 
provide fertile ground for new kinds of communities and social arrangements to take root. 
Olamina’s insular Acorn harkens to the many separatist communes and communities that 
historically have dotted “the State of Jefferson38” and Oregon.    
Butler, writing into the dominant genre of disaster fiction and utopian science 
fiction of California, mixes into her story aspects of African American slavery narratives 
(R. Butler, Gamber). Numerous critics have described the series an Afrofuturist or 
Afrocentric example of a “neoslavery narrative;” the Parable signifies heavily on 
autobiographical slave narratives, as the story focuses on acts of emancipation and 
migration related through epistolary (by one narrator in Sower and five in Talents) 
(Kouhestani 2015, R. Butler 2010). As with slave narratives, and much of Octavia 
Butler’s literature, the Parable texts take up complex conceptions of social power; and 
further signifying on slave narrative tropes, both Sower and Talents focus on characters 
gaining and exercising power through the acquisition of different kinds of literacy (Lacey 
380).  
                                                      
38 Running from Yreka, California north 100 miles to O’Brien, Oregon, Jefferson was a proposed state in 
1941 that has continued to exert a cultural influence in mostly rural Southern Oregon and Northern 
California.  
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By combining genre elements of Californian disaster fiction, science fiction, and 
neoslavery narratives, the series therefore not only exists at the nexus of these genres but 
also can be read as early exemplar of what Ramon Saldivar terms “historical fantasy” and 
“speculative realist” fiction. Saldívar argues: 
When fantasy and metafiction come into contact with history and the racialized 
imagination, vernacular cultures, and the stories of figures from the American 
global south they become… a fantasy-shaped realism that bids to create a new 
form, a sur-realismo, a global south realism, within the speculative regions of 
fiction. (593).  
 
Using “all the classical forms and themes available to ethnic writers to tell their protest 
stories” combined with speculative fiction tropes to “reverse” the penchant of fantasy to 
take flight from history and trauma (Saldivar 593-594). While speculative fiction is 
always also “specular” fiction, reflecting back and on historical and cultural moments, 
historical speculative realism takes up concrete calls for social justice amidst the 
historical emergence of global neoliberal capitalism and its exacerbation of social 
inequalities while simultaneously denying the reality of race, gender, ethnicity, or other 
forms of social difference that make a difference (Saldivar 594). In terms of chronology, 
Butler’s early work predates most of the authors that Saldívar signals out as paragons of 
writing against conceptions of a postracial U.S., but her final three novels (Sower, 
Talents, and Fledgling) overlap with this same group writing at the turn of the century 
(such as Percival Everett, Sesshu Foster, Colson Whitehead, and Karen Tei Tamashita) 
(Saldívar 596). As an early practitioner of this kind of fantastical historical metafiction, 
Butler’s Parable series tackles “the meaning of race in a time when race supposedly no 
longer matters” (Saldívar 575).  
Saldivar’s definition of historical speculative realism does not overtly discuss 
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environmental issues within these novels, however other scholars such as Kate Marshall39 
have looked to similar archives in describing literatures of the Anthropocene; literatures 
addressing the pervasiveness of neoliberal capitalism’s ecological ramifications across 
scales, times, and locations (local, regional, global, molecular, immediate, delayed, 
attritional) and attendant environmental and climate justice issues (distributional, 
compensatory, and recognitional in nature). While Saldivar does not describe 
environmental justice as part of the matrix of domination historical speculative realism 
describes, the canon of authors he suggests, and indeed the novels he chooses to analyze 
in his article, do place a great emphasis on environmental justice issues. Julie Sze’s call 
for reading of “environmental justice literature” contains an extended reading of 
Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange, and her novel Through the Arc of the Rainforest is a 
regularly-assigned staple in environmental literature courses. Junot Díaz’s short story 
(and presumably the rest of his currently forestalled novel,) “Monstro” takes up global 
coloniality and climate justice in the Antilles, and Whitehead’s Zone One has been called 
the paradigmatic novel of the Anthropocene (Marshall 524). Given the ubiquity and 
originality with which historical speculative realism takes up environmental and climate 
justice issues, it’s arguable that historical speculative realism is a paradigmatic genre of 
the Anthropocene and the issues that animate this new cultural and geologic era. At a 
minimum, those novels Saldivar hails as historical speculative realism are also treated by 
                                                      
39 While Saldivar does not describe environmental justice as part of the matrix of domination historical 
speculative realism describes, the canon of authors he suggests, and indeed the novels he chooses to 
analyze in his article, do place a great emphasis on environmental justice issues. Julie Sze’s call for reading 
of “environmental justice literature” contains an extended reading of Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange, and 
Yamashita’s Through the Arc of the Rainforest is a regularly-assigned staple in environmental literature 
courses. Junot Díaz’s short story (and presumably the rest of his currently forestalled novel,) “Monstro” 
takes up global coloniality and climate justice in the Antilles, and Whitehead’s Zone One has been called 
the paradigmatic novel of the Anthropocene (Kate Marshall). 
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scholars who examine environmental justice and the Anthropocene in literary studies.  
Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents show numerous intersections 
between environmental justice and social justice issues. Taking a “critical environmental 
justice” perspective on both novels entails assuming that the human and non-human 
members of the world depicted in the books “are subjects of [intersectional] oppression 
and agents of social change” (Pellow “Critical Environmental Justice…” 5). That is to 
say, that in order to perform an environmental justice reading of Butler’s Parable series, 
one must unpack the textual (over)determinations that adhere to the depiction of both 
human and ecological things in the novels, and more, inspect what agencies these things 
exert within the universe of the novels and how the ecology of such agencies affects what 
meaning we can derive from these stories. As I have mentioned previously in this 
chapter, depictions of ecocatastrophe in speculative fiction often serve metaphorically to 
“sympathize” with the social ills being decried in the text; blighted landscapes and 
pollutants act as setting that bolster an emotive atmosphere of modern dystopias without 
necessarily drawing a coherent relation between what social forces produce or sustain the 
dystopia itself. And yet, if Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents can be truly 
regarded as environmental justice narratives, as Govan, Gamber, Miller, Koutenheni, and 
other scholars have suggested, then the uneven distribution of environmental benefits and 
burdens within the novels cannot simply mirror or resonate with the social critique of 
nationalism, racism, sexism, and neoliberal capitalism within the novels. The 
environmental hazards and despoliation described in the novels are presented as 
symptoms of these social injustices, however, the depiction of the environmental hazards 
and their relationship to human interpersonal or organized violence turns, like Oroborus, 
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onto itself by conveying tropes of colorblind racism in its environmental description and 
classism that undercut the antiracist messages that Lauren Olamina pens in her journals 
and Earthseed: Book of the Living.  
Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents take up “the meaning of race in a 
time when race supposedly no longer matters” by throwing the reader into a near future 
when race has continued to matter, acutely, violently, and overtly. It does so in large part 
by placing racial representation and social meaning within a failed state that is marked by 
resource scarcity, lawlessness, and extreme violence (Miller 203). Much of the 
scholarship and embrace of the novels (particularly Sower) stems from ecocritical 
readings of how the Parable series narratively demonstrates the interconnection of 
environment, economy, and social justice. Yet to suture these realms of social existence 
to one another in the speculative future, these narratives deploy tropes of barbarity, urban 
decay, and Hobbesian war depict environmental catastrophe and environmental collapse 
as a racial and racist project. 
Resource Scarcity and the War of All Against All in Parable of the Sower 
 
Lauren Olamina’s narration focuses on resource scarcity and the connections she 
sees between society and environment far more often in Sower than in Talents. These 
connections are conveyed through Olamina’s journal, and her epistolary constitutes the 
entirety of the narrative in the first book. Olamina’s journal entry of what she sees on one 
evening of television is indicative of the world she sees herself living in, as well as some 
of the connections she sees holding it together:  
We saw the dead astronaut with all of red rocky Mars around her. We saw a dust-
dry reservoir and three dead water peddlers with their dirty-blue armbands and 
their heads cut halfway off. And we saw whole blocks of boarded up buildings 
burning in Los Angeles. Of course, no one would waste water trying to put such 
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fires out. (Sower 18). 
 
The serial images Olamina relates in staccato sentences juxtapose seemingly unrelated 
images that Lauren connects in her writings. The danger and romance of space 
colonization; the geophysical and social effects of climate change; the terrifying violence 
consuming Southern California because of the interlinked scarcity and economy of 
resources.  This violence is focalized first through the grotesque murder of the water 
peddlers; they are not simply shot or stabbed but have been nearly decapitated. Olamina 
notes that because water has been privatized and is now expensive commodity, costing 
“several times more than gasoline,” that “water peddlers” are routinely robbed and killed 
(Sower 18).  But the news shows interpersonal violence at a grander scale in the form of 
the unmitigated burning of a whole city. Both forms of violence, serialized alongside the 
“dust-dry” reservoirs, links climate change to violence through the sensationalist 
spectacle of television. By interpreting all of these images as the part of a greater whole, 
Olamina formulates her own unique vision of social and environmental justice: a series of 
beliefs and practices she calls “Earthseed.”  
Olamina’s interest in nature closely attends how the natural world can help or 
hinder her community’s survival. She meticulously tracks the cost of water and gasoline 
from her father, and devours survivalist books on the uses of native plants and 
agriculture. In Talents, Olamina attempts to establish a community (“Acorn”) that is as 
self-sufficient and sustainable as possible, to the point where there is no “trash pit,” only 
a compost pit and a salvage pile. Her allegiance to zero waste and care to nonhuman 
ecosystems is an extension of the frugality and necessity she was born into; Olamina 
exhibits some hallmark traits of Ramanchandra Guha and Joan Martinez-Alier’s “empty 
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belly environmentalism.” Her valuation of the more-than-human world stems from this 
tight coupling between her daily existence and the bounty of local nature, and extends 
outward into the larger world from this understanding. While Lauren never refers to 
herself as an environmentalist, she spends considerable time within her journal entries, 
and later, in her Earthseed verses, to understandings of environmental change as it relates 
to the economy, and by extension, social justice.  Indeed, Earthseed is drawn from 
Lauren’s analysis of nature. She writes, “Consider: Whether you’re a human being, an 
insect, a microbe, or a stone, this verse is true. 
All that you touch,  
You Change. 
All that you Change,  
Changes you.  
The only lasting truth 
Is Change.  
God 
Is Change. (Sower 79). 
Lauren regularly deploys evolutionary and ecological metaphors to explain her 
understanding of social phenomena. The bedrock of her religion, Earthseed, is 
recognizing the changeability of the universe and life’s interrelation and interdependence 
within a changing world. The appeal of Earthseed to Lauren is not that it reflects her 
sense of value, but that her beliefs seem rooted in the universality of a dynamic universe 
in which each thing is hitched to everything else. The ethics of Earthseed are an attempt 
at rooting morals and ethics in nature and the logics of species survival. Olamina’s model 
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of survival, however, is necessarily confined to the kinds of life she experiences as a 
child in Robledo and those conveyed in the paucity of books, radio, and one semi-
working television she has access to. Olamina applies a Darwinian imperative of 
evolution and migration to individuals as well as at the level of species and population, as 
she believes space colonization is the only hope for humanity’s long-term survival.  
Like many a teenager, she sees her life as confined in the “prison” of these walls, 
yet she also understands that the walls are the only thing protecting Robledo from “the 
sharks” that surround her island fortress. What more, while she yearns to leave Robledo, 
she sees both the community and the wider world as “a dying place” (Sower 78). 
Spinning out the Darwinian logic to its logical extreme, Lauren deems the world an 
“evolutionary cul de sac” for humanity, and believes that only travel to extrasolar worlds 
will “pry [humans] loose from the rotting past and maybe push them into saving 
themselves and building a future that makes sense” (Sower 79). Lauren doesn’t see the 
“failing economies and tortured ecologies” as a collection of lifeboats (like Robledo) 
fighting off the drowning hordes, but rather sees the whole Earth as a sinking ship. 
Earthseed, as a collection of ideas, is a tool for building lifeboats that will jettison and 
save some from inundation. Evoking the idea of potential in seeds, the Destiny of 
Earthseed is “to take root among the stars” “far from the parent plant of earth” (Sower 
80). Lauren’s knowledge and love of seeds also comes from her life in a gated 
community: by necessity, the community of Robledo grows much of its own food within 
its walls. Seeds are valuable stock in such an existence, and Lauren caches them with 
other survival supplies in her “go pack.”  
Olamina’s metaphor for civilization and long-term survival of the species is 
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constructed through metaphors of plants propagating themselves to far off places in 
successive generations of movement. Growing its own food from old, well-kept trees, the 
frugal and efficient people of Robledo sustainably utilize their local resources. They 
capture infrequent rain in barrels, harvest and eat diverse fruits of the trees using 
knowledge gained from a book “of California plants and the ways the Indians [sic] used 
them” (Sower 63). When she flees North Olamina brings, along with literal seeds from 
the Robledo gardens, these values of self-sufficiency and frugality as well as a pastoral 
impulse to avoid densely-populated cities and costly water.  
These values and skills are a far cry from the people on the road who “carry 
neither food nor water nor adequate weapons [but] carry pills” (Sower 236). Yet while 
stable, largely self-sufficient communities such as Robledo, and later, Acorn, constitute 
one generation towards this line of evolutionary flight, Lauren describes the ecosystems 
and economies in which these communities exist as a “corpse” teeming with “maggots” 
and “the living dead.” The abject poor, the drug addicts, and those without homes or jobs 
constitute, to young Lauren, a threat to her own survival and the larger survival of the 
species. She dismisses critics of NASA’s Mars mission who cite the need to direct scarce 
resources to humanitarian aid (Sower 17). For Olamina, species survival easily trumps 
specific populations’ well-being in the present. 
While explicitly tying widespread poverty and need to “tortured ecologies,” 
Olamina expresses her fear, aversion, and condescension of drug addicts and the poor 
through tropes of antiurbanism (as John Gambler argues) and colorblind racism. For 
example, when discussing Lauren Olamina’s anti-urbanism and pastoral impulses, 
Gamber notes Lauren’s penchant for deracializing the marauding class of nameless 
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characters who threaten Earthseed. The “pyro” drug-addict arsonists who destroy 
Robeldo are painted in carnivalesque dayglow colors, highlighting their unnaturalness by 
glowing in the firelight of their own destruction. Reveling in destruction for destruction’s 
sake, the Pyro addicts constitute a fearsome and unpitiable force. The paint conceals the 
race of the marauders, and Gamber notes that it becomes impossible for readers to code 
these characters by phenotype (28). And while Lauren relates that the addicts are a part of 
a “burn the rich” movement that is largely populated by children of the rich, suggesting 
these assailants are likely white, the tropes by which these literally colored marauders 
destroy communities resemble racist and colonialist stereotypes of undifferentiated 
swarms of primitives rising up and besieging white luxury enclaves (Gamber 27, Sower 
99).  
The destructive power of the Pyros makes way for Olamina’s migration north and 
the growth of Earthseed. Moving away from Robledo, the journey allows the text to 
highlight other forms of racial and gender oppression, and further allows Olamina to 
process and combat these specific injustices. In particular, Olamina is able to cobble 
together a formidable band of survivors of these structural and acute injustices that are 
able to fight off other bands of Pyros and protect each other. Yet these developments are 
set in motion and sustained through the ubiquitous promise of racialized criminal menace 
in the land.  
Paired with the tropes of nonwhite insurrection is the ubiquity of fire itself within 
the novel. The fires that consume Los Angeles, Robledo, and San Francisco in Sower 
recall the ways in which whole blocks of Los Angeles were left to burn during the 1992 
Los Angeles Uprising. The tropes of riots, of instigated but ultimately senseless violence, 
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reverberate throughout the novel. In her introduction to the 2017 graphic novel adaptation 
of Butler’s Kindred (adapted by Damian Duffy and illustrated by John Jennings) Nnedi 
Okrafor relates a part of an email exchange she and Butler shared directly after the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. Butler tells Okrafor:  
“One of my favorite quotes— so sadly true— is from Steve Biko: ‘The most 
potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.’  
There is also the sad reality that it takes very little to set off young men who want 
to feel powerful and important, but who are either unwilling or unable to find 
constructive outlets for their energies. Testosterone poisoning. And men have the 
nerve to complain about women’s hormonal mood swings.” (qted. in Okrafor, 
2017).  
 
Throughout the corpus of Butler’s fiction violence is not an evil in and of itself, but a tool 
that can be used by oppressors or the oppressed that can be used to initiate radical—even 
emancipatory— change (Outterson 433). But the violence Lauren describes from the 
“monsters” who kill her brother Keith, and sack her town, and attack her, Zahra, and 
Harry on the road is not revolutionary violence but just rampant, senseless crime. Such 
violence pervades Sower, as different characters from Robeldo— including Lauren’s 
brother and father— are caught up in the crossfire of gang violence or robberies. As with 
the Pyro addicts who sack Robledo, these assailants are never explicitly racially coded, 
yet the depiction of unchecked urban crime resonates with “War on Drugs” and 
conservative anticrime rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s. It’s not just climate change and 
resource scarcity that propel this criminal violence, but also the absence of a disciplined 
police or military force. Olamina is distrustful of police, but the narrative seems to imply 
that without a strong, militarized police force, violent chaos is the natural state to which 
urban populations will assume.  
 One of the biggest examples of environmental stress inciting interpersonal and 
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organized human violence comes in the form of a massive earthquake that hits San 
Francisco and the greater Bay Area as the Earthseed community approaches from the 
south on Route 101. Earthquakes are natural hazards that are endemic to California, 
which is one of the most seismically active states in the U.S. Unlike climate change and 
its attendant environmental hazards (including wildfires like the one Olamina outruns 
towards the end of Sower), the earthquakes of California are not caused by human 
activities. Yet within the landscape of Sower the earthquakes seem to resonate and 
exacerbate the social instability that dominates Olamina’s surroundings.  With much of 
California falling along the potent San Andreas Fault (in reality a series of faults), there 
are over 10,000 earthquakes in California each year. Yet only a small fraction of the 
quakes are felt by people, and fewer still cause any infrastructural damage. Nonetheless, 
Olamina reacts to the repeatedly massive, building-destroying earthquakes as a regular 
occurrence throughout Parable. What’s more, Olamina interprets these earthquakes as 
instigations to not only violence but human savagery. Olamina describes one such 
earthquake in a journal passage “(from notes expanded Sunday, August 29)” that occurs 
on August 27th, 2027, beginning the passage with the declaration: “Earthquake today” 
(Sower 225). I mention that Lauren composes the description of the earthquake and the 
events that follow two days after the incidents because this act of “expanding” from one’s 
notes implies that she had time to process and arrange the narration of this entry; it is not 
a slapdash listing of events made on the same day. It is for this reason that I don’t 
interpret “Earthquake today” as a quick note one might make in a diary to causally 
distinguish one day from another (for instance, writing “rainy today” or “Arbor day”) but 
rather a narrative choice to foreground the most significant thing to one’s life about that 
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day. And in the narrative that follows Olamina attributes numerous deaths and the course 
of their migration to the earthquake of the 27th.  
 People experience uneven levels of vulnerability and resilience in the face of 
virtually all environmental hazards, including earthquakes. The nascent Earthseed 
community is caught on the road when the earthquake hits. Though Lauren reports that 
they and the other migrants are literally shaken and that some lose their footing, no one is 
seriously injured by the quake itself. Indeed, looking down the highway “everything 
looked the same—except for sudden patches of dust thrown up here and there in the 
brown hills above us” (225). Yet a short while later the group comes to a community of 
homeowners living along the highway that is devastated by the quake. Lauren reflects on 
her immediate premonition of conflict:  
One house down the hill from the road smoked from several of its windows. 
Already people from the highway had begun to drift down toward it. Trouble. The 
people who owned the house might manage to put out their fire and still be 
overwhelmed by scavengers” (Sower 227).  
 
Although her own companions wish to join the “scavengers,” Lauren admonishes her 
friends that the homeowners will not give up what they have without a fight, and that 
whatever they could take would not be worth getting shot (Sower 227-228). Lauren, 
analyzing this community from afar much as she did her own Robledo before and after its 
fall, concludes that “I don’t think toughness will get them through this day.” (Sower 228). 
As the group moves on they hear screams and gunfire; Lauren’s prophesy of the town’s 
collapse fulfilled.  
 Lauren does not blame her friends for joining the group that is “attacking the 
community en masse” on ethical grounds, but rather limits her scolding to the practicality 
of stealing enough to make the effort worthwhile. As she has referred to the massed 
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exodus of paupers and pilgrims in multiple occasions as “the living dead” and “the no 
longer human,” the only ones capable of shouldering human blame for the event are those 
who live in the community. The sin is not attacking another human being or even 
hoarding resources from other human beings, but rather the inability of the homeowners 
to remain self-reliant and defend their property. Instead of questioning the actions of the 
raiders, Olamina privately condemns the action of the besieged community in her journal: 
Distant shouts and screams mixed with gunfire. Stupid place to put a naked little 
community. They should have hidden their homes away in the mountains where 
few strangers would ever see them. That was something for me to keep in mind. 
All the people of this community could do now was take a few of their tormentors 
with them. Tomorrow the survivors of this place would be on the road with scraps 
of their belongings on their backs. (228).  
 
Lauren’s analysis of the “naked” community’s placement as “stupid” underscores her 
upbringing and forced education within a failed state (228). She intends to learn from this 
community’s “mistake” of being in the path of migrants and earthquakes, but will come 
to replicate this error when building Acorn in Northern California. That she replicates the 
open vulnerability of this unnamed community is interesting given its superficial 
similarity to Robledo (small, laid low by flames and raiders) and the fact that she 
continues to muse over the death of the community. She thinks that “they should have set 
up overwhelming defenses— a line of explosive charges and incendiaries… only power 
that strong, that destructive, that sudden would scare attackers off” (228). This fantastical 
vision of a fortress community with literal firewalls discounts the obvious cost of such 
defenses, as well as the danger such defenses would pose to the community itself. Not to 
mention the fact that a strip of land mines in an earthquake prone area is a risky 
proposition in and of itself! She concludes “if the people… were without explosives, they 
should have grabbed their money and their kids and run like crazy the moment they saw 
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the horde coming” (228). The earthquake produces a seachange in those streaming north 
from Southern California, changing paupers and beggars into a “horde” of violent 
scavengers.  
 The naturalness, the obviousness, of the violence that follows the earthquake 
undergirds Lauren’s frustration with the community she identifies with. The community 
should have prepared in light of the “stupid” decision to place a community in the path of 
so many migrants and in such a fire-prone area. Lauren’s sense of forethought and 
preparation are based entirely on the notion that one small fire or earthquake will break 
the levees holding back a sea of human violence, and the battle erupting as the group 
passes vindicates Lauren’s diagnosis within the narrative. Lauren is frustrated with the 
community because it could not anticipate and prepare for this outcome. Yet even Lauren 
struggles to understand the relationship between the earthquake, fire, and subsequent 
violence: “It’s odd, but I don’t think anyone on the road would have thought of attacking 
that community en masse like that if the earthquake—or something— had not started the 
fire” (228). Why does the earthquake trigger not only the idea but the swarming of so 
many? While she has described different scenarios from the point of view of the 
homeowners, she does not imagine the motivations or incitements of the migrants (wither 
herself being a migrant) beyond diagnosing them with “greed or need.” Lauren doesn’t 
express outrage at the scavengers, but seems to hold umbrage towards the earthquake; to 
her it’s obvious an earthquake would further dehumanize the faceless hordes on the road.   
 While Lauren’s perception of the nameless roadside community offers prolepsis 
for both how Lauren will act as architect to Acorn and also the way in which Acorn will 
be destroyed, this event would be minor in scope of the narrative save for the fact that it 
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sets off three major developments in the story. The first is the introduction of Taylor 
Franklin Bankole, the doctor who will father Lauren’s daughter, Larkin, and be a part of 
Earthseed until he is killed by Christian Crusaders in Acorn. The second development is 
yet another precipitous rise in danger and violence for the group in its odyssey. While 
Lauren’s assessment of the community and the pillaging horde is made from the position 
of safety in the moments I have been discussing, in mere pages the group comes under 
attack and Lauren kills a man, her hyper empathy incapacitating her early in the fight. 
Finally, this earthquake’s amplified effects— both geophysical and its violent 
aftermaths— cause the party to change course away from the coast and into California’s 
interior to avoid the mayhem of San Francisco. Following the earthquake, the Bay Area is 
thrown into chaos where “the quake hit hard” and “scavengers, predators, cops, and 
private armies of security guards seem bent on destroying what’s left.” The fate of the 
Bay Area connotes the scalability of Lauren’s naturalizing of earthquakes triggering 
widespread violence.  
Such tropes are nothing new to the strands of Neo-Malthusian “green hate” 
coursing through environmentalism in the American West. Garrett Hardin’s now 
notorious “Living on a Lifeboat” appeared in the journal Bioscience in October of 1974. 
In the short article, Hardin argues against the popular metaphor of “Spaceship Earth” and 
advances his argument that instead of a spaceship people should think of the world as a 
collection of lifeboats floating in a sea of ecological turmoil. It doesn’t make sense to 
think of independent nation states as belonging on the same spaceship, since nations are 
not all unified crewmembers under the command of a captain (as they would be in any 
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self-respecting spaceship40). With rampant population growth, and dwindling resources, 
there are more people than can fit in the “lifeboats” of the rich (developed) nations. The 
poor nations, having grown their populations beyond the carrying capacity of their land, 
are at fault for this problem. While it is understandable to want to help one’s fellow 
human, Hardin argues, if one were to allow the poor into the lifeboat of the rich, the boat 
would surely swamp and sink. If one feels guilty about this, Hardin sneers, then one 
should get out their boat and give someone else her place. The policy payoff of this 
metaphor-heavy argument is that the United States, a rich country that is nonetheless in a 
precarious place (a lifeboat is hardly a pleasure yacht, after all), should strictly limit 
immigration into the country, and should cease giving aid to “underdeveloped” countries 
that are just getting addicted to aid and using it to raise the tide of highly-procreative poor 
that threaten the viable nations and cultures. Hardin particularly singles out migrant 
agricultural labor in the U.S. as an example of pernicious immigration destabilizing 
regions ecosystems and economies. Implicit in his arguments is the prospect of the poor 
forcibly entering the lifeboat, swamping it and drowning everyone. Hardin’s argument is 
hardly a flash in the American environmentalist pan; in the late 1990s a group of fiercely 
anti-immigrant, anti-population growth members tried to take control of the board of the 
Sierra Club, based in California, forwarding many of the same arguments. And as I 
discussed in Chapter III, federal and California’s state government initiated and vastly 
expanded anti-immigrant border militarization efforts through Operation Gatekeeper 
                                                      
40 One can’t help but wonder if Hardin would have been so hard on the Spaceship Earth metaphor if he had 
more widely sampled science fiction depictions of interstellar spacecraft. The world may not have a 
Captain Kirk, but perhaps he would find Octavia Butler’s behemoth, decentralized organic spacecrafts in 
her Xenogenesis triology on the late 1980s and 90s more apropos. 
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throughout the 1990s when Butler was writing the Parable series from her home in Los 
Angeles. Each of these movements in American environmentalism are bound up in racial 
projects that associate people of color and immigrants with filth and environmental 
degradation while defining white American citizenry with environmental stewardship and 
the rightful control of resources (even if that “rightful” control is simply the product of a 
regrettable, but inevitable Social Darwinian logic).   
Olamina, while enacting antiracist actions and reflecting on the dog-whistle 
racism of company towns, carries forward these ideas. This is consequential because 
Olamina’s views of the world are generally offered ex cathedra in much of Sower and 
tend to be validated by events in the novel. Yet her Social Darwinian views are 
challenged and change at various moments in the text; one particularly striking moment 
comes after the Earthseed group leaves the coast and travels past Sacramento. Leading 
the group, Olamina rounds a bend in a dried out creek bed and encounters three young 
teenagers “the age of [her] brothers, twelve, thirteen, maybe fourteen years old” (271). 
One of the children, a girl, is “so huge it was obvious she would be giving birth any day,” 
and along with the two other boys, is roasting a human leg over a meager fire. After the 
pregnant girl “pull[s] a sliver of charred flesh from the thigh and stuff[s] it into her 
mouth” Olamina silently signals for the group to turn around and flee. The image is 
striking and haunting, but if the children are taken as anything more than horror-movie 
symbols of a depraved and collapsing society, the ethics of Olamina abandoning them to 
their “cannibal feast” seems equally disquieting. It’s not as if Olamina has eschewed 
helping others—she trips up thieves robbing Travis and Natividad at the water station 
early in her travels. She helps an old man get up after the earthquake, and saves Allie and 
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Jill from the rubble of the same quake. She takes on several others, including her future 
husband, after deciding they can strengthen the group, despite their individual 
weaknesses. Some are hyperempath sharers, like Olamina, and everyone save Bankole 
comes to the group poorer and more ill-equipped than Olamina, Zahra, and Harry began 
their flight north. The children, pregnant, alone, and desperate to the point of 
cannibalism, however, are abandoned.  
After leaving the children behind Olamina reflects:  
The country we walked through was even beautiful in some places—green trees 
and rolling hills; golden dried grasses and tiny communities; farms, many 
overgrown and abandoned, and abandoned houses. Nice country, and compared to 
Southern California, rich country. More water, more food, more room….  So why 
were the people eating one another?  
(Sower 272).  
 
Olamina finds it difficult to imagine inhumanity coinciding with lands of relative plenty, 
and yet makes no prolonged effort to identify with the children. The most charitable 
reading of her actions, given her description of the “cannibal feast,” is to think that she 
found the children to be threatening. Yet what danger could three tweens—one very 
pregnant—pose to an armed group of eight adults? I see her conduct as fitting into her 
Social Darwinian approach to Earthseed and its destiny to “take root among the stars.” 
Olamina is not a eugenicist, but she is selective of the ideas that will move the species 
and group forward. This moment constitutes the harshest conduct of the band during their 
march north. Even as Olamina is quick to measure the children against her own deceased 
siblings, she feels no responsibility for helping those who would descend to cannibalism. 
Her ability to look past the children—either by deeming them a threat or by considering 
them inhuman—underscores how dimly Olamina views the migratory and destitute 
populations she encounters throughout the novel. She sees value in humanity, and in the 
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lives of those wretched of the earth who migrate north, at least so long as those people 
can accept and contribute to the mission of Earthseed. Cannibal children, it would seem, 
do not make the grade.    
In Talents, however, the largely white Christian fundamentalist Crusaders are 
more fully fleshed out as human beings who participate in actual historical modes of 
domination. Perhaps surprisingly, Lauren Olamina appears to marshall greater empathy 
towards her tormenters in Talents than in Sower. As a “hyperempath,” Lauren is 
subjected to the feelings of pain and pleasure of those she looks at. In Sower, Olamina 
feels “the ghost ache of hunger” and other forms of gnawing pain when she looks upon 
the urban and ex-urban poor. The pain she inflicts in battle compels Lauren to kill swiftly 
so that she does not have to experience the pain she inflicts any longer than necessary. In 
Sower, then, her hyperempthy contributes to her antiurbanism and exoticizing of the 
poor. Yet in Talents she is given an even more horrific form of empathic connection with 
those around her. Enslaved by the Christian Crusaders for over a year, Lauren 
experiences what she calls the “twisted, schizoid ugliness” of experiencing her own “pain 
and humiliation” of being raped but also the “wild, intense pleasure of [her] rapist” 
(Talents 234). She feels the electronic “lashings” that are administered by the slavers via 
electronic collars to herself and her friends, but also the perverse pleasure the slavers feel 
in the act.  Suffering more than others by virtue of her hyper empathy, and fully attentive 
to the hypocrisy of Christian zealots who rape and torture, Olamina “hate[s] to admit it, 
but some of them are, in a strange way, decent, ordinary men” (Talents 233). She 
clarifies, “I mean that they believe in what they are doing. They’re not all sadists and 
psychopaths. Some of them seem truly to feel that collecting minor criminals in places 
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like Camp Christian is right and necessary for the good of the country” (Talents 233). 
Olamina empathizes more with the Crusaders than with the painted pyromaniacs or drug 
addicted highwaymen in Sower. Lauren knows the accepted urban legend of Pyro making 
fire “better than sex” but does not feel this orgiastic pleasure whenever she encounters 
these miscreants in her travels.  In Sower Lauren’s tormentors are to her “the living 
dead,” “animals,” and anything but human, despite the fact that they stand in for the 
human consequences of “failing economies and tortured ecologies,” while in Talents 
Lauren faces all too human and all too relatable forms of human evil present at the time 
of the book’s publication. Lauren’s begrudging empathy towards the Christian Crusaders 
lends a more complex image of human evil; one more directly informed by legacies of 
American chattel slavery, the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, and Nazi concentration 
camps than Sower’s Hobbesian savagery amidst of ecological collapse.  
The discrepancy between Olamina’s description of the “living dead” in Sower and 
the Christian Crusaders in Talents underscores a difficulty environmentalist science 
fiction and American environmentalism more broadly faces when discussing the security 
ramifications of environmental degradation. While it is not legal for vigilantes to round 
up “minor criminals” and “heathens” for indefinite detention, rape, and torture in the 
U.S., both Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents were published during the 
sharpest increase incarcerations in U.S. history— particularly driven by the imprisonment 
of nonviolent drug related offenses (“Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections”). Asha 
(Lauren’s daughter who is kidnapped by the Christian Crusaders and narrates large 
portions of Talents) explains that what happened to her mother in 2034 “was illegal in 
almost every way,” however, that “[v]agrancy laws were much expanded, and vagrant 
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adults with children could lose custody of children” (Talents 242). The landscape of 
California need not be made into a “Third World topoi of utopian possibilities” that 
Sower depicts —the US already entails dystopia and human rights atrocities as they are 
represented in Talents. Asha tells her readers that the events of Sower took place in a time 
of maximal chaos, called “the Pox,” short for Apocalypse. The wordplay of “Pox” 
connotes a pandemic sickness, suggesting further that the actions of humans during the 
pox are a kind of passing madness—a collective infection that yielded barbarism and 
madness41.  The events of Sower, the animalistic violence and the war of all against all, is 
replaced in Talents with the more calculated and rationalized violence of religious 
fanaticism and economic exploitation. Human slavers and sex traffickers, backed by an 
authoritarian, patriarchal, fundamentalist state, are the clear and present dangers—not the 
poor gone wild.  
Talents’ extended treatment of neoslavery and religious fanaticism articulate more 
pointed social critiques than the blanket evocation of barbarism Sower exhibits 
throughout its narrative.  Inversely, Butler’s overt critique of environmental exploitation 
in Sower doesn’t sustain itself in Talents. Indeed, if absolute resource scarcity and 
climate change are central shapers of the Californian landscape in Sower, mentions of the 
environmental conditions are exceedingly rare in Talents. There are no earthquakes. 
There is no mention of hurricanes and tornados in the Midwest and South. There are no 
apocalyptic fires chasing characters on the road, nor mention of “dust-dry” reservoirs. 
These, apparently, were more prevalent during “the Pox.” Lauren still focuses on 
environmental conditions, but confines her own writings on the environment to the 
                                                      
41 Sickness and madness are tightly linked in Western literature.  
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sustainable initiatives Earthseed employ in Acorn.  
 Nature, and specifically the environmental catastrophe of a flood, allows Olamina 
to successfully rebel and escape Camp Christian42. The flood is caused by a tremendous 
storm: Olamina writes later in her journal: “it went on all night, tearing the world apart 
outside” (Talents 255). The storm triggers a landslide that destroys the cabin housing the 
central control unit of the slavers’ electronic collars. This enables a tactical insurrection 
led by Olamina to kill the slavers and free the collared. Without the central control unit, 
the overseers electronic whips are powerless against Olamina’s prepared, stealthy, and 
efficient fighters. While it’s Olamina’s disciplined preparation for any chance of escape 
that helps her kill all of the remaining Christian Crusaders, it’s the Crusaders’ own 
neglect of environmental stewardship and militancy against every vestige of Earthseed 
practice within the former Acorn that affords Olamina her chance. She explains:  
The hill where our cemetery once was with all its new and old trees, that hill has 
slumped down into our valley. Our teachers had made us cut down the older trees 
for firewood and lumber and God. I never found out how they came to believe we 
prayed to trees, but they went on believing it. We begged them to let the hill 
alone, told them it was our cemetery, and they lashed us. Because they forced us 
to do this, the hillside has broken away and come rumbling down to us. It has 
buried a [an armored tank-like vehicle] and three cabins, including the cabin that 
                                                      
42 This flood echoes the Although Olamina does not dwell on environmental damage in Talents, 
environmental degradation influences the narrative through specific characters’ neglect of sustainable 
practices. It is Christian Crusaders’ lack of attention to environmental issues that allows Lauren and her 
friends to overthrow their tormenters and escape from their enslavement. In Sower an apocalyptic wild fire 
drives Earthseed north; a final challenge the group faces before arriving at the land they’ll make into 
Acorn. The fire originates from a group of fire-hungry Pyro addicts who are mourning the loss of several of 
their comrades—killed in an attack on the Earthseed group (Sower 313).  The group is forced to cover their 
faces with damp cloths and force march the entire night to outrun the roaring fire that eventually outstrips 
their progress on both sides on Interstate-5. As Olamina writes after fleeing Robledo in a verse:  
In order to rise from the ashes 
A phoenix 
Must first 
Burn. (Sower ???).  
Emerging from the weaponized fire tired but largely unharmed, Earthseed’s community takes on a 
Christlike role as he who has battled the devil and been reborn to the world. .  Unlike the fire, which largely 
serves as an overdetermined symbol of rebirth and apocalyptic revelation at the end of Sower, Talents’ 
apocalyptic, revelatory storm is predicated on the ecological ignorance of the Christian Crusaders.  
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Bankole and I had built… (Talents 253-254). 
 
The malice the Christian Crusaders inflict on the nonhuman world is returned onto them. 
Forcing the members of Acorn to destroy their living cemetery is an act of psychological 
torture, and the Crusaders’ drive to humiliate and break down the people of Acorn blinds 
them to the practical value of the forested slopes. Their arrogant anthropocentrism and 
deliberate assault on the nonhuman world brings a biblical wrath down on the Crusaders’ 
heads. The flood carries with it allusions to Christian eschatology. The dead of the 
cemetery literally rise up in the Crusaders’ final moment of righteous judgment. The 
collared and enslaved line up to have their collars cut by Olamina, the religious leader (a 
Shaper) of Earthseed.  
 Not only does environmental change directly open emancipatory possibilities at 
the level of the microcosm in Talents, but climate change blunts the senseless violence of 
President Jarrett’s “Al-Can War.” Even though the very Trumpian43 president goes to war 
to prevent Alaska’s succession from the union, his ability to wage war is compromised by 
the new economic and political geographies created by climate change. Alaska allies with 
Canada when the U.S. declares war. Although the war destroys several iconic U.S. cities, 
including Seattle, Jarrett can’t continue the fight because food prices skyrocket and the 
populace turns against him and his war. “Years of climate change and chaos” has turned 
Canada into the breadbasket of North America (Talents 243). Without a steady supply of 
cereals, the U.S. is unable to continue the war effort and makes peace with Canada, 
allowing Alaska to secede.  This is a far cry from Sower, where earthquakes, fires, and 
                                                      
43 Jarrett exploits American’s fears and sense of nostalgia for past glories to gain the presidency. He 
partners with a coalition of white nationalists and Christian evangelicals. His iconic campaign slogan is 
“Make America Great Again” (Talents 12).  
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water stations alike both spark and exacerbate violent conflicts. In Sower the violence of 
the poor—by gun, by fire, by knife—rises like the tides and temperature with 
anthropogenic climate change. Likewise, as the company towns of Olivar and the private 
armies in San Francisco shows, industrial-scale violence of the rich also increases44. In 
Talents, however, the same environmental catastrophes work against sustained 
interpersonal violence. As the landslide and curbing of the Al-Can war suggest, 
environmental factors can limit large-scale violence or even render assistance towards 
liberatory ends.  
 Olamina and Asha do not tell readers about the environmental conditions of the 
United States or indeed the rest of the world at the end of Talents. At the end of Sower, 
however, Olamina finds temporary refuge on Bankole’s property, but the book ends with 
Bankole cautioning Olamina that “as bad as things are, we haven’t even hit bottom yet” 
(Sower 328). Stating “[s]tarvation, disease, drug damage, and mob rule have only begun,” 
Bankole correctly prophesizes that Earthseed is not yet the ascendant phoenix rising from 
the ashes. It is only just begun to burn. This last bit of dialogue that Olamina records in 
her journal ends Sower by reminding her readers of the constitutive forces that have 
shaped her life and journey to Acorn. Environmental change—marked by resource 
scarcity and a changing climate—influences each of the harbingers of doom that Bankole 
points out before allowing himself to be swayed by the energy and strength of Olamina’s 
relatively optimistic perspective about the long-term viability of Acorn. While this scene 
can be read as a moment of relentless optimism and qualified hope in the face of large-
scale crises, Olamina’s optimism rings tragic when considered alongside violence that 
                                                      
44 Again, I am indebted to Solnit’s simple and insightful taxonomy of “violence from below” and “violence 
from above” dichotomy (“Call Climate Change…” 2015).  
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overtakes Acorn in Talents.  
 At the end of Talents there is no mention of environmental change or the long 
term problems affecting society at the end of the 21st century. Instead, the book ends 
with a final entry in Olamina’s journals. The entry begins and ends with the terse 
statement, “I know what I’ve done” (Talents 405, 407). What she’s done, in her words, is 
to “help [humans] give themselves the heavens” and “helped [humans] to the next stage 
of growth” (Talents 405). Instead of worrying about the sustainability of the Earth’s 
ecosystems or social justice, Olamina reflects on her ability to “give our species its only 
chance at immortality” by sending Christopher Columbus, the first Earthseed space 
shuttle, onto its first colonizing mission (Talents 406). Olamina realizes she is close to 
death, and has planned to send her ashes along in a shuttle to fertilize the crops on some 
new planet. She does not seek to commit herself to the Earth, which is, in her Darwinian 
analysis, so much like the “corpse” of Los Angeles and the “rotting past” she hoped 
Earthseed would rip people away from.  
 Given that environmental disruption played such a critical role in the chaos of 
“the Pox,” it is frustrating that Asha or Olamina don’t give readers a sense of what the 
environment looks like in 2090, especially given the ubiquity of environmental 
description throughout the narrative of Sower. If, as so many critics have written, Parable 
of the Sower points to the interrelation of economy and ecology, or social and 
environmental justice, then how are readers to interpret the gaps at the end of Talents 
(indeed, throughout the 400 pages of Talents)? Given that Earthseed, through its vast web 
of well-funded universities, is able to train, develop, and launch a fleet of star colonists, 
and that Olamina would spend her latter days flying hither and yon giving lectures, it 
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would seem that the Pox was truly a blip in an otherwise rich 21st century. Climate 
change has altered the geopolitical and regional contexts, but not derailed globalization or 
the nation-state, which is remarkable, given how the U.S. appeared on the verge of total 
social collapse at the end of Sower.  
 It is petty to critique a story for something it is not about. If the text of Talents 
doesn’t make any claims as to the linkages between social and environmental justice, or 
between the relationships between resource scarcity, capital accumulation, war, and 
peace, then the book is like most other novels written in the 1990s or today. But if one 
returns to the idea that both Parable books function as parables, and together as a 
diptych, then the lack of environmental representation in the latter half of Talents appears 
a significant aporia in an otherwise richly-rendered fictional universe. Perhaps the lack of 
representations suggests questioning the tightly-linked issues of resource scarcity, climate 
change, and violence that were so graphically represented in Sower. Considering the 
unmitigated triumph of Olamina’s Earthseed in 2090, are readers to discount the graphic 
violence and dramatic environmental catastrophes that populate the first book? Are such 
problems simply beneath relevance given her success? There is no certain answer, and 
this ambiguity is perhaps most productive for those readers, scholars, teachers, and 
students who want to read lessons from the books; to see Parable of the Sower and 
Parable of the Talents as conveying lessons for the individual or the collective in the 21st 
century. The act of critical questioning and reading are, after all, foundational to the 
praxis of Earthseed.  
Conclusion: Climate Futures  
 
The ecologically ambiguous conclusion of Talents has the effect of decoupling the 
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relation between environment and political violence that the two novels establish prior to 
the conclusion. I read this inconsistency as a “failure of imagination" that Zižek claims 
hampers meaningful positive action in an era of climate change. There is no talk of 
earthquakes and other major environmental catastrophes in Talents. Yet for most of the 
novels it appears that seismic instability, climactic instability, and social instability align 
in the two novels, a kind of natural sympathetic fallacy. This points to the ultimate fallacy 
under guarding much of the discourse within these novels and without regarding political 
and interpersonal violence and environmental degradation. While it is laudable that 
public discourse now acknowledges some relation between environmental conditions and 
peace, the overdetermined textual effect of aligning social and environmental instability 
within the novels, especially those heralding themselves as “parables,” makes it easy to 
read such sympathy between nature and human actions as direct causal influences 
simplifies the tangled web of social and environmental forces that produce, sustain, or 
obviate both interpersonal and intergroup violence. Lost in this simplification are the 
forces that Octavia Butler so deftly explores throughout the corpus of her work: 
patriarchy, racism, neoliberalism, and imperialism. These forces which theorists from 
Fanon to Mignolo have diagnosed as primary causal agents in contemporary violence 
organize violence have more explanatory power, ultimately, that environmental changes 
such as anthropogenic global warming or earthquakes or resource scarcity. 
Leviathan was written before modern biological and cultural conceptions of racism 
and race were formulated (Fredrickson). Hobbes’ theory of the social contract arising 
from the state of nature (“war of all against all”) was itself written in a time of protracted 
civil war. It did carry racial implications, but nonetheless posited a grim view of 
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individual humans separated by, as Lauren Olamina might put it, “need and greed.” 
Hobbes derives the need and legitimacy of coercive rule under the auspices of a 
sovereign power from the ecology of human and nonhuman nature—our violent 
predispositions amidst a land a scarcity. This philosophy, carried into the apocalyptic and 
dystopian fiction of the late 20th and early 21st century carries forward Hobbes’ view of 
an atomized, needy and greedy human nature set amidst the ruin of civilization. If the 
plenty of industrial capitalism will no longer produce full-bellied environmentalists 
willing to curb the worst of capital’s exploitation of the land, then the empty bellied 
Global North will turn into a hideous, barbarous caricature of the Global South’s failed 
states (Miller 204).  These modern reboots of Leviathan carry forward a naturalized 
sympathy between human development and environmental health; antagonistic but 
interdependent. But in depicting the collapse of this antagonistic relationship speculative 
fiction in the U.S. sustains racialized conceptions of citizenry and worth.  
Intertwining ecological and civilizational collapse narratives with racist depictions 
of human savagery in the war of all against all at the end of the world works to justify the 
warlike oppression of some against some in the present. Environmental decline signals 
not only the reduction of so-called “ecosystem services” like flood control, food, or water 
filtration, but also a direct attack on the angels of our better nature, authorizing people’s 
acts of barbarism. In such a world the might and order of sovereign power is not only 
necessary, but desirable for those lucky enough to be offered exclusive security amidst 
the dispossession and endangerment of all.  
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CHATER V 
MONSTROUS FIGURES OF THE ANTHROPOCENE: CLIMATE MIGRANTS AND 
REFUGEES AS THE HUMAN FACE OF EMERGENT RISK IN CLIMATE 
DISCOURSE 
 
“Waves of climate refugees. Dozens of failed states. All-out war. From one of the 
world’s great geopolitical analysts comes a terrifying glimpse of the strategic 
realities of the near future.” 
 
—Amazon.com advertisement for Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the 
World Overheats by Gwynne Dyer  
 
“Disenfranchised felon, enemy combatant, and illegal immigrant, each enact a 
violent and exclusive social relation through a discursive and institutional process 
of criminalization without the requirement of a racial prerequisite. This raises the 
question whether all social relationships constituted through forms of extreme 
state violence should be considered ‘racial’ or ‘racist’— which is to say, it 
broaches the central and unresolved question of how we can know someone is 
‘racial’ or ‘racist’ and why we might want to retain ‘race’ as a category of 
analysis even when its epistemological grounds are shaky and its ontological basis 
largely refuted.” 
 
—Nikhil Singh, “Racial Formation in an Age of Permanent War”  
 
“We have repaid these cannibals war for war, crime for crime, outrage for 
outrage. Yes, I have saved my country, I have avenged America!” 
 
—Jean-Jacques Dessalines, after ordering the murder of over 2,000 French 
nationals at the founding of Haiti as a free and independent nation 
 
Introduction: Climate Migrant as Contested Construct 
 
 This chapter claims the construct of the climate migrant, and its closely related 
figure the climate refugee, as paradigmatic figures in climate change discourse, 
particularly the aspects of this discourse where issues of national security and apocalyptic 
change are articulated. To do this, I set out to perform two tasks: first, I describe how 
recent scholarship has identified different roles the climate migrant plays in different 
“families” of climate discourse, including those Giovanni Bettini describes as “scientific, 
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capitalist, humanitarian,” and “radical” (Bettini 64). I contextualize these diverse roles 
within broader conceptions of racial formation through carceralized and militarized 
institutions managing emergent and insurgent risks. I do so to show how attending to the 
tropes and narratives that adhere to the figures of climate migrants can reveal why 
climate migrants play such prominent roles across discursive communities (Baldwin 
“Securitizing ‘climate refugees’” 2012). Andrew Baldwin writes: 
The climate change migrant is said to be a destabilizing subject bearing down on 
the present from the future. This in turn demands of us, the inhabitants of a 
particular present, a war-like posture… Yet this is a deeply troubling form of war 
because the enemy… has committed no wrongs. (Baldwin “Orientalizing 
Environmental…” 637).   
 
Baldwin describes an enemy yet to come, one who has yet done no wrong, who does not 
hold enmity against those in the “warlike posture” militating against them. And yet this 
enemy is already being constructed through orientalist and racist tropes, and made into a 
monstrous dehumanized foe.  I argue that the logics of counterinsurgency and 
anticipatory action undergird the ways in which the construct of climate migrant 
embodies both threat and victim, provoking both menace and a humanitarian ethical 
demand from the future onto the citizenry of the Global North. I read Michael Nash’s 
2009 documentary, Climate Refugees, alongside Junot Díaz’s “Monstro” (2011) to show 
how the “human face” of climate change is rendered a monstrous, revolutionary other to 
be combatted through U.S. Counterinsurgency. Díaz’s short story, “Monstro” is as an 
exemplar text depicting the climate refugee as epitome and paragon of emergent global 
risk, and as an assertion of the folly of the ecological security state’s attempt to guarantee 
security while fomenting insecurity (Marzec 9). Finally, and conversely, I juxtapose how 
people in the US climate justice movement have latched onto the identity of “climate 
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migrant” as a political identity. This new political identity is exemplified in the People’s 
Climate March of 2014, where self-identified climate migrants claimed privileged 
epistemological and political subjectivity within climate discourse by marching at the 
frontlines of mass demonstration. Locating climate migrants at the “frontlines” of climate 
change and the “forefront of [social and political] change” inverts the ways these 
migrants are militantly excluded from participation and representation in climate 
discourse.   
 The construct of the forced climate migrant, or the closely-affiliated notion of the 
climate refugee, is a paradigmatic and prominent figure within climate change discourses. 
Such a claim requires a few terminological caveats in the service of clarity and concision 
before I proceed to describe what paradigms climate migrants instantiate. Strictly 
speaking, there are no climate refugees. A refugee is someone with or seeking a legal 
protection governed by the 1951 Geneva Convention. Under the UN’s definition, a 
refugee is “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of 
persecution, war, or violence” (“What is a Refugee?”). Someone who flees their country 
of origin due to changing climate conditions in that country (or less commented on, 
conditions within the country being migrated to) are not currently recognized as refugees. 
As the one report of the UN Secretary General on the security implications of climate 
change unequivocally states: “Although terms such as “environmental refugee” or 
“climate change refugee” are commonly used, they have no legal basis” (UN Secretary 
General 2009). Beyond legalistic ambiguity, there is wide uncertainty within academic 
literature regarding the actual number of climate migrants, and even the ontology of 
climate migrants and refugees. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report estimates anywhere 
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between 50 and 350 million people may be displaced by climate change in 2050, while 
Richard Black, an analyst for the UNHCR, published a report on the 51st anniversary of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention lambasting the focus of policymakers on environmental 
refugees as a category of migrants in need of additional legal protections. Regarding the 
existence of climate migrants, Black writes, “despite the breadth of examples provided in 
the literature, the strength of the academic case put forward is often depressingly weak” 
(2). There are so many complex forces that cause people to move, it is perhaps too 
difficult or too reductive to single out environmental change as the dominant cause of 
mass migrations. Black’s analysis, however, is confined to studies of more contemporary 
cases of mass migrations; Takeyyuki Tsuda and Brenda Baker synthesize numerous 
studies in archeology and bioarcheology to argue that environmental disruptions have 
powered human migration for millennia, and that contemporary migrations are also 
motivated or hindered by environmental change, a position endorsed by the UN Secretary 
General (297-298, 2009). Andrew Baldwin separates the academic literature of climate 
migrants into the “maximalists” and the “minimalists,” two camps that take generally 
opposing positions on the phenomenon of climate migration. In general, the maximalists 
see climate change or other environmental changes as major contributors or direct 
catalysts of international migration and the creation of internally displaced peoples 
(IDPs), while the minimalists see climate change as a relatively minor contributor within 
a larger collection of “push” and “pull” factors governing migration in and between 
nation states (Baldwin “Securitizing climate migration…” 121-122). Like Black and 
Baldwin, I place myself in the minimalist camp, yet nonetheless argue that climate 
migrants as constructs, as figures in climate narratives, carry forward major weight not 
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only in UN refugee policy circles, but also in climate discourse and security discourse 
more broadly.45  
 Climate change is a cognitively difficult issue to comprehend, as it works across 
various spatial scales— from the microbial and chemical to the global— and temporal 
dimensions— from past emissions and land use to thousands of years from the present, 
and perhaps one geological epoch to another. It entails a politicization of acts as banal as 
turning on a lightbulb, and “seems a happening whose trauma is to enact or entail the 
deconstruction of multiple frames of reference in multiple fields and modes of thought at 
the same time” (Clark 132). Its human causes are relatively simple (enhancing the 
greenhouse effect through emissions of greenhouse gases and the destruction of carbon 
sinks), but distributed across space and time as to be relatively imperceptible to the 
biological and ideological eye, resisting easy representation (Clark 131, Markowitz and 
Shariff 244). As with any wicked problem, climate change must be focalized through 
narrative. Indeed, the concept of climate is inherently a narrative that links past weather 
events to future weather expectations. In these narratives certain stories and images, the 
tropes that constitute them, circulate between people in and out of climate research and 
policymaking. Since climate change affects and implicates so many different parts of 
                                                      
45 To step back from the issue at hand, which is the discursive construction of the climate migrant and 
refugee, we may reconsider the philosophical distinction between displaced people pushed by political or 
religious persecution compared to climate change. If the spirit of the 1951 Convention is to give asylum to 
the persecuted, it would seem those displaced through “natural” disasters are not persecuted by anyone, per 
se. But, to follow Bruno Latour’s injunction that phenomena like climate change are geophysical processes 
that are nonetheless “too social and too narrated to be truly natural” then we may reconsider the agencies 
that may well persecute the climate IDP or international migrant (6). If someone’s farm was burned to the 
ground by a political regime, that person would have grounds to seek asylum. If the emissions of 
extractivist economies produce such effect, and those producing emissions know the effects of that 
economic activity, then may we not say this is a kind of calculated persecution, or at least callous 
indifference to the destructive byproducts of fossil-fuel driven economic growth and militarism? 
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society, from economics to politics to public health to conservation, there are a large 
number of different discussions about climate change being held across different 
discourse communities around the world. Hence, not all climate narratives are created 
equal nor are all climate narratives given voice in all communities; people construct 
narratives around climate change that fit with pre-existing ideologies and world-views 
(G. Marshall 18).  
 The varied ways in which the climate migrant is figured across different areas of 
climate discourse evince how the social construction of climate migrants functions as a 
site of both the “rearticulation of pre-existing racial ideology” and radical challenges to 
those pre-existing racist and white-nationalist ideologies in the 21st century (Omi and 
Winant 89). In one prominent racial project climate migrants are configured as 
dehumanized savages, in the words of Bettini “barbarians at the gate” of the Global 
North, a 21st century “form of racial Other” (Baldwin “Racialisation and the figure” 
1474). Yet it is insufficient to read the climate migrant as an exotic “barbarian at the gate” 
of Western security and civilization, or as an Other in need of white salvation. It is also 
important to read why the climate migrant, figured in these (and other) ways, has captured 
such prominent space within climate change discourse across different political 
perspectives.  
 Thus, the specific narrative tropes, the meaning-dense turns of phrase and 
imagery that course through climate discourse, reflect how understandings of climate 
change are shaped by different, durable discourses and suggest how these discourses are 
rearticulated through climate change. Take, for example, the polar bear, stranded on an 
ice flow adrift somewhere in the Arctic Sea. The polar bear remains a powerful icon of 
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the effects of climate change within the US climate movement. Whenever “global 
warming” and “climate change” have ticked upwards as phrases searched in Google 
search engines since 2004 (when Google Trends premiered its open source big data tool) 
so too has the public interest in polar bears risen. And yet the ubiquitous polar bear shares 
the stage with an ever-growing panoply of climate change signifiers, including the 
“human faces of climate change” like the climate refugee.46  What worldviews then does 
the climate migrant, someone forced to relocate within or outside of their country of 
origin, reflect? Why is the forced climate migrant so prevalent within and across climate 
discourses?  
 To answer this question, I’ll begin by touching on some major discussions 
defining the discursive terrain of climate security discourse, the land through which the 
climate migrant most frequently treads. The climate migrant is progeny of both traditions 
concerning environmental migrants, and migrants and refugees more generally. This 
                                                      
46 The polar bear itself is often portrayed as a climate migrant, and it is this story of displacement and 
endangerment that mainstream Global North environmental organizations often use to portray both the 
polar bear and climate migrants. And indeed, both Ursus marinus and Homo sapiens do migrate in 
response to changing environmental conditions, among other push and pull factors. But the stories of both 
bear and human not only overlap but also elide in many environmentalist representations of both through 
an adaptive repackaging of older “noble savage” and “ecological Indian” tropes long common in US 
environmentalist discourse.  This elision casts the migrating bears as particularly poignant and endearing 
charismatic megafauna, endowed with grace and nobility even as they appear emaciated and laid low by 
forces beyond their ken and control. Similarly, climate migrants, particularly indigenous peoples from 
around the globe, are depicted as exotic endangered species, likewise noble, likewise innocent of the 
political and economic sins causing climate change, but nonetheless imperiled by displacement. As the idea 
of the ecological Indian always implies, the admirable innocence, morality, wisdom and traditional 
ecological knowledge of these peoples is not only under threat but already foredoomed. The pathos and 
poignancy of both bear and (indigenous) climate refugee are bound up in this noble savage logic that they 
are not only endangered but will inevitably become extinct. Symbolically, both constitute a sacrifice; the 
offering up of humanity’s and progress’ collective but necessary sins, and a form of permission to mourn 
the loss of Others while continuing to pursue the path that eliminated the ecological Indian and polar bear 
alike.  
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figure is an admixture of criminality, terrorism, hunger, destitution, and suffering. What’s 
more, like the Malthusian predictions of the growth of migrants in the face of 
environmental decline, the figure of the climate migrant is always future-oriented, 
looking back and bearing down on the present because they do not yet exist. Andrew 
Baldwin describes the climate migrant as a “destabilizing figure bearing down on the 
present.” In considering the climate migrant as a discursive construct one must, to use 
Omi and Winant’s apt phrase, be “compelled to think racially, to use the racial categories 
and meaning systems into which we have been socialized” to conduct anti-racist analyses 
and interventions into racist discourses (159). This is to say, I view the social construction 
and representation of climate migrants and climate refugees is a racial project that offers 
“simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and 
an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines” (Omi and 
Winant 56).  In Chapter IV I argued that even progressive science fiction narratives 
deploy colorblind racist tropes when rendering the figure of the climate migrant, using 
the racial formation of climate migrant as a kind of corollary glue to stick rising 
temperatures to rising conflict.  In this chapter I extend this basic argument to, on the one 
hand, another speculative fiction text that explicitly foregrounds racial formations in a 
menacing portrayal of climate migrants as a decolonizing force unleashed upon an 
imperialist neoliberal world order. On the other hand, I examine other modes of climate 
security discourse that render the figure of the climate migrant as a destabilizing force, as 
a threat to be confronted or a humanitarian crisis to be ameliorated and managed.  Nikhil 
Singh argues that in the US context, “concrete institutionalizations of militarized-carceral 
regimes” define the “principal background condition to contemporary theorization of 
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race.” The figure of the climate migrant and increased international migration in the 21st 
century is central to anxieties of both more liberal and conservative movements vis a vis 
climate change, and this broad resonance across “discursive families” of climate change 
discussions indicate why a thorough study of this figure is important to understanding 
climate discourse, racial projects post 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, and the discursive 
links between war and environmental change.   
Climate Refugees: The Human Face of Climate Change, a 2010 Documentary 
directed by Michael Nash, is emblematic of the paradoxical representation of the climate 
migrant in contemporary security discourse. Numerous scholars have taken up how the 
climate migrant is portrayed as a menacing threat to economic and cultural stability, 
particularly in the Global North (see Bettini 2012, Baldwin 2012, 2013, 2014, Trombetta 
2012, Jakobeit and Methmann 2012). This is the first, and in the context of security 
discourse, dominant narrative by which the climate migrant is articulated and understood. 
Climate Refugees participates—heartily—in this tradition of “securitizing” climate 
migration by depicting climate migrants as a destabilizing force, or indeed “threat 
multipliers” whose racial, religious, and economic makeup fuel civil unrest or, 
hyperbolically, the extinction of the human species. Yet Climate Refugees also 
participates in the second major characterization of the climate migrant. This narrative 
theme emphasizes climate migrants as victims, or indeed, refugees fleeing the 
persecution of environmental problems they themselves did not cause (Miyoshi 295). 
Replacing or at least coexisting with the polar bear (itself a climate migrant) the climate 
migrant/refugee is depicted as the “human face” of climate change that provokes 
“solidarity from anxiety” of humanity’s common plight in the face of climate change 
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(Beck 49, quoted in Mossner 157) As the subtitle suggests, Climate Refugees frames 
individual migrants in this sympathetic, if paternalistic, light. For instance, the film 
concludes with an unnamed elder from Tuvalu asserting “whether you live in a big 
country or a small island, we are all the same human race—no difference. If they suffer 
we suffer too” (1:18). As he speaks the film cuts to a montage of slowed-down footage of 
smiling children of color from around the world interspersed with close-cropped images 
of tearful and concerned parents and elders. The man admonishes the viewer as a soft 
piano crescendos in a minor key, “love one another, that’s the principle… we are one, 
love one another” (1:19). The man makes a final plea to his implicitly white audience, 
“tell world leaders about us because we are human” (1:20).  
 Both narratives and tropes elide the figure of the documented/undocumented 
immigrant, terrorist, mob, victim, refugee, with the climate migrant construct today. 
These narratives derive from earlier narratives that attend the related constructs of the 
“environmental migrant” and “environmental refugee,” both terms are historically linked 
to discourses of US national, and later “homeland,” security.  And like climate migrants 
and refugees today, environmental migrants and environmental refugees have been linked 
to security discourses through colorblind racial projects that evade overt 
acknowledgement of their racial dimension.  The climate migrant may be a new figure in 
various cultural and policy discourses; however, ideas of the “environmental migrant” 
and “environmental refugee” date back at least to the mid-20th century. What’s more, the 
construct of the environmental migrant/refugee has always been contiguous with U.S. 
National security discourse. Patricia Saunders identifies 36 “key documents” that 
emphasize the role of migrants and refugees within the conceptual history of the 
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environmental refugee.  Saunders argues that each of her key documents draw from the 
intellectual lineage of Malthus and concerns of overpopulation and absolute scarcity of 
resources, particularly food and water (219).  While Malthus was concerned that 
population growth would outstrip agricultural production and lead to political and 
ecological turmoil, neither Malthus nor early Neo-Malthusian thinkers ever turned the 
phrase “environmental migrant/refugee.” However, by the 1960s and early 1970s Neo-
Malthusian environmentalists such Paul Erhlich and Garrett Hardin jumpstarted modern 
notions of migrants and refugees as threats to environmental sustainability as well as 
national security. In the Population Bomb, Ehrlich argues that both “underdeveloped 
countries… face an inevitable population-food crisis” and that overdeveloped countries 
are similarly overpopulated because they consume more amenities than their own nation 
states can supply (3, 9).  In his influential essays “Lifeboat Ethics: or, the Case Against 
Helping the Poor” and “Tragedy of the Commons,” biologist Garrett Hardin naturalizes 
social arrangements to argue in favor of anti-immigrant policies within the US and a 
reduction of food aid abroad. For Hardin, it’s the Global South’s own profligacy that has 
doomed their “lifeboat” nations to sink and that if any humans are to survive in the well 
provisioned life boats of the Global North, the US and its citizen should militantly 
prevent environmental refugees from seeking asylum in their countries. To allow them in, 
Hardin argues, is to risk swamping and sinking the lifeboat.  
 More than Erhlich or Hardin, however, Saunders credits Lester Brown not only 
with tying migration and security to environmental change, but with influencing the 
paradoxical construction of the environmental refugee as both an environmental threat 
and victim in various discourses since the 1970s (227, 229). Brown has a Masters of 
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Agricultural Economics from the University of Maryland and another Masters in Public 
Administration from Harvard University (“Biography of Lester Brown”). He is perhaps 
most famous for founding the Worldwatch Institute in 1974, an environmental think tank 
that gave Brown a platform to publish numerous policy position papers and op-eds 
engaged with the intersections of environment and security. Worldwatch Institute 
continues to publish research and white papers, including the popular “State of the 
World” sustainability reports, and remains one of the most recognizable environmental 
think tanks in the US. In 1977, Worldwatch published Brown’s Redefining National 
Security, which argues that the depletion of “biological systems, petroleum reserves, 
[and] mineral reserves” paired with a “preoccupation with national and military security” 
vis a vis the USSR contribute to nonmilitary threats to US security and geopolitical 
primacy (qtd. in Saunders 229-230).  
 In Redefining National Security, Brown predicts environmental refugees will be 
the product of war and political instability fomented by global environmental crises. As 
would become typical in depicting climate migrants, Redefining National Security 
identifies environmental migrants and refugees as symptoms of the environmental and 
social malfeasance of the Global North, but also symptoms of rapid population growth 
and agricultural failure in the Global South. Brown identifies illegal immigrants as threats 
to national security and a symptom of political leaders’ failure to understand the 
nonmilitary threats “from the rapidly changing relationship between humanities’ and the 
earth’s natural systems” (Brown 37). To render the threat that environmental refugees 
may pose to political stability and national security, Brown cites the high numbers of 
“illegal immigrants” already in the US and immigration in Western Europe.  
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Today, the United States is home to eight to twelve million illegal immigrants, at 
least six million of them believed to be Mexican. Each day thousands of 
additional Mexicans cross the U.S. Border, making a mockery of passports, visas, 
and immigration law… the number of aliens believed to be holding jobs in the 
United States in 1977 approximated six million— the number of Americans out of 
work and actively seeking a job” (Brown 35).  
 
Brown positions environmental refugees as the product of resource depletion, but also the 
proverbial whirlwind reaped by the Global North for its own ecological profligacy. 
Brown links the supposed threats of undocumented migration to civilizational threat, 
specifically and gratuitously citing Mexicans as prototypes of future environmental 
migrants. In addition to “making a mockery” of immigration law and taking jobs that 
American citizens could theoretically take, Brown claims Mexican migrants “often 
collect welfare payments, adding to the burden of financially troubled cities such as New 
York” (Brown 36). Thus, he coaxes Worldwatch Institute’s readers to view environmental 
refugees as a disrupting force of the nation’s wealth, culture, and collectively-shared 
resources. Just as the overpopulated countries of the Global South overburden their 
countries, Redefining National Security implies, so too will these immigrants tax the 
stability of commonly-held resources like welfare and affordable food. Endangering the 
stability and sustainability of the nation, the environmental migrant is quickly recast from 
the role of victim of resource overconsumption and mismanagement to that of an agent of 
overconsumption and disruption. By rendering future environmental refugees as 
analogous to anti-Mexican and anti-immigration discourses of the present, Brown 
chooses to infuse racism and nativism into the construct of the environmental migrant as 
well as discussions of national security and sustainability, a trend that continues today.  
 Lester Brown is one of the most frequent commenters in Climate Refugees. With 
a running time of an hour and twenty minutes, Brown’s face appears on the camera to 
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speak 14 times. He appears more frequently and at greater length after the film turns 
more directly towards security concerns within the US in the latter half of the film. In his 
opening statement within the film, Brown conceives climate migration as a problem 
stemming from overpopulation, asserting that in a world of 6.5 billion people “there are 
not many places to migrate to, and not many places that welcome migrants” (5:05-5:19). 
Brown’s claim is couched as a kind of common sense logic, but ignores the legacy and 
ongoing displacement of people by US imperialism and neocolonial industry and 
development organizations to depict a world filled with the bodies and needs of the 
global poor. There is no correlation between the political difficulty of transnational 
migration and population growth. Filmed thirty years after the publication of Redefining 
National Security, Brown deploys anti-Mexican and anti-immigrant rhetoric nearly 
verbatim to his earlier writing in outlining the challenges posed by climate migrants in 
the near future.  Closely following a memorable sequence in the film in which a 
computer-generated legion of pointed red arrows signifying flows of climate migrants 
arcs out of the Global South and penetrates the Global North, including the US and 
Canada, Brown rhetorically asks the audience to “consider the concerns we have in this 
country with a few million people crossing the border from Mexico” (1:03:10). As he 
speaks the film moves to night-vision green archival footage of ICE or Border Patrol 
agents apprehending a line of young male suspects, presumably in the U.S.-Mexico 
borderlands. The sound of a siren plays as the footage shifts again to an elevated eyestalk 
of a government camera slowly scanning the terrain before it. Brown’s voice claims “they 
[the Mexicans] will get lost… they will be trivial in comparison with the people 
migrating from Africa, from India and Bangladesh, Vietnam, and China” as more archival 
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footage shows men dressed all in black scale a border wall successfully while police try 
to apprehend them. The sequence ends with a still shot of a rusty fishing boat loaded with 
more young brown men in tee shirts, their hands held over their heads as they surrender 
to a white man pointing an assault rifle at the men on the boat (1:03:14-25). The camera 
angle in the still is pointed from behind the shoulder of the gunman, indicating a visual 
solidarity with his point of view; both lens and rifle trained on the unarmed men across 
the water. Compared to this scene, Redefining National Security’s racist nativism seems 
banal, even innocuous. Brown ends this specific appearance within the film by linking 
the wave of black and brown climate refugees with “refugees within our own country” 
caused by climate change, harkening back to earlier in the film when he noted that of the 
million people displaced by Hurricane Katrina, only 300,000 displaced residents returned 
to New Orleans. Thus, Brown and Nash imply that black and brown refugees menace the 
US from without and within.  
 Yet while environmental migrants and refugees have been constructed as 
menacing threats through essentially racist and nativist rhetoric, in the 1970s and 1980s 
these discourses coincided with widespread public awareness and humanitarian concern 
for migrants, particularly those fleeing Cold War proxy conflicts and famine. The use of 
hunger as a weapon in the Biafran War of 1966-70, the prolonged Sahel drought of the 
early 1970s, the surge of Vietnamese refugees and immigration following the Fall of 
Saigon in 1975, and perhaps most dramatically, the famine in Ethiopia in 1984 and 1985, 
all contributed to educating American consumers on the humanitarian difficulties facing 
refugees and migrants. Events like the Live Aid concerts in 1985 drew on cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism and common humanitarian values to raise relief funds for such crises. In 
  169 
these discourses, the migrant and refugee is not constructed as a threat, but as the victim 
of war, poverty, or environmental catastrophe and is instead an object of charity. This is 
not to say that these multicultural humanitarians did not also use racist or nativist 
rhetoric, or that such events existed outside the realm of security discourse. For instance, 
Jacob Hamblin credits the Sahel Drought, in particular, with raising U.S. military 
thinkers' awareness of humans inadvertently causing widespread earth system change. 
The prominence of the Ethiopian famine in US news media and popular culture was in 
part a means of highlighting the consequences of Ethiopia’s political leaders aligning 
with the USSR (Hamblin 218, 220). 
  Plewes and Stuart dub the closely cropped images of starving children (which 
became ubiquitous following the Biafran war in eastern Nigeria through the 1984-85 
Ethiopian famine) the “pornography of poverty,” or “images that exploit the poor for little 
more than voyeuristic ends and [in which] people are portrayed as helpless, passive 
objects” (Plewes and Stuart 15). Such images, conspicuously prominent in photographs 
of black Africans, strip away agency and infantilize populations. In his acerbic satire, 
“How to Write About Africa,” Binyavanga Wainaina instructs a presumably Western 
author to “treat Africa as it were one country. It is hot and dusty with rolling grasslands 
and huge herds of animals and tall, thin people who are starving” (2).   Such narratives 
accompanied by platitudinous wails of “we are the world” amount to acknowledgement 
of tragedy, but do little to protest or apprehend the forces contributing to these real 
tragedies while committing epistemic violence against the complex subjects of food-aid 
photography and journalistic accounts of refugees (Sontag 40).  Due to the academic 
critiques of those like Kate Manzo, Plewes and Stuart, as well as the infamous suicide of 
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Kevin Carter,47 images of starvation and abject poverty have been contested and to some 
degree addressed by the international aid community by the adoption of new industry 
standards and ethics guidelines. And yet these literally and figuratively close-cropped 
conceptions of refugees are still used in prominent charitable organizations’ campaigns, 
and nascent efforts to photograph or otherwise render “the human face of climate change” 
signify on this tradition of narrating individual human misery through photography in the 
wake of disasters. Photographs of climate refugees are a mixture of sublime disaster and 
individuated abjection. Former chair of the IPCC Pachauri tells Nash within Climate 
Refugees that “these are the human faces of climate change we should be aware of,” 
appealing to the moral force these faces claim on the viewer. Yet such claims are 
ubiquitous in the world of mass media spectacle and violence, and similar appeals in 
recent history have not altered the power relations that produce the “face” of a given 
tragedy.  
The climate migrant, figured as threat and victim, can hold this paradoxical 
subject position in security discourse through the logics of precaution, prevention, and 
preparedness, or in other words, the logics that underpin counterinsurgency theory 
(Anderson 2012, Bettini 2012, A. Baldwin “racialization…”). One won’t find explicit 
reference to “race” within counterinsurgency theory or US military doctrine. However, 
this mode of full spectrum biopolitical warfare relies on colorblind racial formations and 
enacts its own kind of racial projects. Robert Marzec calls the kinds of thinking that 
                                                      
47 Carter received the Pulitzer Prize in 1993 for his photograph of a starving girl collapsed in the dust at the 
feet of a plump vulture in Sudan (now South Sudan). First published in The New York Times, the photo 
prompted hundreds of letters and editorials (as well as frequent re-printings). Carter committed suicide 
three months later, haunted by his work photographing the famine in Sudan and the uproar his photograph 
caused. 
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underpin counterinsurgency’s embrace of environmental control “environmentality” in 
the US security state, a form of “environmentalism as police action” that “creates 
insecurity in the name of security” (7, 31). From its roots in European and American 
imperial policing, modern counterinsurgency continues to militarize police action, and 
criminalize unauthorized use of violence. Enemies are delegitimized as such, and 
depicted as illogical or irrational criminal elements and terrorists (Genova 183-184). In 
an age of permanent anti-terror and counterinsurgency small wars the “disenfranchised 
felon, enemy combatant, and illegal immigrant, each enact a violent and exclusive social 
relation through a discursive and institutional process of criminalization without the 
requirement of a racial prerequisite,” writes Nikhil Singh. And yet each figure is indelibly 
marked by racial othering, and they stand in as colorblind shibboleths that rearticulate 
racist ideology and continue to (re)distribute power, voting rights, citizenship, and 
economic and political power along racial lines domestically and vis a vis US foreign 
policy.  
Apocalyptic narratives featuring “waves” of climate migrants from the Global 
South eroding the social fabric of the Global North abound in popular culture and 
policymaking circles (Bettini, 63). That any figure associated with climate change is 
associated with apocalyptic narratives, given that apocalypse is the single most important 
master metaphor in American environmental imagination (L. Buell 285). Yet the way in 
which the climate migrant is articulated within such narratives is often to play “the 
barbarian at the gates,” and this frequent Orientalist threat signals the strong degree to 
which white affect motivates present anxieties around climate migrants (Baldwin 
“Whiteness and Futurity”).  The climate migrant’s dual nature of threat and victim is not 
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only a product of the orientalist othering of the migrant (via racial projects and other 
discursive formations), as Andrew Baldwin maintains, but also and relatedly a product of 
what Ben Anderson terms “anticipatory geographies” enacted through kinds of 
environmentalities to control emergent and insurgent threats. Within the larger militarized 
discourses of resource enclosure and “environmentalism as police action” the climate 
migrant constitutes a “destabilizing figure” that, by virtue of their terroristic insurgent 
potentialities or the seemingly inexorable dissolving power, the societal erosion, 
envisioned by the rising “human tide” of mass migration, threatens the white social order 
that has erected violent environmentalities to manage both the migrant and the white 
citizenry of the Global North.  
Junot Díaz’s “Monstro” and the Apocalyptic Insecurity of the Security State 
 Junot Díaz centers climate refugees and migrants in an apocalyptic climate justice 
short story called “Monstro.”  Díaz’s 2012 story, set in the Dominican Republic and Haiti 
sometime in the near future, reflects the shared logics of anticipatory action that 
undergird US security discourse in the 21st century by crafting a speculative short story 
that combines aspects of mysterious pandemic, climate change, migrant uprisings, and 
fierce militarization defending corporate geopolitical interests. Not only does “Monstro” 
reflect the logics of anticipatory military action as a means of managing emergent 
environmental threats, the story does so while also representing a means by which this 
anticipatory action constructs threats as racial projects. In doing so “Monstro” narrates 
how the climate migrant is articulated within a number of discourses that condition 
publics to accept the hegemony of militarized responses to these threats and militarization 
of social institutions. If militarized hegemony “gerrymanders the boundary of 
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perception,” Díaz’s short story is an example of artistic cultural production that 
“highlight(s) those places that are most unseen and unknown and at risk of climate 
disaster” through a sustained emphasis on migration and displacement (Sze 103). 
“Monstro” appeared in The New Yorker’s June 2012 special “Science Fiction Summer 
Issue,” and was originally intended to be an excerpt of a larger novel. In 2015 Díaz 
admitted that he was abandoning his Monstro project, nearly three years to the day 
“Monstro” appeared in the New Yorker.  
 Told by an unnamed Dominican-American narrator who is a journalism student at 
Brown, the story interweaves the narrator’s personal recounting of the bizarre outbreak of 
a new disease— colloquially called la Negrura (the Darkness)— with a tale of the 
narrator’s “chasing a girl” throughout a summer he spends in the Dominican Republic. 
The mysterious disease begins in Haiti, and after several unsettling and mysterious 
epidemiological developments, fuses the infected together into an army of “forty-foot-tall 
cannibal motherfuckers” who bring about the end of the world. By the end of the story 
the narrator’s admittedly shallow personal ambitions and the epoch-defining events of the 
outbreak are coming to a head, as he and his two friends hop into a car and drive towards 
the DR-Haiti border to witness a DR-backed military force meet waves of “invader” 
refugees “with maximum force.” Like Alfonso Cuarón’s 2006 film, Children of Men, the 
dystopian features of “Monstro” reside at the figurative edges of visibility within the text, 
flickering in and out of the story as the narrator almost pathologically directs his gaze in 
the wrong direction to see the enormity of what is happening around him. Sketched 
through these brief narrative glimpses, the end of the world is constructed through 
suggestion and interpretation of the descriptions of the quotidian world that the narrator 
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relates without intentionally singling out as relevant or important to understanding the 
mysterious outbreak that leads to the apocalypse. For the narrator and his companions the 
disappearing beaches, the “one hundred straight days over 105 F,” the climate-controlled 
New Colonial zone that the rich inhabit, the militarized borders and inhumane conditions 
of refugees in Haitian “relocation camps” aren’t spectacular within the story; they’re just 
part of the normal landscape that the narrator necessarily has to relate to tell his story 
about hanging out with his friends during a summer break from college. The narrator 
spends his summer in the Dominican Republic to “take in that ole-time climate change” 
because a “General Economic Collapse” has made getting a job in his home of New York 
nigh impossible. The General Economic Collapse, the narrator informs the readers, is 
caused by “droughts.” He delivers this information not to lament climate change, but 
simply account for why he chose to travel to DR instead of working closer to where he 
attends university.  
In “Monstro,” the apocalypse arises from what James Ferguson calls the “global 
shadows” of neoliberal capitalism and coloniality in an era of pronounced global 
warming. Paradoxically, even as narratives of globalization highlight the tighter 
connections between disparate peoples and places via an expanding global economy and 
lightning-quick communication technologies, more and more places are thrown out of 
global visibility and political imperatives. Narratives of global connection and contiguity, 
Ferguson notes, often employ naturalistic metaphors of “flow” and webs, but that 
metaphors of quicker “point to point connections” skip over points in between. 
Information, minerals, missiles, and especially capital can skip across the globe without 
passing through communities in between their point of departure and point of destination. 
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This is not a more connected world, but a more selectively and strategically connected 
world that, as Arundhati Roy puts it, “as if you shine a light very brightly in one place, 
[and] the darkness deepens around.” These darkened areas, dimmed by the contrast of the 
spotlights shining in the Global North, are the global shadows. In an interview 
accompanying the story in the New Yorker, Díaz explains his fascination with apocalyptic 
narratives in the context of Hispaniola’s unique history of colonialism and global 
capitalism.  
From the start of my immigrant days, I’ve been fascinated by end-of-the-world 
stories, by outbreak narratives, and always wanted to set a world-ender on 
Hispaniola. So many apocalypses have already taken place on that island, 
including the one that gave rise to the modern world, I figured: what’s one more? 
If any place could take it, it would be that poor island. What sparked this precise 
story was: A couple years ago I got to thinking that our world has so many blind 
spots, so many places and people it intentionally doesn’t want to see—if some 
menace began to coalesce in these spaces, our own unseeing would, in fact, blind 
us to the danger. It struck me that many of these very spaces were also the most 
neglected, mistreated, vulnerable areas of our world—areas on the global body 
where an opportunistic infection could and would take root—and from there the 
story began developing. (qtd. in Leyshon 2012).  
 
Díaz references the multiple “world ending” events that have defined Hispaniola and the 
Antilles more generally, beginning with the apocalyptic “contact” between the so-called 
Old and New World in 1492. Within ten years of Columbus inadvertently landing on the 
island well over 90% of indigenous Taíno (Awarak) peoples living on the island were 
killed by European diseases or enslavement. Following that particular world-ending 
genocide, the Europeans began importing enslaved Africans to replace the extirpated 
Taíno labor pool. Communities decimated and scrambled in West and Central Africa, all 
to bring uprooted men, women, and children across the ocean to labor in the cane fields 
(themselves replacing pre-contact socionatural ecosystems), constitutes the second world-
ending event Díaz alludes to. By referencing these genocides as the “[apocalypse] that 
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gave rise to the modern world,” a world built on slavery, sugar trade, and global 
capitalism, Díaz places Hispaniola as the ground zero for ancient apocalypse while 
looking to his future-oriented story as the proper site of modern apocalypse. The story 
itself signifies heavily on these world-ending and world-forming events, but also alludes 
to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, a devastating example of how neoliberal global 
capitalism places resource extraction enclaves alongside communities denied access to 
the benefits of extractivist economies. While Hispaniola has been the site of multiple 
apocalypses and the founding of the modern world, it remains in the “global shadows” at 
the periphery of both hemispheric and global geopolitics. Haiti is chronically the poorest 
country in the Western hemisphere, and was the first country to gain its independence 
through a slave revolt.  
 “Monstro” doesn’t directly explain or narrate the end of the world, but rather the 
narrator’s life prior to the unknown world-ending event. The narrator begins his tale from 
a post-apocalyptic vantage, well after the world-ending events in the story have already 
taken place. He tells his reader “these days everybody wants to know what you were 
doing when the world came to an end. Fools make up all sorts of vainglorious self-
serving plep— but me, I tell the truth. I was chasing a girl” (Díaz). The girl is named 
Mysty, an international law student at Universidad Iberoamericana. The narrator meets 
her early in the summer while hanging out with his friend from Brown, Alex V—. Alex 
V— is a super-rich, super attractive, super talented, and super hard working “priv kid 
who looked more like an Uruguayan fútbal player than a plántano.” Alex embodies a 
kind of European privileged ideal, down to the “short curly Praetorian hair and machine 
made cheekbones and about the greenest eyes you ever saw,” features that the dark-
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complexioned narrator envies and blames for why Mysty romantically overlooks the 
narrator in favor of rich, white men. From a plot perspective, the three friends don’t really 
do much of note; they janguiar (hang out) like rich people do today, taking drugs, going 
to clubs, and focusing on their hobbies. Alex is obsessed with becoming “either the 
Dominican Sebastião Salgado or the Dominican João Silva,” and thus he is constantly 
dragging his friends along with him to photograph impoverished residents outside the 
walled (indeed, domed) enclave of privilege he lives in. “[Alex] also got obsessed with 
photographing all the beaches of the D.R. before they disappeared.” It is Alex who raises 
the prospect of going to Haiti to take photographs of those infected by the mysterious La 
Negrura.  
 Beyond reading La Negrura through the always already racialized logics of 
anticipatory geographies in the age of counterinsurgency, I also read the disease as an 
“imperial ruin” within the larger imperial formations of climate change. Ann Laura Stoler 
defines imperial ruins as that which “people are ‘left with’: to what remains, to the 
aftershocks of empire, to the material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and 
things” (194). The accumulation of greenhouse gases and dramatic shifts in nonhuman 
species populations, material, and land use patterns since the rise of modern capitalism 
and imperialism in the Antilles all constitute imperial formations exerting force today on 
various peoples’ mitigation and adaptive capacities in the face of climate change. The gas 
molecules in the atmosphere are not only a material trace or legacy of empire, but rather 
continue to be “processes of becoming, not fixed things” within the ongoing imperial 
“processes of decimation, displacement, and reclamation” (Stoler 193). La Negrura, and 
by extension, the indeterminate future-oriented figure of the climate migrant, condense 
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the ruinous nature of climate change; they stand in for “both the claim about the state of a 
thing and a process affecting it” (Stoler 195). Like Jean Jacques Desallines, the fusion 
monsters of La Negrura, “repay the cannibals war for war, crime for crime, outrage for 
outrage” as they fuse together each of these outrages in a collective body. The human and 
more than human body of the “forty-foot-tall cannibal motherfuckers” avenges the 
wrongs committed against its constituent body.  
 Each age gets the monsters it deserves. Within the post 9/11 security state threats 
of terrorism, pandemics, and climate change all share similarities in their discursive 
construction, and the logics by which these threats are enacted as threats are also similar 
(Cooper, Anderson 779). Each threat constitutes “systemic interruptions” that, while low 
in probability, are catastrophic in effect (Anderson 779). Each is difficult to detect and 
isolate, as they emerge from within the population itself, and are not imposed on a 
population from without. This is why we can consider climate change, epidemics, and 
terrorism a kind of emergent/insurgent (from the Latin “insurgere:” to rise up) threat and 
why counterinsurgency theory is useful to describing prominent responses to each of 
these threats. Counterinsurgency theory holds that since potential threats incubate within 
populations, counterinsurgency forces must work to monitor and intervene preemptively 
into populations in order to defend against insurgent threats.   
 Who, or what, is monstrous in “Monstro,” and how do these monsters resonate 
with the shared logics of these threats to the modern, increasingly ecological, security 
state? In his New Yorker interview Díaz claims that he was drawn to the short story form 
because he could be suggestive without being explicit about the monstros in the story, 
whereas in the form of the novel he would need to narrate the monstros in greater detail 
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(Leyshon 2012). The power of Díaz’s depiction of monsters is precisely in the text’s 
ability to leave much to the imagination of the reader, using culturally resonant tropes to 
allow for interpretations to give flesh to the shadowy monster. The ultimate apocalyptic 
monster is never described; the closest the story narrator gets to revealing the monster is 
to claim that a few polaroid pictures show a “class II” eating a child. Reading “Monstro” 
as climate justice fiction, the monstrous pertains first and foremost to the human systems 
that give rise to climate and broader social injustice as well as the specific mechanisms 
that unleash mere anarchy upon the world. I’ve already detailed how placing the story on 
Hispaniola fingers the imperial formations of colonialism, slavery, and global capitalist 
extractivism at the heart of the monstrous story, but I have yet to comment on the 
speculative figuring of monstrous collapse the text provides in reflecting these systemic 
evils back on the narrative. The representation and effects of La Negrura within 
“Monstro” combine aspects of epidemic disease, insurgency-theory, and the ever-
racialized discourse of zombification. Following Jefferey Jerome Cohen’s method of 
“reading cultures through the monsters they engender,” and his understanding that 
monsters serve as gatekeepers of social boundaries, I interpret La Negrura as an 
expression of counterinsurgency-invested fear of emergence and insurgence out of a wild, 
perilous environment of neoliberal capitalism’s own creation.   
 La Negrura enters the narrative in the first lines of the story, initially posed as a 
racist joke. La Negrura (the Darkness) is not the disease’s official moniker, but rather the 
slang by which Dominicans refer to the disease they initially regard as “the joke of the 
year” (Díaz). The punchline of this joke is that the mysterious new outbreak “[made] a 
Haitian blacker” (Díaz). The narrator relates that “you couldn’t display a blemish or catch 
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some sun on the street without the jokes starting. Someone would point to a spot on your 
arm and say, Diablo, haitiano, que te pasó?” (Damn, Haitian, what happened to you?) 
(Díaz). The joke assumes that any Dominican who has dark skin must have this disease 
particular to black Haitians, and therefore the person must be Haitian. The seemingly 
innocuous joke highlights the racial assumptions linked to citizenship in both Antillean 
countries and signifies the pervasive antihaitianismo developed over 200 years of 
contentious, and sometimes genocidal history held between the countries. Modern day 
Haiti, at the western side of Hispaniola, was historically held by the French, but enslaved 
Africans and Native American peoples overthrew the French, and by 1809, also had 
liberated the present-day Dominican Republic from Spanish Control. Yet Spain 
repeatedly attempted to regain its former colony, and after decades of civil war and 
rebellion within the greater republic of Haiti left the country vulnerable to fragmentation. 
A cadre of Hispanic creole property owners, led by Juan Pablo Duarte, violently gained 
independence for the Dominican Republic in 1844, and briefly re-annexed the country to 
Spain. The mountainous borderlands of the DR and Haiti provided refuge to Dominican 
rebels who fought successfully to regain independence from the Spanish is 1865. The 
product of global mixing and routes, of economic, political, and cultural exchange, the 
populations of both countries are multiracial. However, elite in the DR identify 
themselves as more European and whiter than Haitians. Through various wars and 
struggles, this distinction has given the tensions between the countries on Hispaniola a 
distinct racial component, one that has erupted into open race war. For example, in 1937 
under the order of Dominican dictator Trujillo thousands of Haitians and dark-skinned 
Dominicans living in the borderlands of the D.R. and Haiti were rounded up and 
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butchered based on their skin color and their ability to pronounce “perejil,” the Spanish 
word for parsley. The jokes spawned by the disease “that could make a Haitian blacker,” 
calling Dominican citizens “haitiano” for their blackness, however phenotypically 
ephemeral, are only funny if the teller and hearer assume blackness is an inherent vice, or 
indeed, pathological in nature.  
 Even as La Negrura is immediately racialized, it is also associated from the start 
with displacement and climate change. The disease is traced to a small boy in a 
“relocation camp” near Port-au-Prince “in the hottest March in recorded history.” La 
Negrura causes the boy’s arm to swell to an enormous size of black, rugose “mold-
fungus-blast” (2). The new disease is unique, but not outside the ordinary ecology of 
Díaz’s near-future Antilles: 
Everybody blamed the heat. Blamed the Calientazo. Shit, a hundred straight days 
over 105 degrees F. In our region alone, the planet cooking like a chili and down 
to its last five trees— something berserk was bound to happen. All sorts of bizarre 
outbreaks already in play: diseases no one had names for, zoonotics by the pound. 
(Díaz 2).  
 
In Díaz’s speculative near-future story “everybody” has internalized the logic of climate 
change producing new diseases, a position that remains at the margins of climate 
discourse even as the IPCC consistently reports that diseases may spread farther and 
faster in a warming climate. New life forms emerge from the bare life the relocation 
camps, “zoonotics by the pound” rising up and out of precarious life suffering the effects 
of climate injustice. This particular “blast” begins “epidemically and then worked its way 
up and in,” slowly paralyzing the infected over the spread of a few months (Díaz). The 
infection indeed “makes a Haitian blacker,” as “black rotting rugs masses” fruit from the 
infected epidermis. To describe what this looks like, the narrator wryly notes that “coral 
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reefs might have been adios on the ocean floor, but they were alive and well on the arms 
and backs and heads of the infected” (Díaz). This particular wordplay further associates 
the “viktims” of La Negrura with climate change by comparing the symptoms of La 
Negrura to an early casualty of warmer, more acidic oceans. Despite the grotesque effects 
of the disease, the narrator explains that “this [disease] didn’t cause too much panic 
because it seemed to hit only the wicked of the sick, viktims who had nine kinds of ill 
already in them” (Díaz). In other words, La Negrura seems marginal to “everybody” 
because it affects only those who are already marginalized and materially suffering from 
political, economic, and social marginalization and thus excluded from “everybody.” La 
Negrura is a form of climate injustice that is layered onto ongoing social and 
environmental injustice wrought by ongoing imperial formations working prior to the 
extreme heat of a changed climate.  
 The position of the refugees perfectly exemplifies Giorgio Agamben’s concept of 
the homo sacer, they who live under the ban of sovereign power at the outskirts of 
political life. The homo sacer is not properly a subject of normal political life, but is 
reduced to “bare life” that is not targeted for death, but is dispensed with nonetheless in 
this peculiar state of exemption through “violence without precedent precisely in the most 
profane and banal ways” (Agamben 144).  For Agamben, the technology of “the camp” is 
a means of making homo sacri of masses of people, and is paradigmatic of the links 
between biopolitics and sovereign power in the 20th and 21st century. The technology of 
the camp and Haiti’s long history at both the center of world history and the periphery of 
world power helps explain the geographic pathology of Díaz’s mysterious disease. The 
reader does not know why the camp residents have been relocated to the camps. 
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Published two years after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti when dozens of refugee camps 
were (and are) still operating in Haiti and the D.R., “Monstro” implies the camps may 
contain “refugees” of both economic and environmental catastrophes. La Negrura 
emerges from the normalized state of exemption established by relocation camps where 
they are contained and managed as a potential threat to those outside the camp. As such, 
the force of La Negrura challenges the passivity with which Agamben’s rendering of 
“bare life” generally implies. While the disease seems to justify the exclusion of the homo 
sacri from the polis of Port-au-Prince and beyond, it also signals the inability of camps to 
truly banish homo sacri from the biotic and political webs they are a part of. As the 
narrator admonishes the reader, the diseases “respected no boundaries,” and boundaries 
of the camp seem only to foster the coalescing threat of La Negrura towards those outside 
of the camp. La Negrura asserts the agency of those human and nonhuman living in the 
sovereign ban of global biopolitical regimes.  
 The relocation camps at the outskirts of Port-Au-Prince signal one kind of enclave 
in “Monstro,” but they are juxtaposed within the narrative by the narrator’s experiences 
within the rebuilt Zona Colonial of Santo Domingo. Known colloquially as “the Dome,” 
the “meta-glass palace” of the Zona “overlooks the Drowned Sectors” of Old Santo 
Domingo.  If climate justice narratives conceptually need to construct the “vulnerable 
figure” (and indeed, who more vulnerable than the homo sacer host of an apocalyptic 
disease?) these narratives likewise need to juxtapose this vulnerable figure with the 
seemingly-impervious and powerful enclaves of the privileged, the center of extractivist 
power.48 In Colson Whitehead’s Zone One, heralded by Kate Marshall as a paradigmatic 
                                                      
48 Such enclaves, to my mind, function as reverse mushrooms. Many species of fungi spread outward from 
where their original spore germinates through hyphae, a network of tendrils that digest organic matter in 
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novel of the Anthropocene, for example, protagonist Mark Spitz is deployed out of the a 
“green zone” in the Wall Street area of a zombie-infested Manhattan that is ultimately 
overrun by the walking dead (524). In Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents, 
as I have detailed at length in the previous chapter, the technology of “walls” are 
deployed against migrants and brigands alike, to little ultimate effect. But to figure the 
technology and politics and viability of the fortress state (instantiated at whatever scale 
one desires), many cli-fi stories explicitly incorporate tropes of the BioDome. Matt 
Johnson’s Pym (2011) is an obvious example, as climate justice critique of the pastoral 
retreat is centered on the Karvels’ biodome. Without calling it a biodome, Paolo 
Bacigalupi’s Water Knife also constructs glass orbs of privilege amidst dangerous 
landscapes of climate risk. In “Monstro,” the narrators’ friend Alex lives in the “rebuilt 
Zona Colonial” of Santo Domingo, where “the bafflers held the scorch to a breezy 82 
degrees F. And one mosquito a night was considered an invasion.” Access to the Dome is 
exclusive to those with V.I.P. security passes costing “about a year’s tuition” (at Brown, 
no less!). As in other moments of the narrative, this description of the Zona Colonial 
harkens back to the earliest histories of European conquest in the Americas. Old Santo 
Domingo was built across the Rio Ozama after Nuevo Isabella, the first colonial city built 
in the Americas was destroyed by a hurricane. Santo Domingo, as of this writing, is the 
                                                      
soils or a decomposing log, or animal flesh (depending on the species). The hyphae are sustained by the 
organic matter, and thus once the substrate is stripped bare of the resources the fungus needs the hyphae in 
that area die back while other hyphae expand outward to find more resources. Most of a fungus is hyphae; 
mushrooms are only the sexually fruiting organs that develop for the purposes of reproduction. On the 
University of Oregon’s campus where I am writing this, for example, it is common to see large “fairy 
rings” of mushrooms. Supposedly the location of where fairies danced the night before, such rings are 
circles of mushrooms. The mushrooms indicate where the hyphae are alive and thriving, but the center of 
the circle indicates where the fungus began its live years’ prior. Resource-capture enclaves secure the 
nearest usable resources to it, then resources a bit further, then future, until the land around the fortified 
enclave is damaged and barren while the enclave lives on like a permanent yet sterile fungus. 
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oldest permanently-inhabited European settlement in the Americas, making the creation 
of a “rebuilt Zona Colonial” above the sea-rise susceptible city a renewal of a 500-year 
cycle of settlement, extraction, destruction (via socionatural disaster), and relocation.  
 More than a way of representing enclaves of resource capture and privilege in 
speculative future fiction, the specific technology of the biodome in these texts always 
refers back to the fantasy and folly of the Biosphere II projects. Biosphere II (as on 2007 
Biosphere 2, under the new leadership of Arizona University), is a sprawling “closed 
system” laboratory where scientists attempted to live free of outside inputs or exports for 
two year cycles. The two experiments (1991-1993 and 1994-1996) tested the idea of a 
vivarium, where earth-like environments can be sustained under the exacting and total 
technocratic control in the face of larger ecosystem collapse, and suggested this idea is 
fantasy. Even with unlimited money and the finest scientific apparatuses, the Earth’s life-
sustaining complexity is not so easily reproduced or substituted. Extrasolar fiction like 
Wall- E, Elysium, Interstellar, and the far-cleverer The Martian all point to the social and 
ecological downsides of this thinking while holding out hope that such technology may 
preserve a minority of privileged individuals long enough to escape ecosystem collapse. 
The folly of the Biosphere II and its fictional counterparts is the belief in closed systems 
of discrete parts over dynamic systems interacting, at times, in nonlinear ways at spatial 
and temporal scales beyond the perceptive horizons of the human.  
 Both varieties of enclaves deploy similar strategies of walled securitization and 
militarization to manage the population of Hispaniola. Both are a form of anticipatory 
geography, technologies of space used within biopolitical regimes to survey, monitor, 
protect, save, abandon, destroy, and sustain different segments of life within certain 
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social-spatial conditions (B. Anderson 781). In the Zona Colonial one needs an expensive 
“VIP pass” to move within the boundaries of the enclave, and the quarantine zone 
separates the potentially threatening bodies from the healthy polis.  
From Human Face to Human Tide in Climate Change Discussions: La Negrura  
 
 La Negrura “respects no boundaries,” and this perhaps more than any other aspect 
of this fictitious disease maps onto the fears that animate the threats of climate change, 
pandemics, terrorism, and insurgent threats more generally (Díaz). Climate change, 
pandemics, and terrorism all disrupt dominant social, economic, and political relations, 
and call into question the taken-for-granted boundaries that discipline populations to 
comply with the hegemonic power of the neoliberal state. While La Negrura emerges 
from a shadowed point of origin within the normalized state of exception (the metaphoric 
and literal camp), its danger to the social order is bound up in its possibility of spreading 
and fusing as well as its unpredictability and inscrutability. It is unpredictable because it 
evolves, and through the narration of “Monstro,” the pathology of the epidemic is 
revealed one mysterious and unsettling turn by turn. “The blast seemed to have a boner 
for fusion, respected no boundaries,” the narrator explains (Díaz). The narrator and 
Mysty are disgusted by the images of “naked trembling Haitian brothers sharing a single 
stained cot, knotted together by horrible model, their heads slurred into one” (Díaz).  The 
coral-like growths not only tunnel through the infected, but the arborescence sticks to 
other infected, “slurring” them into a ghastly whole. La Negrura signifies the fear of 
multiplicity within aggregates, obliterating the taken-for-granted integrity of individual 
bodies and social relations by fusing together the immiserated Haitian individuals. 
Infections always constitute a threat to the purity and integrity not only of society but also 
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of the autonomous self. This “fusion” is replicated and elaborated as the disease evolves 
and continues to confound the scientific attempts to diagnose its cause, effects, or cure. 
Notable for this study, the narrator avers that not even “the military enhancers could 
crack it.” He describes the disease as “a slow leprous spread” of “mold-fungus-blast” that 
“didn’t turn out to be a mold-fungus blast” but instead “something different… something 
new” (Díaz).  
In addition to the literal fusion, the infected patients strongly desire to be close to 
one another in the main quarantine zone of Champ de Mars, the largest relocation camp 
(Díaz 5). Individuals separated from each other or removed from the relocation camps 
react by getting violent and irrational, breaking their restraints and ignoring sedatives or 
physical discomfort by trying to return to the infected zone. Growing stalks of coral-like, 
fungus-like, mold-like bodies on their own bodies, and drawing together spatially and 
physically within the camps shows the dissolution of individual human bodies even as 
they are taken up, with nonhuman-like features, into a geographic and multi species black 
body. Once gathered in the quarantine zone the infected stop speaking, an event the 
narrator terms “the Silence” (Díaz). Their literal silence echoes their loss of agency and 
subaltern status as camp refugees. While the subaltern voices of the infected are silenced, 
the disease claims the proper location “suited to the task of assuring the care, control, and 
use of bare life” in the quarantine camps themselves (Agamben 140). Resisting violently 
the attempts to separate the infected from each other and the quarantine zone, those 
infected by La Negrura reclaim agency by asserting their determination to live in 
solidarity with one another. The infected are not separated from the general population 
through the mechanism of the quarantine, but instead withdraw themselves.  
  188 
 After “the Silence” La Negrura begins “the Chorus.”  Two or three times a day 
“the entire infected population simultaneously let out a bizarre shriek.” Despite blocking 
the literal fusion of the rugose fruiting bodies between human bodies, the infected are 
somehow in perfect synchronization with each other despite a lack of physical contact, 
emitting “eerie siren shit” in thirty second intervals all together. Opposite Spivak’s 
subaltern silence, figuratively performed by “the Silence” of in the quarantine zone, is 
this literary enactment of Enrique Dussel’s “originary interpellation.” For Dussel, the 
“radical origin” of ethical responsibility in Philosophy of Liberation—a moment within 
Latin American philosophy to rupture oppressive and colonial relationships— comes 
from hearing the cry of another:  
The oppressed, tortured, destroyed, in her suffering corporeality, simply cries out, 
clamoring for justice: I am hungry! Don't kill me! Have compassion for me! 
(Dussel 111).  
 
While Agamben defines bare life as that which is always outside the political, Dussel 
maintains bare life’s inclusion within the political because of its capacity to express 
suffering. Bare life indicts the polis to acknowledge and respond to its plight: 
The radical origin is not the affirmation of one's self (the soi-même), for that one 
must be able to first reflect, assume oneself as possessing value, that is, discover 
oneself as a person. We are before all of that. We are before the slave who was 
born slave and who therefore does not know he is a person. He simply cries out. 
The cry, as noise, as clamor, as exclamation, proto-word still not articulated, 
which is interpreted in its sense and meaning by those "who have ears to hear," 
indicates simply that someone suffers, and that from out of their suffering they 
emit a wail, a howl, a supplication. This is the originary ‘interpellation.’ (Dussel 
111).  
 
The “wail” of the silenced patients can be read as simultaneously a collective protest and 
interpellation from the global shadows of the quarantine camps as well as a more-than-
human indictment from the disease itself. “Those with ears to hear,” the narrator relates 
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again and again, fail to acknowledge or heed the warning signs each new mutation or 
progression of the outbreak brings.  
 All monsters “escape the epistemological nets of the erudite” and signal the limits 
of dominant ways of knowing and thus ways of controlling aspects of the world, La 
Negrura’s monstrousness is partially a product of the narrator and world powers’ ability 
to hear the summons of its lamentation (Cohen 12). This willful deafness is 
“[unfortunate] for just about everybody on the planet” as managers pay heed to “more 
immediate problems” like the patients’ family members attempting to burn the patients 
for being devils instead of digging deeper into the diagnoses and potential outcomes of 
the outbreak. Díaz’s narrator justifies why public attention and a global elite stopped 
paying attention to La Negrura early in its epidemic:  
When the experts determined that [La Negrura] wasn’t communicable in the 
standard ways, and that normal immune systems appeared to be at no kind of risk, 
the renminbi and the attention and savvy went elsewhere. Any since it was just 
poor Haitian types getting fucked up— no real margin in that (Díaz).  
 
As a monster, La Negrura operates outside of the “standard ways,” and thus challenges 
the efficacy of medicalized risk management. The infected “Haitian types,” excluded 
from the polis but still a population to be managed in relation to their impacts on the 
health and economy of the “normal immune systems” of non-Haitians, are in and of 
themselves unworthy of resource expenditure to diagnose or cure the disease. Without a 
strong incentive for gaining profit from describing the pathology of the disease, both 
“renminbi and the attention and savvy” are directed to other sources. The narrator notes 
the ubiquity of new outbreaks, and obliquely references one called “KRIMEA” that 
appears to be worse than La Negrura several times during his narration.  
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 And yet local Haitian doctors do make progress in learning of the disease, most 
notably, one epidemiologist named Noni DeGraff. While the medical examiners and 
military scientists cannot find the mode of transmission between patients via standard 
medicine, DeGraff finds that in addition to the more obvious and grotesque symptoms the 
patients’ temperatures rapidly fluctuate up and down out of line with normal human 
levels. Using a thermal image scanning gun, DeGraff finds that infected patients “flicker 
blue” in the eye of the scanner, while uninfected read as a solid red color. Pointing the 
gun onto the street, DeGraff and her colleagues are alarmed that one in eight of the 
supposedly uninfected pedestrians with no signs of La Negrura flickered blue. The self-
described challenge of COIN operations is to identify insurgent and potentially insurgent 
elements within a population and isolate these from the population (US Army & Marine 
Corps 41). The image of one in eight people, to the naked eye just “pedestrians,” 
harboring an apocalyptic infection, proffers a hallmark example of both the horror and 
fantasy of COIN operations. The flickering blue pedestrians exemplify insurgencies 
themselves, hidden threats simmering below detection until they will erupt in 
revolutionary violence (as indeed the infected end up doing shortly after DeGraff 
uncovers the extent of the epidemic). But the ability of DeGraff to use military 
technology; a “gun” pointed to survey the population in a panoramic sweep from afar, 
embodies the idealized vantage of the counterinsurgent, apprehending the true threats to a 
population in a glance so that they can be targeted with the appropriate levers of 
“aligned” military and civilian force.  
 As the “signs of the apocalypse” creep in and around the narrator and the world at 
large, the attention of experts, military scientists, and other global managers is directed 
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elsewhere. This inability or unwillingness to deal with a creeping disaster is a prominent 
feature of environmentalist critique. Rob Nixon refers to this as the failure to 
“apprehend— to arrest, or at least mitigate— often imperceptible threats,” echoes the 
preoccupation of counterinsurgency planners (14). How to align social movement energy, 
or indeed military energy, to tackle a target that is imperceptible or seemingly peripheral 
to more pressing, immediate challenges? “Monstro” gives no indication of what 
“KRIMEA” is, other than to imply it is another bizarre outbreak that appeared worse than 
La Negrura. The failure to recognize and preempt the emergence and spread of Negrura is 
a cardinal sin in the world of “catastrophe risk” preparation (Cooper 82). Biotic 
emergence, like terrorism, market crashes, and extreme weather events are all threats that, 
this discourse maintains, can be managed only through Nixon’s concept of apprehension 
and both probabilistic and possiblistic risk assessment (Cooper 83, Amoore 23).  It is only 
when the disease turns infected patients into “possessed” killers who lay waste to several 
battalions of troops and seize control of 22 camps that “High Command pull their head 
out of their ass.” By this time, the intermittent wails are replaced by a constant unified 
song sung by the infected.    
 Considering the mysterious lead up, the outbreak’s turn to military conflict turns 
into a relatively conventional zombie narrative; one again relegated to the figurative 
margins of the page but nonetheless legible because Díaz employs tropes that are 
immediately recognizable in this moment of zombie renaissance in popular culture.  The 
idea of existential threat born from infected individuals swarming, assaulting social 
orders via relentless waves of attack, is key to the modern Western zombie. Díaz’s 
“Possessed” and their more apocalyptic “forty-foot-tall cannibal” children are interesting, 
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but easily recognizable, specimens within the broader genealogy of zombies in popular 
culture. There are many forms of zombies in this milieu, including slow shambling 
undead and fast, bloodthirsty monsters. Díaz’s “Possessed” are the later, and their 
appearance in the story is heralded by the infected letting out a choral wail for twenty-
eight minutes straight, a nod to Danny Boyle’s fast-zombie cult classic, 28 Days Later 
(2003). Yet before the infected walking dead overtook American popular culture in the 
21st century, the zombie originated in the dawn of modernity through the slave trade in 
the Antilles, and in Haiti more particularly, through the syncretic religious practices of 
Vodou. Founded by a wide range of enslaved West Africans, Vodou traditions draw 
together many stories of different kinds of African monsters— fairy creatures, shape-
shifters, and disembodied souls of dead humans— into the category of “zombie” 
(Moremon and Rushton 2-3). These “zombie astral” have not translated to the Western 
imagination, but the Haitian variant of the reanimated corpse has indeed captured global 
fascination across numerous vernacular modernities of the West and the rest (see Eric 
Hamako 2011, Castillo et. al. 2016, Huber et al 2015 for these transglobal walking dead). 
The idea of “subjugated agency” undergirds these disparate conceptualizations of 
zombies, and the original Haitian zombies were reanimated by sorcerers to labor as slaves 
even after death in the sugar cane fields (Inglis 42-43). The infected in “Monstro” take on 
many recognizable tropes of the modern zombie apocalypse, including their grotesque, 
rotting physiognomy, their single-minded cannibalism, and their penchant to swarm and 
“flood” urban spaces and militarized fortifications, including national borders (Stratton 
267).   
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 Of course, a zombie apocalypse set in Haiti takes on other significations as well, 
namely those moments of political and genocidal massacre that have marked the history 
of Hispaniola. The zombie, as infected, ravenous, insatiable consumer of flesh, doesn’t 
really evidence a fear of the Global North with the Global South sending waves of 
insatiable poor and hungry to their shores to deplete welfare and natural resources. 
Instead, the zombie manifests the rapacious overconsumption by the Global North itself; 
a mindless, ghoulish hunger that is seldom visible to the full-bellied “omnivores” 
capturing resources and dumping the effects of pollution and ecosystem degradation onto 
the rural poor “ecosystem people” within the Global South (Guha and Martinez-Alier 12, 
16). The swarm of Haitians who “go Rwanda” and the literal fusion of the infected 
patients into giant cannibal monsters signifies off narratives of Marxian revolution by the 
proletariat and also the successful revolt of enslaved peoples that birthed the nation of 
Haiti itself. The ravenous swarm is, to borrow again James Ferguson’s productive 
unpacking of shadow metaphors in globalization discourse, a kind of doubling and 
representation of the Global North’s own hunger back on itself.  Just as Jean-Jacques 
Dessalines boldly declared “We have repaid these cannibals war for war, crime for crime, 
outrage for outrage” after killing thousands of French families at the end of the Haitian 
war of independence, Díaz’s cannibals are a simple balancing of imperialist and 
ecological accounts. The figure of the zombie is inured to reasonable appeal, as it is of a 
single motivation; while the US has traded enslaved Africans with Saint Domingue and 
militarily occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the early 20th century, and sent 
ill-prepared and poorly-coordinated disaster and humanitarian aid to Haiti along with 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund-sponsored structural adjustment programs 
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(SAPS) in the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s, the US mass media and K-12 education seldom 
mentions its close neighbors in the Caribbean. Indeed, most raised in the US have no idea 
of the Antilles’ history in any meaningful sense.  
 Like zombies, the US and Europe has lurched forward and ravaged the island of 
Hispaniola and its peoples, without hearing or caring. “Monstro” turns the tables, 
centering the most marginalized of marginalized subject positions as a force of 
apocalypse, or revelation (to readers) and revolution (to the narrator’s world). The giant 
black cannibals, the physical embodiment of the global shadows, assert an unstoppable 
agency swiftly revenging a larger and longer combination of cannibalism, war, and 
outrage. The assemblage of elements that these climate zombies embody; their zombie 
tropes, their blackness, their displaced status, their poverty, their Haitian origins, their 
unknowable infection and power and fusion with one another, are indeed terrifying to the 
imperial and colonial world order that has produced them. As it becomes clear that 
military intervention and technological surveillance have limited efficacy in dealing the 
outbreak, the revolutionary status of the nonmilitary threats Lester Brown describes are 
put into relief. But more, the failure of a bombing bombardment to quell the threat again 
resonates a tenet of modern counterinsurgency theory. One of the “paradoxes” identified 
in the US Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual is that “sometimes the 
more force used, the less effective it is” (38).  The High Command carpet bombs the 22 
camps held by the Possessed La Negrura patients, only to trigger an 8.3 magnitude 
preternatural earthquake that knocks out all electronic devices (including satellites!) in a 
600-square mile radius, and presumably catalyzes the transformation of the Possessed 
into “forty-foot-tall cannibal motherfuckers.” The application of force compounds the 
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insurgent threat, and compromises the safety of those who will undoubtedly be sent in to 
combat the redoubled revolutionary threat. It is as if Díaz’s monstrous Others, the present 
absence of bare life on the margins of the world, have appeared and declared “that their 
ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let 
the ruling classes tremble” (Marx and Engels 1848)! Once the outbreak goes “Rwanda,” 
the narrator’s colorful idiom for relating the outpouring of homicidal violence the disease 
instigates at the end of the story, and the electronic surveillance of Haiti goes dark, the 
tragedy of the disease and its apocalyptic effects become known through a series of 
“iconic Polaroids.” One such polaroid, showing a “Class 2 in the process of putting a 
slender broken girl in its mouth,” is captioned “Numbers 11:18. Who shall give us flesh to 
eat?” (Díaz).  
 In this chapter, and throughout this project more generally I have considered the 
discursive construction of the climate migrant as an individual. But more than the 
individual face of climate change, climate migrants and refugees are represented in 
aggregate. The threat of climate migration is often represented by portraying migrant 
collectives as “waves,” “rising tides,” or “floods.” For instance, the dust jacket of 
Gwynne Dyer’s Climate Wars reads: “Waves of climate refugees. Dozens of failed states. 
All-out war.” In the montage of images this advertisement primes a reader to see, the 
climate refugees are the only threat conveyed through figurative language. By eliding a 
multiplicity of individual refugees and migrants— themselves more prone to be victims 
of violent crime and structural violence of poverty than citizens of countries they migrant 
to— such depictions disintegrate the individual into a larger and more impersonal 
collective. While a migrant, or a migrant’s family, may arouse sympathy, so many 
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unchecked migrants constitutes a larger force of nature that menaces through its enormity 
and chaotic unpredictability. The image of the “rising tide” is a potent one in climate 
change discourse as seas literally rise to reclaim the land where 70% of humanity resides. 
While bulkheads and seawalls may forestall destruction, the erosive persistence of the 
tide is implacable and cannot be reasoned with. The imagery of “waves” and “tides” 
connote relentless natural force, and floods convey the sense of disaster as well as the 
biblical imagery of destruction and renewal. The flood is the perfect metaphor to punch 
out the fantastic domed enclaves represented in so many cli-fi stories. Climate refugees 
are not only a factor of these rising tides, but described as a human tide that performs 
similar functions as the rising seas themselves. In Climate Refugees this human tide is 
further abstracted through the substitution of swarming red arrows that erupt from across 
the Global South to first careen into and penetrate the Global North. The arrows come in 
their own waves in attack, provoking the war-like posture Baldwin asserts the Global 
North takes in the face of future climate migrants.  
 The tidal imagery associated with climate refugees highlights the conflicting 
metaphors by which we often refer to globalization’s benefits and burdens; crashing the 
metaphorized flows of people and ecological change against the walled-off enclaves that 
can reap resources and access capital between other enclaves without coming into contact 
with the contiguous communities and aftermath of their neocolonial influence. Waves of 
climate migrants penetrating national borders embody the precarity of this system from 
the perspective of those living inside the enclave, and further Otherize the migrants 
excluded from the enclave. In “Monstro,” the infection of La Negrura signifies off these 
associations, positing the infected as drops in a rising ocean that will disregard and 
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destabilize political and structural boundaries placed in the way of its flow. As La 
Negrura progresses the narrator relates that riots begin in the camps and that “Haitians in 
the DR were getting deported over a freckle” (Díaz). After the infected begin butchering 
the uninfected over 200,000 Haitians seek refuge over their eastern border in D.R. Thus, 
the crises that arises from refugees produces more refugees, who are in turn demonized 
by the DR government. The army is instructed to meet these “invaders” with “maximum 
force” to prevent the contamination of the DR. It is left between the lines if this strategy 
can or could work, other than that the “end of the world” is nigh (implying that these 
actions are not helpful).  
 As the “slow leprous spread” of La Negrura abruptly mutates or matures into the 
exponential violence of the camp massacres and later, the forty-foot-tall cannibals, La 
Negrura offers a number of category crises, resisting western medical and scientific study 
and even bombs and bullets. But in doing so, and in giving a Dusselian wail beyond 
language, and fusing human and nonhuman bodies together into the cultural body of the 
monster, La Negrura brings with it apocalyptic revelation as well as devastation. La 
Negrura is the creation of the world it emerges from, a form of politically mobilized bare 
life that contains the remnants of the life it once was (Ziarek):  
Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest margins of 
geography and discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the 
forbidden recesses of our mind, but they always return. And when they come 
back, they bring not just a fuller knowledge of our place in history and the history 
of knowing our place, but they bear self-knowledge, human knowledge— and a 
discourse all the more sacred as it arises from the Outside. These monsters ask us 
how we perceive the world, and how we have misrepresented what we have 
attempted to place. They ask us to reevaluate our cultural assumptions about race, 
gender, sexuality, our perception of difference, our tolerance toward its 
expression. They ask us why we have created them. (Cohen 20) 
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Arising from the normalized state of exception and exclusion of the Port-au-Prince 
relocation camps, La Negrura appears to emerge from the margins of the world, from the 
periphery of the periphery. It emerges from the black body of the refugee. Yet more than 
the sociogeographic location, the disease spreads precisely because it remains “hidden 
away at the edges of the world,” outside the scope of care and concern of capital and 
empire.  
 Díaz’s “Monstro” depicts climate refugees as both threat and victim, and given 
the apocalyptic events, it is tempting to read the story as emphasizing the threat side of 
the climate migrant paradox. But more than depicting climate refugees as a threat, 
“Monstro” highlights how the climate migrant brings together different concerns of 
anticipatory action.  In the different iterations of La Negrura, “Monstro” gives monstrous 
forms to Western fears of atmo-bio-terroristic emergence in the 21st century. La Negrura, 
and its apocalyptic outcome, signify the insurgent kinds of threats COIN-style adaptation 
recognizes and combats, and gives voice to the anxiety that imperial police actions, the 
fabric of environmentality in the U.S. security state, is not adequate to its own imperial 
mission. La Negrura is not a monster born to show the inadequacy of global management 
and power to confront threats from the Outside, but rather of the very processes that 
define both the hegemony of the global security state and neoliberal capitalism. The 
wailing zombie-like Possessed are so many chickens coming home to roost for hundreds 
of years of imperialism and exploitation, and their ability to thwart conventional military 
firepower and overwhelm border defenses shows a kind of exaltation in the destruction of 
unjust power.  
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This chapter has shown that the climate migrant plays a number of roles—often 
contradictory and paradoxical— within climate discourse of the Global North. In the 
genealogy of this figure, tropes tying climate migrants to national and international 
security discourse emerge from Malthusian and Neo-Malthusian concerns of 
overpopulation and white fears of miscegenation, and later the figure of the climate 
migrant’s visage increasingly took on a strong likeness to the starving Indian or 
Ethiopian, and later the Haitian or Syrian refugee. Climate Refugees offers an emblematic 
depiction of this dual identity, the migrant as both threat and victim of complex social and 
environmental forces. Yet I do not see this formulation of the climate migrant as a 
“destabilizing” subject. Instead of “destabilizing” dominant modes of thought or policy 
regimes, constructing the climate migrant/refugee as a racialized threat to national 
security— the “barbarian at the gate” side of this discourse— or the abject in desperate 
need of humanitarian assistance— the so-called “human face of climate change aspect of 
this discourse— works to bolster and rearticulate hegemonic modes of thinking. Eric 
Holthaus, a journalist who is also a prolific blogger, podcaster, and public commentator 
on issues related to climate change and culture pins the recent rise of the nationalist far 
right movements in the US and EU on anti-immigrant sentiment augmented by “climate 
induced migration” (2017). I find Holthaus’ argument, on the one hand, overly focused 
on climate change in explaining the rise of Trump, whom another journalist calls “the 
first demagogue of the Anthropocene” (Meyer). Nativist sentiment is nothing new to the 
US nor, as my discussion of Lester Brown’s Redefining National Security shows, 
mainstream environmentalist views of migrants and refugees. Still, Holthaus identifies a 
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chilling positive feedback loop in the nascent days of Trump’s presidency. In a tweeted 
imaged of a Post-It™ note sketch, Holthaus lays out the following causal loop:  
Escalating climate change—> increased climate induced migration—> anti-
immigrant rhetoric—> rise of Far Right—> Climate denial—> No climate 
action—> [Escalating climate change].  
At the center of the diagram is a crudely sketched Earth with a series of scribbles on top 
of it, showing it to be on fire with “run away climate change +6 degrees.” The causal 
map’s phenomena are not easily supported nor refuted. Migration is complex, and while 
climate change is and will continue to spur human movement, most will be within 
countries’ borders, not across them. Holthaus doesn’t support the idea that climate 
induced migration will necessarily lead to an increase of anti-immigrant rhetoric with any 
specific evidence. And yet, as my discussion of “Monstro” shows, climate change is 
culturally articulated within a broader spectrum of social anxieties. It is not that fear and 
hate of the climate migrant is supplanting other racist, anti-immigrant, Islamophobic 
rhetorics and actions within this or near-future nativist moments. Climate migration 
doesn’t “destabilize” these formations, but rather adds to the feeling of insecurity and 
instability in which militaristic, and even authoritarian modes of action and adaptation 
seem necessary, even inevitable. In a world of terrorism, biotic emergence, and climate 
change, the militarization of a broad variety of institutions— from the police, to the 
carceral system, to US Customs and Border Control— seems an obvious imperative of 
government, even if that imperative is being challenged by social movements such as 
#blacklivesmatter and climate justice organizations.  
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 On the other side of the climate migrant paradox, viewing climate induced 
migrants through the lens of humanitarian crisis similarly works to re-inscribe dominant 
modes of thinking and problem solving. Again, Climate Refugees is emblematic of this 
narrative. The film evokes the suffering of others as a means of forging a bipartisan 
consensus to better fund and more intentionally manage the movement of people. 
Although pitched in apocalyptic images of disaster and close-cropped appeals from 
unnamed victims of climate change, this pathos ultimately amounts to telling world 
leaders to do their jobs a bit better and bit more humanely. While redoubled funding for 
humanitarian assistance and climate adaptation, particularly in the Global South, is a 
critical tool to a just climate future, these actions are not in and of themselves evidence of 
destabilized institutions, but instead a strengthening and modernization of long-standing 
tools of power. While the concept of “climate migrants” has called the legal definition 
and intention of “refugee” into question, Climate Refugees advocates for a stronger, but 
similar approach to climate migrants as any other “wave” of displaced people. Climate 
refugees are a problem of governance and the need to find viable and feasible solutions 
within our current economic and political systems.  
La Negrura in “Monstro” is closer to truly destabilizing current social systems; 
the word “monster,” Cohen reminds us, comes from “Monstrum”— that which shows, 
and that which warns (Díaz). Apocalyptic monsters are doubly revelatory, as they overtly 
tear down world order as a means of showing a different world of potential. La Negrura is 
the bogeymen of anticipatory counterinsurgency logics embodied and emboldened by 
histories of colonialism and neocolonialism in a warming world. The monstrous disease 
emerges from the global shadows at the margins of the world to violently overthrow the 
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social conditions of the present. It is a monster created by and resistant to the logics and 
outrages of modernity, and its horror-story arises from other representations (such as 
zombie stories in general) that mobilize subtle fears and anxieties born within the public. 
If Dr. DeGraff could find a fear-imaging gun and point it on Díaz’s audience from within 
the pages of the New Yorker, she may well find bodies flickering a deep blue color, 
indicating patterns of fear infecting the 21st-Century American populace. The monster 
violates taken-for-granted modes of regarding the separation of bodies, space, and time 
within a globalized world economy that often occludes our shared yet uneven 
vulnerabilities and risks (Alaimo 20).  
Conclusion: New Stories of and by Climate Migrants 
 
But these imaginings of the future-oriented subject do not constitute all of the climate 
migrant’s stories. Increasingly in the Global North this identity is formulated as a part of 
a broader coalition of marginalized “frontline” communities bearing the brunt of climate 
change but also positioning themselves “at the forefront” of political and adaptive 
change. In the 2014 People’s Climate March49, easily the largest single mass 
demonstration focused on climate change in history, the vanguard of the largest march in 
                                                      
49 Composed of over 2,600 marches across 162 countries, The People’s Climate March of September 
23rd,2014 was easily the largest protest march in the history of the climate justice movement and climate 
change environmentalism writ large. At the center of the events was the march in New York, where 
somewhere between 125,000-400,000 people marched to urge on world leaders attending the United 
Nations “Climate Summit 2014: Catalyzing Action.” The Summit, billed as a space to consolidate the 
groundwork for a meaningful and ambitious climate plan in the UNFCCC 23rd Conference of Parties 
negotiations in Paris in 2015, hosted many high-profile leaders such as US President Obama, and resulted 
in renewed funding and support by UN agencies for climate-related actions in areas as disparate as food 
security and climate-change related insurance markets (UN Summit site). The marches were organized by 
the Peoples’ Climate Movement, a consortium of civil society organizations including national and 
international environmental organizations (e.g. Power Shift Network, 350.org), and environmental justice 
organizations (Indigenous Environmental Network and Climate Justice Alliance), unions (like the SEIU), 
and racial and social justice organizations (such as the NAACP, Grassroots Global Justice, Hip Hop 
Caucus). The large and diverse steering committee organized more than 1,500 additional organizations 
which took part in the New York City march. 
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New York City led the way carrying two massive banners. One banner read “at the 
Frontlines of Climate Change” and the other, “at the Forefront of Change.” They were 
carried by indigenous organizers and marchers from around the globe, flanked by those 
displaced by Superstorm Sandy in New York City and northern New Jersey, as well as 
those living in the crosshairs of fossil fuel extraction (Peoples Climate March Press 
Release). This group highlighted the fact that while climate change affects all humans, it 
also entails disproportionate risk and harm for those facing other forms of social 
oppression and marginalization. Although climate change is often figured as a problem 
comprised of future effects, this particular “frontline” showed that people are already 
experiencing the brunt of climate change’s physical and social impacts. In the press 
releases and social media of the March itself these marchers were heralded as 
“indigenous and frontline communities,” placing the issue of climate and social justice 
both literally and figuratively front and center of the movement.  
 The term “frontline community” evokes several militaristic resonances.  The 
phrase “frontline communities” refers to both a geographic location as well as specific 
bodies engaged in war. The frontline is the first group of infantry to enter battle, and thus 
are simultaneously those most likely to be killed or wounded as well as those who 
necessarily advance the position of their army forward in an offensive maneuver. As 
opposed to the rearguard, the frontline is where not only the danger of war lies heaviest, 
but also constitutes the point of advancement for combatants in one of Clauswitz’s duel-
like war. The frontline is also a location; it is the neutral plane over which a battle is 
waged, the precise point of friction between opposing sides. The idea of the frontline is, 
in the context of the global ecological security state, an anachronism. Clausewitz wrote of 
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what was for him “modern war,” a description that aptly described the tactics of 
European warfare from the Napoleonic Wars up to World War I:  
What do we do now usually in a great battle? We place ourselves quietly in great 
masses arranged contiguous to and behind one another. We deploy relatively only 
a small portion of the whole, and let it wring itself out in a fire-combat which lasts 
for several hours, only interrupted now and again, and removed hither and thither 
by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks. 
When this line has gradually exhausted part of its warlike fire in this manner, and 
there remains nothing more than the cinders, it is withdrawn and replaced by 
another. (Clausewitz 4.2) 
 
This is hardly the character of modern small wars battles, and even more so is this 
description estranged from the kinds of emergent threats that COIN and anticipatory 
security state actions militate again. Yet the People’s Climate March, like other mass 
demonstrations, appropriates the outdated military technology of the phalanx and 
battalion to engage in the art of politics. Like Clausewitz’s “great masses,” this specific 
“vocabulary of protest” concentrates strength of force through the solidarity of numbers. 
Direct action is always more than material movement, but also always “struggle over 
meaning” with both “utilitarian and expressive dimension[s]” (Guha and Martinez-Alier 
13). They constitute a metaphoric army led by those already displaced by climate change 
and those facing multiple forms of social oppression. This wave is figured as a 
seachange, pushing the world to adapt to its reality.  
 In the top-level negotiations of the UNFCCC, the AOSIS countries have 
repeatedly rallied around forced climate migration as a bargaining position. In the lead up 
to COP 15, for example, the parliament of the Maldives donned wetsuits and SCUBA 
gear to hold an official meeting under the rising seas threatening their nation. While these 
efforts across the Global South to lobby the Global North in formal climate negotiations 
are an important and high-profile way that climate migration has been taken up as a form 
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of political strength, this appropriation of the climate migrant identity is always a bit of 
political theatre in these contexts; the delegates flown to COP15, for example, work as a 
part of formal political channels, and themselves enjoy forms of unforced mobility that 
run contra to narratives of forced climate migration.50 Increasingly, however, migrants are 
being identified and identifying themselves as a broader patchwork climate justice 
movement. The movement for climate justice is really a movement of movements, a 
coalition and coalescing of different social movements for justice recognizing the 
importance of climate change to thwarting or realizing a more just and peaceful world. To 
find the true “frontlines” of the fight for climate justice, look not to the UN negotiations 
and monitoring of the nonbonding Paris Accord. Instead, look to the “outpost[s] of a 
territory some have taken to calling ‘Blockadia’” (Klein This Changes Everything 254). 
Klein describes Blockadia as “a roving transnational conflict zone… wherever extractive 
projects are attempting to dig and drill” (254). The projects are being met, Klein argues, 
by more diverse coalitions of people saying “No!” to extractivist projects. The same 
grassroots organizations fighting in Blockadia stood alongside displaced people in the 
frontline of the People’s Climate March. 
The narrator of “Monstro” says that “they call those of us who made it through 
[the apocalypse] ‘time witnesses’” (Díaz). What does it mean to be a time witness? Does 
the term simply mean the narrator was present for a significant historical event as defined 
                                                      
50 I feel I am being overly harsh on COP delegates, particularly from African and small island nations, in 
order to draw distinction between these high-profile expressive gestures around climate migration. Writing 
from the United States it’s easy to imagine delegates negotiating towards treaties and accords across the 
world as a coterie of privileged elites, attending the UNFCCC COPs is poorly supported by many of the 
world’s poorest countries. When I was participating in COP16 in a civil society delegate (a distinction COP 
makes), I met several official delegates from East Africa and Oceanic Countries that were all sharing a 
cramped hotel room far away from the designated strip of suites to afford the trip to Mexico. Many 
delegates are mid-level government scientists or health officials. 
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by some people in the future? Being a time witness might be and embodied state, 
especially given the prominence of bodies within “Monstro” more generally. The climate 
migrant, as an identity, and as a body, is also a “time witness,” a kind of indexical figure 
in the cultural stratigraphy that coincides with the start of the Anthropocene. The 
Anthropocene working group has recommended that the mid-20th century demarcate the 
start of the Anthropocene, as the detonation of atomic bombs (two in war, and thousands 
more in tests and military bravado), proliferation of plastics and domestic meat 
consumption, and clouds of soot have indelibly changed the earth. Beyond these physical 
markers are the ideas, world views, and subjectivities that have entered the world since 
the start of the Anthropocene. The fears La Negrura embodies are fears of a body’s 
integrity within a rapidly changing and radically connected world, even though those 
connections are often occluded, distanced, and uneven; a far cry from the “web of nature” 
tropes that marked environmental writings of the 19th and 20th century (L. Buell 284). 
The individual body’s security is linked discursively with the larger biopolitical project of 
the state, and time witness is yet another biopolitical body demarcated by the exercise of 
sovereign power. And yet as these political movements show, even the discursive 
construct of the climate migrant and refugee are not entirely homo sacri, banished to the 
outer limits of political life:  
 
As we have seen, bare life cannot be regarded in a complete separation from all 
cultural/political characteristics. If bare life emerges as the remnant of a destroyed 
human form of life, then, according to Agamben’s own emphasis on its inclusive 
exclusion in the political, its formulation has to refer, in a negative way, to the 
racial/sexual/ethnic/class differences that used to characterize its form of life. In 
other words, bare life has to be defined as the remnant of a specific form of life 
that it not yet, or no longer, is. (Ziarek).  
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 At the frontline of mass demonstrations, in art collectives, and in numerous 
individual non-profit organizations, so-called climate refugees are asserting political 
agency through their identity as “frontline communities” that have already had their “old” 
lives “destroyed” by climate change, global inequality, and rising militarism (Parenti 11). 
Climate change, and the concept of climate migrants, is changing the ways lives are 
viewed and valued by US publics. Even as migrants are demonized and made monstrous 
by opportunistic politicians tapping into white nationalist sentiments, climate justice 
organizations, and artists are turning to the climate migrant as informant and actor in and 
on the Anthropocene.    
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